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 .דָחֶא וֹמְשׁוּ דָחֶא הוהי ֶהיְִהי אוּהַה םוֹיַּבּ 
—Hebrew Bible, Zech 14:9 
Indeed, if I may be allowed the anachronism, the Hindus 
were Spinozaites more than 2,000 years before the 
existence of Spinoza; and Darwinians many centuries 
before Darwin; and Evolutionists many centuries before 
the doctrine of Evolution had been accepted by the 
Scientists of our time, and before any word like Evolution 
existed in any language of the world. (Brahmanism and 
Hinduism, page xii.) 
—Sir Monier Monier-William (1819–1899 C.E.) 
For my father. 
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Preface 
For where there is a duality, as it were, there one sees 
another; there one smells another; there one tastes 
another; there one speaks to another; there one hears 
another; there one thinks of another; there one touches 
another; there one understands another. But where 
everything has become just one’s own self, then whereby 
and whom would one see? then whereby and whom 
would one smell? then whereby and whom would one 
taste? then whereby and to whom would one speak? then 
whereby and whom would one hear? then whereby and of 
whom would one think? then whereby and whom would 
one touch? then whereby and whom would one 
understand? whereby would one understand him by 
means of whom one understands this All? [¶] . . . [¶] Lo, 
whereby would one understand the understander? 
—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.15. 
I began writing this book as Part Six of my book Torah and 
Nondualism, and early drafts addressed the rich history of 
nondualist thought in post-scriptural Jewish literature. But as my 
research proceeded and broadened, I became intrigued by the 
parallels I saw between the nondual ideas of Baruch Spinoza 
(1632–1677 c.e.) and those of Kashmiri Shaivism, a philosophy 
that emerged in 9th century Kashmir and later spread all over 
India, influencing mainstream Hindu thought. Therefore, I put 
aside for another day, if not another scholar, the task of 
documenting Judaism’s enduring romance with nondual truth, and 
I set out to explicate Spinoza in light of South Asian philosophy of 
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mind. As the saying goes, “this, too, is for the best,”  for my 1
exploration of Vedānta, Kashmiri Shaivism, and Spinoza has 
proved fruitful beyond expectation. 
The primary subject of this book is the question of 
consciousness, what Professor David Chalmers called the “hard 
problem,”  but one cannot explain consciousness without also 2
saying something about ontology, epistemology, determinism, 
ethics, and death. The discussion may seem dry to those who are 
not accustomed to philosophical discourse. I have not written a 
devotional book; rather, I have written an analytical one that 
demands a certain amount of effort from its reader, although the 
reader can also take some solace in knowing that I am not a 
professional philosopher and that the book would likely have been 
even more impenetrable if I were. 
I am not a professional philosopher, but I am a person for 
whom subject-object duality has ceased to feel real, replaced by a 
nondual state that is much more satisfying and true. And although 
this book is somewhat demanding of its reader, it also offers the 
possibility of great reward. The reader who follows the book’s 
reasoning to the end has the opportunity to gain an entirely new 
conception of self, one that “removes the veil” that separates 
knower from known. 
And when the illusion of the subject-object divide dissolves, 
the mind-body problem dissolves with it, and philosophical 
 Hebrew: Gam zu l’tovah. The phrase is most often associated with 1
Nachum ish Gam Zu, a saintly practitioner of nondualism who is 
described in the Babylonian Talmud. “Whatever would happen to him, 
he would say, ‘This, too, is for the best.’ ” He did so even in 
extraordinarily trying circumstances. See BT Taanit 21a.
 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. xii–xiii.2
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puzzles like Mary and her black-and-white room  are easily 3
resolved. The key point is that all consciousness is consciousness 
of one’s own self. One cannot be conscious of a thing—anything—
without being that thing. The reason there appears to be an outside 
world, when in truth one is only consciousness of one’s own self, is 
the same reason that the reflection of a city on the flat surface of a 
mirror appears to be a distant city. It is a trick of perception that 
makes one’s consciousness-of-self appear to be the knowing of an 
external world. But even more important, one’s consciousness-of-
self is not different from one’s being self. Consciousness and being 
are the same thing. Put another way, there is no such thing as 
matter that has consciousness; rather, matter is consciousness. 
That assertion may sound like idealism. The philosophy 
presented here is type of idealism, but it is a diffuse idealism. One 
errs if one imagines that there is a material substance that contains 
consciousness or that supports consciousness, but one also errs if 
one imagines that the objects of the physical world have no 
intrinsic being independent of one’s consciousness of them. Even 
when one’s consciousness of a particular object ceases, the object 
remains conscious of itself, and therefore it continues to exist. Its 
own consciousness, not that of the outside observer, is the 
foundation of its being. 
 Mary and her black-and-white room is a thought experiment that gets to 3
the heart of the mind-body problem. See Jackson, “Epiphenomenal 
Qualia,” pp. 128–130. It is discussed in the present work at pages ___ to 
___, post.
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This book will appeal to philosophy of mind scholars, and it 
will thrill students of South Asian nondualism. But it is worth 
reading just for the anecdote about Einstein at Princeton and what 
that anecdote tells us about human agency. 
J.H.C. 
May 30, 2020 
Berkeley, California 
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Introduction: Cartesian Dualism and Its Alternatives 
[I]t would be easier for me to concede matter and 
extension to the mind [(i.e., to concede that the mind is a 
material thing having spatial form)] than it would be for 
me to concede the capacity to move a body and be moved 
by one to an immaterial thing. 
—Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (letter to Descartes) 
We tend to divide the world into opposites, and often this 
dualism takes on a moral valence. We speak of truth and falsity, 
good and evil, God and devil, but we fail to appreciate that this 
moral dualism has its source in a deeper rift that lies at the core of 
our being. I am referring to the subject-object divide, also known 
as the mind-body problem. The latter problem is brought to the 
fore by Princess Elisabeth’s challenge to René Descartes, quoted 
above. How, she asked, could “an immaterial thing” have “the 
capacity to move a [material] body and be moved by one”? In 
other words, what constitutes the point of intersection between 
one’s mind (consciousness) and one’s brain (matter)? How does a 
physical process in the brain give rise to a conscious thought in the 
mind, and how does a conscious thought in the mind initiate a 
physical process in the brain? 
Moral dualism is concerned with the problem of evil, and 
moral dualists often suppose evil to be the creation of an anti-God
—a super-cosmic force that competes with God. Thus, moral 
dualism evolves into theological dualism. Ontological dualism, by 
contrast, is concerned with Princess Elisabeth’s challenge to 
Descartes. It focuses on the mind-body problem, the fundamental 
rift between self and other, between consciousness and matter. We 
shall see, however, that moral and theological dualism have their 
source in ontological dualism. So, let us delve deeply into the 
1
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mind-body problem, and from what we learn about the mystery of 
consciousness, let us see if we discover something about God and 
the devil. 
René Descartes (1596–1650 C.E.) asserted that each of us is an 
immaterial soul operating the body from a command center located 
in the pineal gland of the brain. Data from the sensory nerves flow 
through the body’s neural network to the brain and, after some 
suitable processing, these data arrive in the pineal gland, and there 
the soul awaits, ready to observe, interpret, and respond with 
appropriate command decisions: “Stop at the curb. Look both 
ways. Now proceed. . . .” And as the soul issues its diverse 
directives, the body responds appropriately. A message is 
dispatched, again through the neural network, to the relevant 
muscle group, which reacts as necessary to actualize the soul’s 
intention. Or, so Descartes imagined, and people who have not 
thought deeply about the mind-body problem often embrace some 
variant of his mind-body dualism, because it seems to align so 
closely with everyday human experience. 
And seeming to confirm this Cartesian model of the human 
soul, there is the near-death experience. The immaterial soul slips 
temporarily from its sheath of flesh, and experiences its 
independence and immortality. There, below lies the body, 
sprawled across the sidewalk, paramedics crouching at its side, 
administering aid, and above that frenetic scene, the soul is gazing 
down with calm detachment. And then the soul makes a conscious 
decision to reenter the body. The heart muscle resumes its 
autonomic contractions. The paramedics smile and cheer. 
As noted, most people are more or less comfortable with the 
Cartesian notion that the physical body contains an immaterial 
bubble-like soul, and they imagine that at the moment of bodily 
death, the soul will slip away unscathed, and it will then 
reincarnate in some suitable new body. Or, perhaps, it will “sleep 
in the dust” until the resurrection of its body in messianic times. 
Or, perhaps, it will journey to the world of the ancestors, bundled 
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up in the “bundle of life.” Or, perhaps, there is a world of 
disembodied souls, high in the starry heavens, a world where the 
soul will be rewarded for its constancy, piety, and faith. 
René Descartes’s answer to the mind-body problem—which 
imagines immaterial souls piloting material bodies—is known as 
“Cartesian dualism,” and Cartesian dualism has serious flaws. Its 
first and most fundamental flaw is that, according to physical 
science, the physical world is a causally complete and closed 
system. Every event in the physical world is fully and sufficiently 
explained by immutable laws. Physical events need no soul to 
initiate them, for they have physical causes that do so, and in the 
absence of such physical causes, the soul is helpless. Even 
Descartes struggled to explain how an immaterial soul could 
initiate a biological process in the pineal gland that would, in due 
course, activate nerves and muscles, causing the movement of, say, 
an arm or a hand. How does the soul communicate its message to 
the biological system? When Princess Elisabeth asked that 
question, Descartes could offer no persuasive response. 
Specifically, Princess Elisabeth asked “how the mind of a 
human being, being only a thinking substance,[ ] can determine 4
[(i.e., move or activate)] the bodily spirits in producing bodily 
actions.”  The best Descartes could come up with was to invoke 5
axiomatic truth. He might just as well have replied, “It is so, 
because it is so.” But Princess Elisabeth’s doubt remained, and 
therefore she asked again “how the soul (nonextended and 
immaterial) is able to move the body.” And this time, she added the 
statement quoted at the beginning of this section: “[I]t would be 
easier for me to concede matter and extension to the mind than it 
 Here, the term “thinking substance” does not imply a physical 4
substance that thinks. Princess Elisabeth used the term “substance” in the 
Cartesian sense, which contrasts “thinking substance” (i.e., mind, 
consciousness) with “extended substance” (i.e., physical things, matter).
 Garber, Descartes Embodied, p. 172, italics added.5
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would be for me to concede the capacity to move a body and be 
moved by one to an immaterial thing.”  6
For Princess Elisabeth, it would make more sense that the soul 
was a material thing—a component of the physical body, in other 
words—than to imagine that it was an immaterial thing that could 
somehow interact with physical things. Princess Elisabeth had 
identified the most fundamental problem with Cartesian dualism: 
What provides the causal link by which an immaterial soul can 
direct movements of the physical body? And, how can we say that 
the soul’s directives—and not the laws of physics—are what 
actually determine the physical body’s actions? 
But the Cartesian dualist has to answer another question, too. 
In a living person, each component of the “soul” has some physical 
system on which it depends. The soul’s power to see depends on 
the existence of physical eyes and a visual cortex; its power to hear 
depends on functioning eardrums and an auditory cortex; and its 
power to recall past events depends on memory cells. If a beautiful 
golden sunset is seen and the soothing roar of the ocean is heard, 
there are eyes seeing the former and ears hearing the latter. If a 
memory of a summer evening is recalled to thought, there are 
memory cells from which it is drawn. If there are thoughts passing 
through the mind, there is some measurable electrical activity in 
the brain. As our scientific knowledge grows, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that there is a physical substratum somewhere in 
the body for every intellectual and perceptive capacity of the 
“soul,” and if we damage that substratum, the soul loses the 
corresponding mental capacity. 
Are we then to assume that this close dependence of the soul 
on the physical body is merely temporary and that when the body 
dies, the soul somehow regains the powers of thought and 
perception that it lost, bit by bit, as the body deteriorated prior to 
death? Are we to assume, despite the lockstep correlation between 
 Garber, Descartes Embodied, p. 172, italics added.6
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the mental capacity of the soul and the proper functioning of the 
physical body, that the soul somehow exists independent of the 
body and that when the body dies, the soul floats away to a future 
existence, all its mental capacities miraculously intact? Isn’t it 
much more likely that the soul does not exist independent of the 
body; rather, it is a consciousness that is somehow linked to and 
dependent upon the physical systems that give rise to its conscious 
experiences? It is easy to see why Cartesian dualism is attractive, 
but it is hard to harmonize Descartes’s theory with the laws of 
physics or with the obvious dependence of specific conscious 
experiences on corresponding physical systems. 
After considering the weaknesses of Cartesian dualism, many 
people abandon it in favor of some nondual solution to the mind-
body problem. Some people—especially neuroscientists and 
computer programmers—veer toward the material, denying that 
there is any such thing as an immaterial soul. They argue that the 
material world alone exists and that consciousness is a physical 
thing that we will eventually discover, just as we have discovered 
leptons and quarks. Other people—especially religious mystics and 
armchair philosophers—see problems with the materialist solution 
to the mind-body problem. Acutely aware of the subjective 
experience of consciousness, which seems to them to be an 
undeniable fact independent of the physical facts of any observed 
system, they veer toward the immaterial, denying the existence of a 
physical world altogether. For them, the physical world is merely 
thought-stuff, a dream without a physical dreamer. 
But there is a third possibility. What if consciousness and 
matter are simply the same thing comprehended in two different 
ways? According to this third possibility, neither the knower 
(consciousness) nor the known (matter) is the ultimate reality; 
rather, they are each characteristics of a third thing that mediates 
the two. We can think of that mediating thing as a form of 
consciousness, but it is not a dualistic consciousness that stretches 
across a subject-object divide; rather, it is a nondual consciousness 
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that is conscious only of itself. 
Below is a painting of an outdoor scene: 
 
The image is flat, but it appears to have depth because of the rules 
of perspective that the artist applies in painting the image. By 
analogy to that painting, consider the possibility that in one’s 
knowing of an object—say, a chair one might be sitting on—the 
“object” that is known has no separate existence from the “subject” 
that is doing the knowing. Consider that the object and its knower 
are only tricks of perception, like the depth that seems to 
characterize the artist’s painting. They are appearances that arise 
when consciousness—which is always conscious only of itself—
assumes a particular form, suggesting a point of view. 
A teacher of nondualism once asked his young student to sip 
from a cup of unsweetened chai (spiced black tea). He then asked 
the student to stir some sugar into the chai and to sip it again. 
“What do you taste?” asked the teacher. “Sweet,” responded the 
student, wondering what point the teacher was making. “Who 
knows the sweet?” inquired the teacher, and he told the student to 
contemplate the question. The student ended up leaving that 
teacher’s academy, but he never abandoned his pursuit of nondual 
wisdom. After many years, he returned to visit the same teacher, 
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who was now an old man. The student paid his respects and then 
said with smile, “The sweet knows the sweet.” 
According to this theory, both the knower (the student’s mind) 
and the known (the sweetness of the tea) have a basis in reality, 
just as the depth that characterizes the artist’s painting has a basis 
in the perspective lines that are sketched on the flat surface of the 
canvas, but the knower and the known are secondary 
interpretations imposed on primary facts. What actually exists as to 
both knower and known is nondual consciousness-of-self. This 
point may be difficult to grasp, but the “hard problem” of 
consciousness is half solved if we consider that all consciousness is 
consciousness-of-self—it is never subject-object consciousness. 
And, the “hard problem” of consciousness is the rest of the way 
solved if we consider that there is no material thing that has this 
consciousness-of-self; rather, consciousness-of-self is the 
underlying stuff of existence. 
We can certainly describe the foregoing answer to the mind-
body problem as a type of idealism. The chair and the sweet tea are 
nothing but consciousness. But they are not merely the dream 
images of a lonely dreamer, ready to go “poof” when the dreamer 
dreams a different dream. They are a real chair and real sweet tea 
in a real universe that operates according to immutable physical 
laws that can be inventively applied to predict real events and to 
devise real responses to those events. That is so, because in using 
the word “consciousness” to describe the true being of the chair 
and the sweet tea, we are not—despite the limitations of the 
English language—referring to the subject side of the subject-
object divide; rather, we are denying the reality of the subject-
object divide. The chair and the sweet tea are not the hallucinations 
of some independent observer; they are the hallucinations of 
themselves, having their own intrinsic being, and therefore, 
although they are consciousness, they are no less material. Thus, 
we can just as validly describe the philosophical system proposed 
here as a type of materialism. 
7
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But what we have said so far is hopelessly inadequate to 
convey the true sense of these counterintuitive ideas, for it is 
nothing less than a new conception of self that these ideas demand 
of us. So let us proceed. 
8
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Part One: Nondual Consciousness 
1. Those Pesky Laws of Physics 
[L]et us conceive something very simple—say, a stone 
which receives a certain quantity of motion from an 
external cause which sets it in motion. Afterward the 
stone will necessarily continue to move . . . , because it 
has this quantity of motion. Therefore, this permanence of 
the stone in motion is compelled, . . . because it must be 
defined by the thrust of the external cause. What is to be 
understood here concerning the stone should be 
understood concerning any singular thing whatever . . . : 
that each thing is necessarily determined by some external 
cause to exist and produce effects in a certain and 
determinate way. (Letter 58.)  7
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
a. The Mind-Body Problem 
We will begin by looking more closely at the way modern 
physics complicates the mind-body problem. The experience we 
have of being a conscious soul that dwells in a material body and 
directs its movements gives rise to a seemingly intractable 
dilemma. What provides the causal link by which an immaterial 
thing (a soul) can activate a material thing (a body)? And, how can 
we say that the soul’s directives—and not the laws of physics—are 
what actually determine the body’s actions? 
We can explain every event in the universe in purely physical 
terms, right down to the subtlest physiological processes that occur 
 The translations of Spinoza’s writings that appear in this book are from 7
Curley, A Spinoza Reader, sometimes with minor, non-substantive edits.
9
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in complex living creatures. Every star and planet, every 
earthquake and winter storm, every green sprout and blooming 
flower, and every muscle, gland, and neuron is part of a dynamic 
system, and all this activity is fully explainable by a vast web of 
causes and their inevitable effects, all proceeding according to an 
established set of immutable physical laws. 
When one moves one’s arm, for example, a physicist could 
fully explain that movement in terms of the contraction of muscles 
and tendons, the metabolism of sugar in the blood, and the 
electronic pulse of a neural signal. And the same physicist could, in 
theory at least, also explain the physical causes of the neural 
messages that initiated the physiological process. And, those 
causes, in turn, have physical causes, and so on, ad infinitum. The 
underlying physics that explains an arm’s movement, like the 
underlying physics that explains a boulder’s chaotic, tumbling 
descent down a steep hillside, might be enormously complex, but 
the fact remains that every event in the universe has a physical 
cause that is both necessary and fully sufficient to explain its 
occurrence. And yet, in the midst of this fully mechanistic 
universe, there is consciousness—an extra thing, unnecessary from 
the perspective of physics, and unexplained by the physical facts. 
Here then is a preliminary expression of the mind-body problem: 
In a universe that is fully explained by physical laws, what role, if 
any, does consciousness play? 
If one were to see a metal spoon lying on a table in front of a 
man holding a wand and wearing a top hat and cape, and if the 
spoon handle suddenly began to bend and twist as the man stared 
intently upon it, what would be one’s natural conclusion? Would 
one conclude that the man was a stage magician who had created a 
marvelous illusion? Would one assume there was some hidden 
explanation for the spoon’s unexpected behavior, an explanation 
that was fully congruent with the laws of physics? Or would one 
conclude that, without any physical explanation, the spoon handle 
was being bent by the power of the man’s mind alone? Most of us 
10
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would reject the latter conclusion, even as we applauded the 
magician’s performance. 
The point is that most of us side with Princess Elisabeth of 
Bohemia in her epistolary debate with Descartes. Few of us believe 
that thoughts can move matter, although that belief is the necessary 
implication of the widely accepted belief that the soul (an 
immaterial, thinking thing) pilots the body from some location 
within the brain (a material thing). If the soul receives information 
channeled to it from the senses, makes choices based on that 
information, and, like a ship’s captain, directs the body’s 
operations, then how does this soul activate the neurons and glands 
that, like the levers and knobs found on the bridge of a ship, direct 
the body’s course? Put another way, if we doubt that the immaterial 
thoughts of a magician can exert a force that bends a spoon, then 
shouldn’t we also doubt that an immaterial soul can exert a force 
that causes a neuron to fire or a gland to secrete a hormone? 
Shouldn’t we instead be looking for purely physical explanations 
for those physiological processes, and aren’t we very likely to find 
them if we study the matter closely enough? 
b. Materialism 
As noted in the Introduction, many people, after considering 
the weaknesses of Cartesian dualism, adopt a nondual solution to 
the mind-body problem. Some of these people seek the answer 
exclusively on the material side of the problem. Doing so solves 
the problem of how the soul directs the body’s activities. The soul 
has a material basis, and as a material thing, it is capable of 
exerting a force (whether mechanical, electrical, or chemical) upon 
the body’s physical control mechanisms. But what then can we say 
about the soul’s existence independent of the body? If the soul is a 
material thing, then it is a part of the body. More important, if the 
soul is a material thing, then it is an integral part of the closed 
system of causes and inevitable effects that characterizes the 
physical world, and therefore its every action is fully determined 
11
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by the laws of physics. It can only “choose” to do what the laws of 
physics compel it to do. Thus, all the events of history—the exodus 
of the Israelites from Egypt, the Buddhist inscriptions on the 
Pillars of Ashoka, Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, the 
invention of the printing press, Napoleon’s decision to sell the 
Louisiana Territory, Hitler’s invasion of Poland, etc.—were 
necessary and immutable. Indeed, everything in the dimension of 
time is fixed, merely waiting for its moment to occur. 
And there remains the question of consciousness. Some 
materialists posit the existence of a physical substance, not yet 
identified, that has consciousness as one of its inherent 
characteristics. Once we identify this soul-stuff, we will be able to 
dissect a brain and point to it, even transplant it. Other materialists 
prefer to explain consciousness in purely functionalist terms. 
According to the latter theory, machines of the future that are 
engineered to mimic, perfectly, the functionality of the human 
body will be conscious by reason of their ability to act as if they 
are conscious. One might think of the popular episode of Star Trek: 
The Next Generation entitled “The Measure of a Man.” In that 
episode, Commander Data—a human-mimicking android—is 
adjudicated to be a conscious being, entitled to the same legal 
rights as biological humans. 
The Commander Data problem at issue in “The Measure of a 
Man” is a subset of the “other-minds problem” that has puzzled 
philosophers for thousands of years. By inductive reasoning, we 
are generally willing to assume that other human beings have 
consciousness very much like our own, and we do so based solely 
on the fact that they act as if they do. Therefore, if a machine 
(Commander Data, for example) perfectly mimics the behavior of 
human beings, then who are we, who are not inside the “brain” of 
the machine, to say that it is not conscious? Many fans of 
Commander Data are functionalists at heart, and they are willing to 
assume that consciousness is a thing that somehow happens when a 
machine is sophisticated enough in its design to mimic conscious 
12
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beings. 
Maybe so, but those who explain consciousness in terms of 
functionalism seem rather stuck on the object side of the subject-
object divide, telling us much about neuroscience and data 
processing, but fudging the details when it comes stating precisely 
how consciousness arises in complex computational systems. 
When the materialist reaches that critical point in the argument, 
what we often get is conclusory gobbledygook such as: “[A]ll the 
phenomena of human consciousness are explicable as ‘just’ the 
activities of a virtual machine realized in the astronomically 
adjustable connections of a human brain.”  For the materialist, it 8
would seem, consciousness is nothing but a smoke-and-mirrors 
trick.  9
But what happens when one jabs one’s finger with a sewing 
needle? There are specific behavioral events that typically 
transpire: (1) the needle pierces the skin on the finger, (2) an 
electrical message is communicated to the spinal cord via a chain 
of neural cells in the finger, hand, and arm, (3) a return message is 
communicated to the arm muscle, (4) the muscle contracts, (5) the 
hand recoils, (6) the person shouts, “Ow!” But aside from all that, 
something else is going on: consciousness of pain. The pain isn’t 
just an electrical impulse that causes a particular behavioral 
response; it is also known. As regards the subjective experience of 
being a conscious human being who suffers from a needle jab, the 
purely functionalist explanation of consciousness falls short. 
Moreover, materialism fails to assign a role to consciousness. 
If consciousness is just a characteristic of some yet-to-be-identified 
physical substance, then why does that substance need to have that 
particular characteristic? Wouldn’t an unconscious substance do 
the job just as well? And if, instead, consciousness is explained in 
 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 431.8
 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, pp. 438–440.9
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functionalist terms, as something that somehow happens when a 
machine is sophisticated enough in its design to mimic the 
behavior of higher-order animals, then why does it need to happen? 
Wouldn’t an unconscious machine be able to do the same things? 
In either case, what does consciousness add? 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the materialist who 
attempts to explain consciousness in terms of ectoplasm or 
machine science has no answer for how space, time, and matter 
came to be. Existence poses just as much of a philosophical riddle 
as consciousness. So, if consciousness is explained in material 
terms, then we have merely substituted one philosophical riddle for 
another. Instead of the question “What is consciousness?” we have 
the question “What is the universe?” We have come no closer to 
ultimate truth. 
c. Idealism 
The idealist, by contrast, seeks a nondual solution to the mind-
body problem by looking exclusively at consciousness. Thus, if the 
materialist seems rather stuck on the object side of the subject-
object divide, the idealist seems rather stuck on the subject side of 
that divide, proposing a universe that is a mere dream. 
According to the idealist solution to the mind-body problem, 
what, if anything, can we call “real”? A drunk man imagines he 
sees a hole in the path in front of him, and he steps aside to avoid 
it. The hole was real for him, argues the idealist. Whether there was 
an actual hole in the path or merely a dark shadow is unknowable 
and irrelevant. The drunk man was subjectively aware of a hole, 
and because subjective thought is the only thing that exists, the 
hole—even if merely imagined—is perfectly real. So claims the 
idealist. 
Idealism has some advantage over materialism because, by 
making consciousness the only thing that exists, it gives 
consciousness a role to play. According to idealism, the world 
exists for the sake of being known, and its knower serves also as its 
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creator, writing and directing the show. Thus, idealism seems to 
have a lot going for it—until, that is, one stubs one’s toe. 
Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones: 
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones. 
—Richard Wilbur (1921–2017 C.E.) 
Or, consider again the drunk man who stepped aside to avoid 
an imagined hole in the path in front of him. If the same drunk man 
bites down hard on a ceramic apple, he will break his tooth. 
Regardless of how sure he is, subjectively, that the ceramic apple is 
a piece of fruit, the objective world has a sometimes unpleasant 
way of taking charge of subjective experience. There is, after all, a 
universe “out there,” shared in common with others, not just one 
“in here,” in the imagination. The world can be a difficult place, 
and that difficulty is something idealism brushes aside a little too 
lightly. Holocausts happen. Earthquakes happen. People die. 
Worse, people suffer without dying. Countless people lack 
adequate nutrition and shelter. Epidemic diseases sweep across the 
planet. Wars ravage entire nations. And idealism merely shrugs, 
asserting that it is all just dream images. 
Moreover, why apply oneself to discovery, invention, and 
industry in a world that is only a dream? If the world is only a 
dream, we should be finding ways to dream better dreams, not 
ways to engineer the objects that are appearing in our present 
dream. Why eke out some small benefit through ingenuity and toil 
if, instead, one can simply awake from the dream and dream anew? 
But has any society overcome hunger, cold, and disease by 
teaching its people to dream better dreams? I’m all for dreaming 
better dreams, but it seems like an impractical and fanciful 
approach to solving the problems confronting the world. 
Moreover, who (or what) is the dreamer? People die every 
day, and yet the dream goes on. Few of us believe that one person’s 
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death will cause the universe to suddenly blink out. Indeed, we 
suspect that even our own death will have no effect on the 
universe’s continuing existence. Is the answer, then, that we all 
dreaming individual pieces of a shared dream? If so, how are our 
individual dreams coordinated with one another so that we each 
dream of the same object in the same place at the same time? Is 
perhaps God the master dreamer, coordinating all our dreams in 
accordance with the laws of physics? But if the dream is governed 
by the laws of physics, then we are no better off calling it a dream 
than we would be if we called it a material world. Whether it is 
made of dream-stuff or matter, it acts the way matter acts, and the 
difference between idealism and materialism is just semantic. 
d. Parallelism? 
After contemplating these issues, some philosophers have 
proposed some version of parallelism as the most satisfying 
solution to the mind-body problem. These philosophers suggest the 
existence of a world of thought that duplicates the law-bound 
material world in every detail and “supervenes” upon it. But why 
complicate it? Why not consider the possibility that thought and 
matter are simply the same thing comprehended in two different 
ways? Then one does not need to prefer matter over thought 
(materialism), or thought over matter (idealism), or to marry the 
two in an eternal duet (parallelism), for thought is matter. 
But how could that be? Thought and matter are so obviously 
not the same thing. One does not solve the mind-body problem 
simply by denying its existence. Before we can accept that thought 
and matter are the same thing, we need to reimagine both the self 
and the universe in nondual terms. 
2. All Consciousness Is Consciousness of Self 
[T]he thinking substance [(i.e., consciousness)] and the 
extended substance [(i.e., matter)] are one and the same 
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substance, which is now comprehended under this 
attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and 
the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but 
expressed in two ways. (Ethics, IIP7, Schol.) 
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
Each of us can focus the attention within and identify what 
appears to be an internal knower of the body’s thoughts, feelings, 
and perceptions. This knower is sometimes called the “I” or the 
“soul”; other times, the “self.” Consider, however, one’s knowing 
of the knower. 
Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950 c.e.), the 20th century Indian 
sage who attracted many people to nondual philosophy, urged his 
disciples to practice ātma vichāra (“contemplation of the self”). He 
suggested that during silent meditation, the meditator should use 
the question “Who am I?” to continuously refocus the attention on 
the knower of whatever thoughts or feelings happen to arise. But 
how does one focus one’s attention on the knower? One certainly 
doesn’t know the knower in the same way one knows an object 
like a chair or sweet tea, for as soon as one attempts to objectify 
the knower, it ceases to be the knower. The very process of trying 
to cast one’s mental gaze on the knower is analogous to trying to 
use the outwardly focused light beam of a spotlight to illuminate 
the spotlight itself. It can’t be done. In other words, we know the 
knower only by being the knower. It is an unmediated, non-sensory 
sort of knowing, and therefore even the word “knowing” is 
inappropriate, for that word implies a subject and an object, and 
some mediating principle that connects the two. With respect to the 
inner knower, being that knower and consciousness of that knower 
are the same thing—subject-object consciousness simply does not 
apply. 
It is the assertion of this book, however, that the foregoing 
discussion describes all conscious experience. Notwithstanding our 
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strong feeling of being a person who knows a world, subject-object 
consciousness is merely an illusion. The experience we have with 
reference to the inner knower—the experience of being conscious 
of a thing by being it, not by perceiving it—is what consciousness 
really is. All consciousness is consciousness of self; there is no 
such thing as consciousness of another.  10
Consider, for example, the knowing of a tree that one sees 
standing on a distant hillside. What is it that one actually knows? 
Does one know the tree? No, one knows the light rays reflected 
from the variegated surface of the tree. But does one even know 
the light rays? No, the light rays pass through the cornea of the eye 
and make an inverted image on the retina, where rods and cones 
are stimulated by the light. It is, therefore, the stimulation of those 
rods and cones that one actually knows. But does one even know 
that? No, for the pattern of that stimulation is communicated 
through neurons to the visual cortex—some neurons being 
dedicated to registering light or dark, others to various parts of the 
color spectrum, others to circles or lines or contrasting edges, and 
still others to motion—and as a result, a representation of the tree, 
constructed out of neural spiking frequencies and constrained by 
the informational categories that the neurons are physically capable 
of reflecting, appears in the visual cortex. It is, therefore, that 
representation of the tree in the visual cortex that one actually 
knows. 
But does one even know that? One can continue the same 
analysis through all the stages of data processing within the brain, 
searching (in vain) for the place where sensory data actually 
become known by the knower—the place, in other words, where 
consciousness occurs. But wherever that place (or those places) 
might be, the most significant point is the impossibility of being 
conscious of anything other than representations of the external 
 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 7 and 9 [making the same point in 10
reference to God’s thoughts].
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world that appear somewhere within one’s own brain.  11
Whatever external thing one may be conscious of—a chair, the 
sweetness of tea, a tree on a hillside—it is always only one’s own 
self that is the actual content of one’s consciousness, for one can 
never be conscious of anything else. And this point holds true 
regardless of how finely one analyzes the problem. If the thing that 
one is conscious of is separate from oneself—if it is an object 
relative to a subject—then one can only be conscious of it by being 
conscious of the effects it is having on oneself, effects that are 
communicated through some medium. Ultimately, then, it is never 
anything other than one’s own self that is the true content of one’s 
consciousness, and because that is so, consciousness is never 
actually spread across a subject-object divide. The subject-object 
divide is a secondary interpretation of the facts. One can never be 
conscious of a thing without being that thing, and therefore 
consciousness is not different from being. And in that insight lies 
the key to the “hard problem” of consciousness. 
Thus, careful analysis belies the very existence of the subject-
object divide and with it the consciousness-matter conundrum. 
There is never consciousness of an external object. Instead, there is 
consciousness of one’s own self, and there is inference about an 
external object—an object that one then imagines to be composed 
of unconscious matter. But why so imagine it? Since one 
experiences one’s own existence as consciousness of self, why not 
assume that all things experience their existence in that same way? 
Consciousness, then, is not some wondrous mystery associated 
with the brains of higher-order animals, distributed, a drop here 
and there, in a mostly unconscious material universe. Rather, 
consciousness is the underlying stuff of existence. 
Nonetheless, subject-object consciousness remains a persistent 
illusion. Why? The answer is that we are predisposed to seeing 
past our own self, which is the true content of our nondual 
 See Russell, The Analysis of Matter, p. 383.11
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consciousness, in order to learn things about the external world 
that our self reflects and that we desire to know in order to survive 
as embodied organisms. Because of this “seeing past,” the nondual 
character of consciousness becomes invisible to us, and then we 
feel as if we are a subject knowing an object. 
An analogy can be made to observing the world through its 
reflection in the surface of a mirror. When we gaze at the mirror, 
we are really seeing only the mirror’s surface, but we tend to see 
past that surface, ignoring it in order to observe the objects 
reflected therein, which is the thing that most interests us. The 
surface of the mirror thus becomes invisible to us in favor of the 
reflected objects, but the mirror’s surface is, in truth, the only thing 
we ever actually see. Likewise, although all consciousness is 
consciousness-of-self, we tend to see past our own self, ignoring it 
so as to gather information about the external world reflected 
therein, which is the thing that most interests us. Our own self thus 
becomes invisible to us in favor of the external world, but our own 
self is, in truth, the only actual content of our consciousness. 
Everyday experience offers many examples of this “seeing 
past.” If one closes one eye, one sees the tip of one’s own nose. 
But what happens when both eyes are open? The tip of the nose 
disappears. Certainly, light from the nose is still striking the retina 
of one’s eyes. So, why does one’s mind tune it out? The answer is 
that it is not useful information, and therefore it becomes invisible. 
Likewise, in every act of perception, the medium of perception 
becomes invisible in favor of the information one seeks to gather 
about the external world. 
Yet another example of this “seeing past” involves a new pair 
of eyeglasses. When one first puts on a new pair of eyeglasses with 
stronger lenses, the shape of external objects may seem to be 
distorted. Over time, however, this distortion disappears. One 
learns to see past the distortion in favor of the information one 
seeks to gather about the external world. 
Language provides yet another example of the transparency of 
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the medium of perception. To a German-speaking boy the 
vocalization “Ich liebe dich” has the same meaning as the 
vocalization “I love you” has to an English-speaking boy. What 
each boy is actually conscious of is a chain of phonemes, and the 
phoneme chain in each case is quite different, but the phonemes 
become transparent to the listening boy, and what he experiences 
when he hears the relevant phonemes is their comforting message 
(i.e., the intention of the speaker). And when the German-speaking 
boy learns English in school, he learns that “I love you” means 
“Ich liebe dich,” and in the beginning stages of that learning, he 
must hear the English words, substitute their German equivalents, 
and then draw meaning from the German. But over time, the 
English words begin to sound like their meanings, and he no longer 
needs to translate them into German. To put the point in colloquial 
terms, he begins to “think” in English. The English phonemes have 
become transparent to him, just as the German phonemes became 
transparent to him. 
And the same process takes place, of course, when one learns 
a new phonetic alphabet. At the beginning, one must labor to 
recognize the unfamiliar squiggles that one sees on the printed 
page, and one must mentally consult a memorized list of 
correspondences. But over time, the squiggles of the newly learned 
alphabet no longer demand such deliberative interpretation. Simply 
looking at them causes one to hear their sound in one’s mind. 
In a famous essay, Professor Thomas Nagel considers what it 
is like to be a bat “seeing” by means of its sonar. As Professor 
Nagel points out, we cannot really know; after all, we are not bats. 
But we can make a pretty good guess that “seeing” by means of a 
sonar is not so very different from seeing by means of eyes. In both 
cases, a creature is employing a tool to gather information about 
the shape of the external world and to construct a representation of 
that world in its brain. But in some respects, the two experiences 
must be very different, and that difference is due to the functional 
differences between the tools each species uses to gather the 
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relevant information. The bat’s sonar, for example, does not deliver 
information about color. Conversely, the bat probably has a 
heightened sense of depth perception relative to a person, because 
people infer depth by merging binary retinal images, whereas 
depth is precisely the information that the bat’s sonar is capable of 
delivering. 
Professor Nagel argues that bat sonar “is not similar in its 
operation to any sense that we possess,” and therefore “there is no 
reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can 
experience or imagine.”  Agreed. It remains true, however, that 12
the medium by which relevant information is delivered is not as 
important as the fact that the information gets delivered somehow. 
In other words, the same experience of perception or intellectual 
understanding can be realized in multiple ways. We know this to 
be true when we learn a new language or a new alphabet, and we 
can reasonably infer it to be true generally. In example after 
example, the medium that conveys the desired information 
becomes transparent to us in favor of the information we hope to 
gather. And in like manner, our own self, which is the true content 
of every conscious experience, becomes transparent to us in favor 
of the external world that is reflected and represented therein, a 
world that we strongly desire to know. 
In this way, we come to feel that we are the knowers of an 
external physical world, knowing it across an unbridgeable 
subject-object divide, and we even imagine that subject-object 
consciousness describes all conscious experience. But what we are 
interpreting as “subject” and “object” is merely our inherent 
capacity to be conscious of our own self by being it. 
3. Thought-Matter Equivalence 
I should say that what the physiologist sees when he looks 
 Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” p. 438.12
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at a [hospital patient’s] brain is part of his own brain, not 
part of the brain he is examining. (The Analysis of Matter, 
p. 383.) 
—Bertrand Russell (1872–1970 C.E.) 
In light of what we have said in the previous section, consider 
the possibility that consciousness is what it feels like to be a thing, 
whereas matter is how a thing appears when it is known by 
inference from the impressions it makes on one’s sense organs and, 
through them, on one’s own self. In other words, when item X is 
known sensorially, it seems to be matter. But when item X is 
known directly, by being item X, it is nothing but consciousness. 
Thus, it is only the mediation of the senses as a method of knowing 
that differentiates matter from consciousness. Matter and 
consciousness are really the same thing experienced in different 
ways. 
But here we have to be careful, because we tend to think of 
consciousness as subject-object consciousness, and we cannot 
allow that tendency to confuse us. Consciousness is always 
consciousness-of-self, not consciousness of another. 
Colloquially speaking, if I am thinking of an apple, my 
thought involves a mental image of a round object, about the size 
of a fist, usually red or green, smooth to touch, having a distinctive 
aroma, etc. But those thoughts are not what it feels like to be an 
apple; rather, those thoughts are what it feels like to be a brain 
thinking of an apple. Thought-matter equivalence does not mean 
that a person’s apple-thought is the same as an apple; rather, it 
means that a person’s apple-thought is the same as a brain 
representing an apple in the form of neural spiking frequencies. 
One might ask, however, whether thought-matter equivalence 
implies idealism. If the physical world, when experienced directly 
rather than sensorially, turns out to be nothing but consciousness, 
then aren’t we essentially denying the reality of matter, dismissing 
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it as the illusory effect of a flawed epistemology? And if so, 
doesn’t thought-matter equivalence share all the problems that 
accompany the idealist solution to the mind-body problem? 
We can correctly conclude from thought-matter equivalence 
that everything is consciousness, but to say that everything is 
consciousness does not mean that everything is merely a dream 
being dreamed by you, its observer. Rather, everything is a dream 
being dreamed by the thing itself, and that point is what 
differentiates thought-matter equivalence from other types of 
subjective idealism. The world is real. Each particle of the universe 
has its own intrinsic being, but its being is nothing over and above 
its consciousness of itself. To be a boson is to be conscious of a 
boson, and that is all it is. 
With our senses mediating our perception of the world, we 
tend to assume that matter is the fundamental nature of things. We 
perceive external things as material, and we perceive our own 
brains as material, and then we conclude that there has to be a 
material substratum for thoughts. But those assumptions are 
merely offshoots of the illusory subject-object divide. They arise 
because we are in the habit of seeing past consciousness-of-self 
and inferring an external world that we take to be material. 
If one perceives, say, a lump of clay on a potter’s wheel, the 
clay appears to be a dead thing, devoid of consciousness. But if 
one realizes that, in perceiving the clay, one is conscious only of 
the clay’s reflection in one’s own self, a self that is veritably 
sparkling with consciousness, then it becomes very hard not to 
conclude that all things everywhere are sparkling with that same 
consciousness. In other words, the one thing in this universe that 
one knows directly, without any mediation, is one’s own self, and it 
is undeniably conscious, so why not conclude that everything else, 
when known directly, is the same? And if that is so, then the 
underlying being of a thing—even a lump of clay—is not matter, 
but the consciousness the thing has of itself. 
According to Descartes, a material thing is a thing that has 
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spatial extension. In other words, material things have shape, size, 
and location. But what does that really mean? Shape, size, and 
location is merely information, which is just thought. Thus, the 
apparent materiality of a boson might only be the fact that one of 
its definitional characteristics is its location within an imagined 
map. Spatial extension, then, is just a way of organizing the data, 
and all things actually exist as thoughts in a dimensionless point of 
nonspace. A boson is only a set of self-referential ideas, and from 
an infinity of such ideas, all of them interacting and changing in 
accordance with fixed laws, a vast material world appears, rather 
like John Horton Conway’s “game of life.”  13
This section opened with a quote by Bertrand Russell about 
the human brain. A very good way to know a human brain is to 
study one the way a physiologist does in a hospital, using the most 
modern scientific equipment available. But a much more accurate 
way to know a human brain is to be one. Despite our great faith in 
scientific objectivity, the physiologist’s way of knowing a human 
brain is mediated and therefore unreliable, leading to confused 
theories such as the theory that the human brain is a material thing 
extended in space. 
Some readers might be doubtful about the assertion that 
scientific objectivity is an unreliable form of knowing. People 
make errors of subjective judgment all the time, and for that 
reason, we value the objectivity of the scientific method precisely 
because of its accuracy. My point is not to dismiss the value of 
scientific research, nor am I suggesting that subjective judgments 
are invariably valid or that one can accurately discover all the 
structures and mechanisms of one’s brain merely by closing one’s 
eyes and being them. Rather, my point is that when one is 
conscious of a thing by being it, one’s consciousness of it is not 
distorted by any mediating physics. Even a drunk man has perfect 
and undistorted consciousness of his own brain—he has perfect 
 Gardner, “Mathematical Games,” pp. 120–123.13
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and undistorted consciousness of the misinformation that his 
alcohol sodden brain is then representing. 
By contrast, when one knows something by sensory 
perception, one’s knowledge of it is very limited. Human beings 
have only five sense organs, each responsive to only a very narrow 
band of information. Thus, it is as if we are viewing the external 
world through five small fragments of a dull and misshapen mirror. 
It is true that we can vastly improve our understanding of external 
things by using scientific instruments to correct the distortions and 
inadequacies of our senses, but we remain disadvantaged in our 
effort to learn, using empirical methods, the true form of things 
that lie outside, even imagining them to be unconscious matter. 
Speaking metaphorically, we might say that when the 
physiologist studies a patient’s brain in a hospital, the 
physiologist’s way of knowing the brain (as matter) is knowing it 
from the outside, whereas the patient’s way of knowing the same 
brain (as thoughts) is knowing it from the inside. But those 
metaphors (“outside” and “inside”) obscure the fact that the 
“outside” view is mediated and inferential, whereas the “inside” 
view is experiential and direct. And either way, consciousness-of-
self is the only consciousness that actually exists. As Bertrand 
Russell explained, “what the physiologist sees when he looks at a 
[hospital patient’s] brain is part of his own brain, not part of the 
brain he is examining.”  14
So, which philosophers are right, the idealists or the 
materialists? Asking the question is like asking whether the true 
Juliet is Juliet’s experience of Juliet or Romeo’s experience of 
Juliet. Both are the true Juliet, but only Juliet is actually conscious 
of Juliet, and she awakes to the reality of that consciousness-of-self 
only when, after years of philosophical inquiry, she stops 
imagining herself to be a “soul” that knows Romeo. Romeo, by 
contrast, only infers Juliet, he is not conscious of her—unless, of 
 Russell, The Analysis of Matter, p. 383.14
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course, his great love for her causes his mind to merge into hers. 
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Part Two: South Asian Nondualism 
The absolute chiti [(“nondual consciousness”)] of its own 
free will is the cause of the [effectuation] of the universe. 
(Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, sūtra 1.) 
—Kṣemarāja (10th–11th century C.E.) 
In Part One, I attempted to convey the theory of “nondual 
consciousness” in general terms. Here, in Part Two, I will focus on 
South Asian literary sources, tracing how nondualism is presented 
in both Vedānta and Kashmiri Shaivism. What follows is not an 
attempt to explicate those philosophical systems in their entirety. 
Instead, I have selected excerpts from the principal texts of both 
traditions, choosing material that bears directly on the mind-body 
problem. 
1. The Principal Upanishads 
The Upanishads are philosophical discussions that form a part 
of the Vedas. The philosophy presented in the Upanishads—known 
as Vedānta—is not perfectly consistent in every detail. A careful 
reader can discern different philosophical emphases that probably 
represent textual emendations and an evolution of thought. One of 
the basic principles that emerges, however, from the Upanishads is 
that Brahman (God, or the power that upholds all things) is the 
same as Ātman (the “self” of the universe, or the universal 
consciousness), which is the same as ātman (the “self” of the 
individual, or the consciousness in each of us). 
The assertion that God’s own consciousness is the 
consciousness underlying the soul of each person may sound like a 
blasphemous arrogation of divine status by ordinary human beings. 
But the soul or self that the Upanishads equate with divine 
consciousness is the person’s true self, not the ego-self that most 
people—steeped in Cartesian dualism—imagine themselves to be. 
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Most people believe a soul or self to be a thinking thing that pilots 
the body, but the Upanishads call our attention to a self that is more 
self—more interior—than that ego-self. This true self is the 
underlying consciousness by which the ego-self becomes a 
conscious entity. 
Sunlight that streams through a window lattice may take on 
the shadow-and-light pattern of the lattice, but it is not different 
from the sunlight shining outside the house. If the window lattice is 
removed, the sunlight remains, no longer conditioned by the 
lattice. Likewise, the consciousness that illuminates an individual 
soul is not different from the consciousness that illuminates all 
things. The ego-self corresponds to the distinctive pattern of light 
that emerges through the lattice, whereas the true self corresponds 
to the sunlight that illuminates that pattern. Put another way, one’s 
own soul is conscious because God is conscious, and one is in 
God. 
Already, we see that the upanishadic theory of nondual 
consciousness is very similar to the theory discussed in general 
terms in Part One. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, dating to the 
early part of the first millennium B.C.E., explains that at first 
Brahman (universal consciousness) knew only itself, but then 
Brahman divided into countless parts, becoming the consciousness 
of individual beings. In other words, consciousness is nondual in 
its original form—conscious only of itself—but in countless 
beings, it takes on the form of subject-object consciousness. 
Despite this apparent change, however, consciousness remains one, 
not many, for those who are awake to the truth: 
Verily, in the beginning this world was Brahman 
[(universal nondual consciousness)]. [¶] It knew only 
itself: “I am Brahman!” Therefore, it became the All. . . . 
Whoever thus knows “I am Brahman [(universal nondual 
consciousness)]!” becomes this All; even the gods have 
not power to prevent his becoming thus, for he becomes 
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their self (ātman) [(i.e., he becomes the consciousness in 
them)]. [¶] So whoever worships another divinity [than 
consciousness], thinking “[This divinity] is one and I 
another,” he knows not.  15
The Upanishad is clearly saying that the consciousness that each of 
us experiences internally is not as individual as it seems to be. 
Instead, the same seamless consciousness shines in all things, and 
when one is aware of that fact, one recognizes one’s own inner self 
to be the inner self of all things. By realizing the unity of 
consciousness, one becomes the self (soul) of even the gods. The 
same idea—that one’s own consciousness is the consciousness of 
all things—is expressed more succinctly as follows: “[T]hese 
worlds, these gods, these beings, everything here is what this Soul 
is.”  16
For this reason, the Upanishad rejects dualistic devotional 
practices, urging instead the worship of consciousness itself. The 
Upanishad explains that the one God (called “Brahman”) is not an 
object of consciousness, and therefore our relationship with God 
cannot be an I-and-thou relationship. Rather, God is the subject in 
all that is conscious, a being that is knowable only by experiencing 
one’s own consciousness. The point is expressed in a dialog 
between Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa and the sage Yājñavalkya: 
Then Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa quest ioned him. 
“Yājñavalkya,” said he, “explain to me him who is the 
Brahman, present and not beyond our ken, him who is the 
Soul in all things.” 
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10. The translations of the Upanishads 15
that appear in this book are from Hume, The Thirteen Principle 
Upanishads, sometimes with minor, non-substantive edits. References to 
“Brahma” have been rendered herein as “Brahman.”
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.6.16
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“He is your soul (ātman), which is in all things.” 
“Which one, O Yājñavalkya, is in all things?” 
“He who breathes in with your breathing in (prāṇa) is 
the soul of yours, which is in all things. . . . 
Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa said: “This has been explained to 
me just as one might say, ‘This is a cow. This is a 
horse.’ [(That is, it has been explained as a fact to be 
learned, not as a lived experience.)] Explain to me him 
who is just the Brahman, present and not beyond our ken, 
him who is the Soul in all things.” 
“He is your soul, which is in all things.” 
“Which one, O Yājñavalkya, is in all things?” 
“You could not see the seer of seeing. You could not 
hear the hearer of hearing. You could not think the thinker 
of thinking. You could not understand the understander of 
understanding. He is your soul, which is in all things. 
[(That is, God is not an object of consciousness; God is 
the consciousness itself.)] Aught else than this is 
wretched.” 
Thereupon Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa held his peace.  17
The identity between God (Brahman) and the consciousness 
that shines in each of us is expressed again later in the same 
Upanishad: 
He is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought 
Thinker, the un-understood Understander. Other than He 
there is no seer. Other than He there is no hearer. Other 
than He there is no thinker. Other than He there is no 
understander. He is your Soul, the Inner Controller, the 
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.4.17
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Immortal.  18
Thus, the Upanishad describes God as the consciousness that 
makes one’s own soul conscious—the self of one’s self—not an 
object of perception. One knows God by being a part of God, 
although not in the ego-sense.  Yājñavalkya makes the point in 19
humorous terms: 
“You idiot,” said Yājñavalkya, “that you will think that 
[God] could be anywhere else than in ourselves [(i.e., the 
consciousness the makes one’s own soul conscious)]! for 
if it were anywhere else than in ourselves, the dogs might 
eat it or the birds might tear it to pieces.”  20
Yājñavalkya also makes the point made at length above in Part 
One that one cannot be conscious of a thing without being that 
thing, and therefore that all perception is really consciousness-of-
self: 
[In the state of nondual consciousness, a person] is verily 
seeing . . . , for there is no cessation of the seeing [in the 
awakened state] . . . . It is not, however, a second thing, 
other than himself and separate, that he may see. [(The 
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.7.23.18
 See Kaushītaki Upaniṣad 3.8 [“ ‘He [God] is my self [(i.e., the 19
consciousness within)]’—this one should know.”]; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 
3.2.9 [“He, verily, who knows that supreme Brahman [(God)], becomes 
ver[il]y Brahman.”]; Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 1.7 [“Brahman-knowers 
become merged in Brahman.”]. On the related idea that the universal 
consciousness is the source of consciousness in the individual, see, e.g., 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7; Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.10–11, 5.12; Īśā 
Upaniṣad 16; Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.7–21; Maitrī Upaniṣad 2.5.
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.25.20
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next seven verses repeat the same principle with reference 
to smell, taste, speech, hearing, thinking, touching, and 
knowing.)] Verily where there seems to be another, there 
the one might see the other; the one might smell the other; 
the one might taste the other; the one might speak to the 
other; the one might hear the other; the one might think of 
the other; the one might touch the other; the one might 
know the other. An ocean, a seer alone without duality, 
becomes he whose world is Brahman, O King!  21
The Upanishad further explains that a self-realized person 
“sees everything as the [universal] Soul.”  In that way, the 22
subject-object duality of a conscious soul knowing a material 
universe is eliminated: 
For where there is a duality, as it were, there one sees 
another; there one smells another; there one tastes 
another; there one speaks to another; there one hears 
another; there one thinks of another; there one touches 
another; there one understands another. But where 
everything has become just one’s own self, then whereby 
and whom would one see? then whereby and whom 
would one smell? then whereby and whom would one 
taste? then whereby and to whom would one speak? then 
whereby and whom would one hear? then whereby and of 
whom would one think? then whereby and whom would 
one touch? then whereby and whom would one 
understand? whereby would one understand him by 
means of whom one understands this All? [¶] . . . [¶] Lo, 
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.23–32.21
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.23. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad includes a 22
lengthy discussion of the ātman (“soul” or “self”).
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whereby would one understand the understander?  23
Similar ideas are found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, which 
also dates to the early part of the first millennium B.C.E. It 
describes the self-realized state by the literary device of a dialog 
between a father, Uddalaka Aruni, and his son, Svetaketu. The 
father says: 
That which is the finest essence—this whole world has 
that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Ātman (‘Soul’). 
That art thou (tat tvam asi), Svetaketu.  24
Tat tvam asi—“That art thou.” In other words, you the reader 
are, insofar as you are conscious, not different from the 
consciousness that underlies everything, everywhere. Moreover, 
the subject-object divide is a false interpretation of the facts. What 
one interprets dualistically as “knower” and “known” is, in truth, 
merely the self being conscious of the self. The Upanishad 
explains: 
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.15, italics added. See also id. 2.4.14 23
[same], 4.4.13 [“He who has found and has awakened to the Soul . . . , 
[t]he world is his: indeed, he is the world itself.”]; Chāndogya Upaniṣad 
2.21.4 [“One should reverence the thought ‘I am the world-all!’ ”], 7.25.1 
[“ ‘I, indeed, am below. I am above. I am to the west. I am to the east. I 
am to the south. I am to the north. I, indeed, am this whole world.’ ”]; Īśā 
Upaniṣad 6–7 [“In whom all beings/Have become just the Self of the 
discerner”]; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.2.5 [“He on whom the sky, the earth, 
and the atmosphere are woven, and the mind, together with all the life-
breaths, Him alone know as the one Soul (Ātman).”]; Maitri Upaniṣad 
6.7 [“Now, where knowledge is of a dual nature, there, indeed, one hears, 
sees, smells, tastes, and also touches; the soul knows everything. Where 
knowledge is not of a dual nature, being devoid of action, cause, or 
effect, unspeakable, incomparable, indescribable—what is that? It is 
impossible to say!”].
 Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8.7.24
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Where one sees nothing else [other than oneself], hears 
nothing else, understands nothing else—that is a Plenum. 
But where one sees something else [other than oneself]—
that is the small. Verily, the Plenum is the same as the 
immortal; but the small is the same as the mortal.  25
When the Upanishad refers to seeing, hearing, and understanding 
nothing else other than oneself, it is saying, in effect, that one 
cannot be conscious of a thing without being that thing, a point that 
has been described in detail in Part One. It is always one’s own self 
that is the content of one’s consciousness, regardless of what 
objects one might think one is seeing or hearing. The Upanishad 
puts it this way: 
As far, verily, as this world-space extends, so far extends 
the space within the heart [(i.e., the theater of 
consciousness)]. Within it [(the heart-space)], indeed, are 
contained both heaven and earth, both fire and wind, both 
sun and moon, lightning and the stars, both what one 
possesses here and what one does not possess; everything 
here is contained within it.  26
These quotations make clear that, notwithstanding India’s 
venerable tradition of ritual worship, it has an equally old 
 Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.24.25
 Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.1.3. The same ideas appear in the Śvetāśvatara 26
Upaniṣad, although there God is described in distinctively Shaivite 
language. See Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 4.20 [“No one soever sees Him 
with the eye./ They who thus know Him with heart and mind/ As abiding 
in the heart [(i.e., as consciousness)], become immortal.”], 6.11 [“The 
one God, hidden in all things/All-pervading, the Inner Soul of all 
things.”].
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philosophical tradition that equates God (Brahman) with universal 
consciousness (Ātman) and that boldly asserts that the 
consciousness illuminating the individual soul is none other than 
the universal consciousness. Moreover, the Upanishads state 
repeatedly that material things are, in fact, just Brahman 
(consciousness). 
But the Upanishads don’t fully explain matter, at least not with 
the detail set forth above in Part One. In other words, they don’t 
quite close the subject-object divide. Instead, the Upanishads seem 
to imply a form of subjective idealism that gives matter no intrinsic 
being of its own. They state that the material world is merely 
“name and form,” implying (like Plato’s theory of forms) that the 
physical world is just something the intellect imagines: 
Verily, at that time the world was undifferentiated. It 
became differentiated just by name and form, as the 
saying is: “He has such a name, such a form.” Even today 
this world is differentiated just by name and form, as the 
saying is: “He has such a name, such a form.”  27
No one can deny that the human mind makes the world intelligible 
by categorizing perceptions according to name and form, but are 
we therefore to conclude that the material world is just our 
thoughts and imaginings with no independent existence? The 
Upanishads do not settle the question. 
2. Adi Śaṅkara 
Adi Śaṅkara (8th century C.E.) is perhaps the leading 
expounder of the philosophical system presented in the 
Upanishads. Little is definite about Śaṅkara’s life, although 
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7. The assertion that all differentiation is 27
just name and form is repeated frequently in the Upanishads. Sample 
texts are set forth in Appendix One, section 1, page ___.
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legends about him provide us with some hints. He was born in 
Kalady, a village near Cochin in southwest India. It is said that he 
lived as a mendicant and died when he was 32 years old, and yet 
despite his short life, he was unusually prolific.  The emphasis of 28
many of Śaṅkara’s writings is that consciousness is universal and 
unitary, and that it only appears to be individual and manifold 
because it shines through a countless variety of material vessels. 
Śaṅkara uses many analogies to illustrate this point. One example 
appearing in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya is that of the space (“ether”) 
inside and surrounding a clay jar: 
There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from 
the Lord [(i.e., Brahman, or universal consciousness)]. 
Still the connection (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, 
consisting of bodies and so on, is [unquestioningly] 
assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into 
connection with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, 
caves, and the like. And just as[,] in consequence of 
connection of the latter kind[,] such conceptions and 
terms as “the hollow (space) of a jar,” &c. are generally 
current, although the space inside a jar is not really 
different from universal space, and just as[,] in 
consequence thereof[,] there generally prevails the false 
notion that there are different spaces such as “the space of 
a jar” and so on; so there prevails likewise the false notion 
that the Lord [(i.e., universal consciousness)] and the 
transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the 
nondiscrimination of the (unreal) connection of the soul 
with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so 
 Some scholars question whether all the texts traditionally attributed to 28
Śaṅkara were actually authored by him.
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on.  29
Below, I set forth three additional quotations from the 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, each making essentially the same point as the 
point made above. The first quotation uses the analogy of the sun 
or moon illuminating an object in space. The next two quotations 
use the analogy of the sun or moon being reflected in a body of 
water. Again, Śaṅkara argues that universal consciousness only 
appears to be individual and manifold because it shines through a 
variety of material vessels: 
[1] Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having 
passed [invisibly] through space enters into contact with a 
finger or some other limiting adjunct, and, according as 
the latter is straight or bent, [the light] itself becomes 
straight or bent as it were [(i.e., the light becomes visible 
as the straight or bent form of the illuminated finger)]; so 
Brahman [(universal consciousness)] also assumes, as it 
were, the form of the earth and the other limiting adjuncts 
with which it enters into connection. (III, 2, 15) 
[2] [Brahman is compared] to the images of the sun [or 
moon] reflected in the water and the like, meaning 
thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due 
to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the 
two following passages: “As the one luminous sun when 
entering into relation to many different waters is himself 
rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the 
one divine unborn Self [(i.e., Brahman)]”; and “The one 
Self of all beings separately abides in all the individual 
beings; hence it appears one and many at the same time, 
 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya I, 1, 5, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras, 29
reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, p. 205.
38
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
just as the one moon is multiplied by its reflections in the 
water.” (III, 2, 18) 
[3] The reflected image of the sun dilates when the 
surface of the water expands; it contracts when the water 
shrinks; it trembles when the water is agitated; it divides 
itself when the water is divided. It thus participates in all 
the attributes and conditions of the water; while the real 
sun remains all the time the same.—Similarly Brahman, 
although in reality uniform and never changing, 
participates as it were in the attributes and states of the 
body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it 
abides; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them 
as it were, and so on. (III, 2, 20)  30
The main point Śaṅkara is making in all the foregoing 
quotations is that the individual consciousness of the body (i.e., the 
body’s “soul”) does not really exist as an independent entity, just as 
the reflection of the sun in the water does not really exist as an 
independent sun. Each of these (the soul and the reflection of the 
sun) only seems to have individuality because of the physical 
medium in which it appears. Below, Śaṅkara again makes 
essentially the same point, this time using ambient light as a 
metaphor. He describes the intellect as an inert thinking machine. 
When that machine is pervaded by the ambient light of 
consciousness, then consciousness seems to be thinking: 
By illumining the intellect—which does the thinking—
through its own self-effulgent light that pervades the 
intellect, the self [(i.e., consciousness)] assumes the 
 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya III, 2, 15–20, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-30
Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, pp. 251–
252.
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likeness of the latter [(i.e., the intellect)] and seems to 
think, just as light [passing through colored glass seems to 
be colored]. Hence people mistake that the self thinks; but 
really it does not. Likewise it shakes, as it were: When the 
intellect and other organs as well as the prā︎ṇas [(i.e., vital 
forces in the body)] move, the self, which illumines them, 
becomes like them, and therefore seems to move rapidly; 
but really the light of the self has no motion.  31
As noted, Śaṅkara expresses this same idea repeatedly 
throughout his writings. Here is a rather succinct statement taken 
from Crest-Jewel of Discrimination: 
The fool sees the reflection of the sun in the water of 
a jar, and thinks it is the sun. Man in the ignorance of his 
delusion sees the reflection of Pure Consciousness upon 
the coverings [that constitute the gross and subtle body], 
and mistakes it for the real I. 
In order to look at the sun, you must turn away from 
the jar, the water, and the sun’s reflection in the water. The 
wise know that these three are only revealed by the 
reflection of the self-luminous sun. They are not the sun 
itself.  32
Later in the same text, Śaṅkara again takes up the same point, and 
once again he refers to ordinary people as fools: 
The sun is reflected upon water. Water moves, and 
 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya IV, 3, 7, translated in Mādhavānanda, 31
The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The 
Essential Vedānta, p. 262.
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 218–219, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 32
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 68.
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the fool thinks that the sun is moving. The Ātman is 
reflected upon the physical and mental bodies. The bodies 
move and act, and the fool thinks: “I act, I experience, I 
am killed”. 
This body may drop dead in water or on land. I am 
not affected by that. The [space the fills] a jar is not 
affected when the jar is broken.  33
We can summarize Śaṅkara’s understanding of Vedānta in this 
way: The body is part of the material world, and it moves and acts 
according to immutable laws that govern the material world, and 
consciousness pervades the body, as it does all things, and ordinary 
people think, “I act, I experience.” But in truth, the body has no 
soul of its own, and the one that knows the body’s movements and 
actions is the universal consciousness. As Śaṅkara puts it, “[t]he air 
in a jar is one with the air everywhere. In like manner, your Ātman 
[(soul)] is one with Brahman [(universal consciousness)].”  34
And as for the body, Śaṅkara states that an awakened person 
does not care about it or identify with it: 
During a solar eclipse, the sun is hidden by the moon. 
The ignorant, who do not understand what has happened, 
say that the sun has been swallowed up by a demon—but 
the sun can never be swallowed up. 
In the same manner, the ignorant see the body of a 
knower of Brahman and identify him with it. Actually, he 
is free from the body and every other kind of bondage. To 
him, the body is merely a shadow. 
He dwells in the body, but regards it as a thing apart 
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 508–509, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 33
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 117.
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 288, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 34
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 80.
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from himself—like the cast-off skin of a snake. The body 
moves hither and thither, impelled by the vital force. 
A log of wood is carried by the river to lower or to 
higher ground. [Likewise, the] body, carried by the river 
of time, enjoys or suffers the effects of past actions.  35
Below is yet another of Śaṅkara’s analogies illustrating the 
true nature of the soul, this one based on a fire-iron glowing in a 
hot fire. I find this analogy to be particularly meaningful, because 
it emphasizes the way in which we tend to co-opt the universal 
consciousness, making it seem as if it is our own individual 
consciousness: 
Just as iron gives forth [glow] when it is in contact with 
fire, so the mind appears to act and to perceive because of 
its contact with Brahman, which is consciousness itself. 
These powers of action and perception, which seem to 
belong to the mind, are unreal. They are as false as things 
seen in delusion, imagination and dream.  36
The glowing iron appears to have its own heat, but its heat is that 
of the fire in which it rests. Likewise, the human mind appears to 
have its own consciousness, but its consciousness is of that of 
Brahman. 
These texts, and especially the probative analogies they 
employ, succeed in redirecting our attention to the undivided 
universal consciousness that hides behind our everyday experience 
of being an individual soul piloting a body. But these texts are 
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 547–550, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 35
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, pp. 123–124.
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 349, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 36
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 91. See also 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 133, 191.
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weak when it comes to explaining in detail how it is that universal 
consciousness comes to be filtered through so many material 
vessels, taking the illusory form of a multitude of souls. 
In this regard, Śaṅkara sometimes invokes a stark 
consciousness-matter dualism, asserting that matter, although 
somehow derivative of Brahman, is completely separate from 
consciousness. This dualistic assertion directly contradicts the 
theory presented in Part One that consciousness and matter are the 
same thing comprehended in two different ways. In other words, 
despite Śaṅkara’s great renown as a nondualist, he does not really 
close the subject-object divide. For example, he writes: 
Fire is hot indeed but [it] does not burn itself, and the 
acrobat, well trained as he may be, cannot mount on his 
own shoulders. As little could consciousness, if it were a 
mere quality of the elements and their products, render 
them objects of itself. . . . Hence in the same way as we 
admit the existence of that perceptive consciousness 
which has the material elements and their products for its 
objects, we also must admit the separateness of that 
consciousness from the [material] elements. And as 
consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the 
Self must be distinct from the body.  37
In other words, the material elements—things such as earth, 
water, air, and fire—could no more be conscious than an acrobat 
could mount his own shoulders. It seems that Śaṅkara is more 
interested in asserting that all consciousness is one, than he is in 
actually closing the subject-object divide. It may be that Śaṅkara 
 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya III, 3, 54, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-37
Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, p. 255. 
Many similar statements, in which Śaṅkara insists on a stark 
consciousness-matter dualism, are collected in Appendix One, section 2, 
page ___.
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draws this sharp distinction between consciousness and matter 
because he wants to break our identification with the body and 
even with the body’s intellect, and thus help us to identify with the 
undifferentiated consciousness that illuminates the body. But be 
that as it may, Śaṅkara insists that any connection between 
consciousness and the body is false. He says: 
It is a well-ascertained truth that that notion of identity of 
the individual Self with the not-Self,—with the physical 
body and the like—which is common to all mortal 
creatures is caused by avidyā [(“ignorance”)], just as a 
pillar (in darkness) is mistaken (through avidyā) for a 
human being. . . . Similarly consciousness never actually 
pertains to the body; neither can it be that any attributes 
of the body—such as pleasure, pain and dullness—
actually pertain to Consciousness, to the Self; for, like 
decay and death, such attributes are ascribed to the Self 
through avidyā.  38
And Śaṅkara draws the same consciousness-matter distinction in 
Crest-Jewel of Discrimination: 
This body is the ‘physical covering’. . . . It cannot be the 
Ātman [(i.e., universal consciousness)], the ever-pure, the 
self-existent. [¶] . . . It is a sense-object, which can be 
perceived, like a jar. How can it be the Ātman—the 
experiencer of all experiences? [¶] . . . [¶] . . . That this 
Ātman, which is the abiding reality, is of another nature 
than the body, must be self evident. [¶] The body is a 
bundle of bones held together by flesh. . . . The body can 
 Bhagavadgītābhāṣya XIII, 2, translated in Mahādeva Śāstri, The 38
Bhagavad-Gītā, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, 
p. 278, italics added.
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never be the same as the self-existent Ātman, the knower. 
The nature of the Ātman is quite different from that of the 
body. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Those who live in ignorance identify 
the body with the Ātman. This ignorance is the root cause 
of birth, death and rebirth. Therefore you must strive 
earnestly to destroy it.  39
Śaṅkara’s stark consciousness-matter dualism could not be more 
clear. 
To be sure, there are many passages in which Śaṅkara states 
that Brahman is one without a second and that the material world is 
nothing but Brahman. For example, he says: 
Our perception of the universe is a continuous perception 
of Brahman, though the ignorant man is not aware of this. 
Indeed, this universe is nothing but Brahman.  40
But Śaṅkara nonetheless insists on distinguishing consciousness 
from matter, asserting that Brahman first created the material 
world and then entered into it.  For Śaṅkara, in other words, 41
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 154–164, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 39
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, pp. 57–59.
 See, e.g., Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 521, translated in Prabhavananda and 40
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 119. See also 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 512, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, p. 118 
[“This whole universe—from Maya down to the outward physical forms
—is seen as a mere shadow of Brahman.”].
 For this idea, he relies on the Upanishads. See Bṛhadāraṇyaka 41
Upaniṣad 1.4.7 [“He entered in here [(i.e., the physical world)], even to 
the fingernail-tips, as a razor would be hidden in a razor-case, or fire in a 
fire-holder.”]; Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.6.1 [“Having performed austerity, he 
created this whole world, whatever there is here. Having created it, into 
it, indeed, he entered. Having entered it, he became . . . both the 
conscious (vijñāna) and the unconscious . . . .”].
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consciousness and matter are distinct, although Brahman happens 
to be the source of each. Śaṅkara also rejects the theory set forth in 
Part One that all things are conscious: 
For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be 
intelligent [(i.e., conscious)], non-intelligent things such 
as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, 
from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, 
scorpions and similar [conscious] animals are produced.  42
The closest Śaṅkara comes to explaining the existence of 
matter is to repeat the upanishadic theory that the material world is 
merely name and form superimposed on Brahman. He states: 
Because of the ignorance of our human minds, the 
universe seems to be composed of diverse forms. It is 
Brahman alone. [¶] A jar made of clay is not other than 
clay. It is clay essentially. The form of the jar has no 
independent existence. What, then, is the jar? Merely an 
invented name! [¶] The form of the jar can never be 
perceived apart from the clay. What then is the jar? An 
appearance! The reality is the clay itself. [¶] This universe 
is an effect of Brahman. It can never be anything else but 
Brahman. Apart from Brahman, it does not exist. There is 
nothing beside Him.  43
 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 1, 6, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras, 42
reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, p. 223. See also 
id., II, 1, 13, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, at p. 227 [“The distinction 
of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary 
experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound 
and the like are the objects of enjoyment.”].
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 227–230, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 43
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 70.
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Moreover, Śaṅkara emphasizes that because the material world is 
merely name and form, it is also a mere illusion.  He writes: 44
By that element of plurality which is the fiction of 
Nescience, which is characterized by name and form, 
which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to 
be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, 
Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world 
with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real 
nature [Brahman] at the same time remains unchanged, 
lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the 
distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, 
originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate 
against the fact of Brahman being without parts.  45
In a similar vein, Śaṅkara says: 
You may dream of place, time, objects, individuals, and 
so forth. But they are unreal. In your waking state, you 
experience this world, but that experience arises from 
your ignorance. It is a prolonged dream, and therefore 
unreal. Unreal also are this body, these organs, this life-
 See Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 406, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 44
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 100. See also 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 110, 138, 246, 387, 569.
 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 1, 27, translated in Thibaut, The Vedānta-45
Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, pp. 241–
242. Similar statements, in which Śaṅkara asserts that the material world 
is merely name and form, and hence unreal, are collected in Appendix 
One, section 1, page ___.
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breath, this sense of ego.  46
The problem with Śaṅkara’s idealism is familiar to us from 
Part One. For most of us, a piece of fine pottery is worth a lot more 
than a lump of raw clay, and if Brahman has taken the name and 
form of a rock, you had better not kick it with a bare foot. 
Therefore, name and form is—at least at the practical level—not as 
dreamlike and illusory as Śaṅkara suggests, and even Śaṅkara 
acknowledges that the material world is not completely false, like 
the “son of a barren woman”; rather, it is ephemeral, and our focus 
should be on the underlying thing (Brahman) that is permanent. He 
says: 
The modifications of Maya [(‘illusion’)]—ranging from 
the sense of ego down to the body and the sense objects—
are all unreal. They are unreal because they change from 
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 252, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 46
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 74, italics added. See also 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 170, 234, 447, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, pp. 60 [“The waking state is only a prolonged dream. The 
phenomenal universe exists in the mind.”], 71 [“If this universe were 
real, we should continue to perceive it in deep sleep. But we perceive 
nothing then. Therefore it is unreal, like our dreams.”], 107 [“When a 
man wakes from his dream, his dream-actions vanish into nothingness. 
When a man wakes to the knowledge that he is Brahman, all 
accumulated causes, all past actions performed in the course of millions 
and millions of lives, are dissolved away. [¶] While a man is asleep, he 
may dream that he is doing good deeds or committing dreadful sins. But, 
when the dream breaks, how can these dream-actions lead him either to 
heaven or to hell?”]. But see Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya IV, 3, 7, 
translated in Mādhavānanda, The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, reprinted in 
Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, pp. 265–266 [rejecting 
idealism].
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moment to moment. The Ātman never changes.  47
Śaṅkara is a master at analogies, and he typically develops his 
analogies for his readers, using them to powerfully illustrate his 
ideas. But in Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, Śaṅkara makes only 
passing mention of an intriguing analogy that gains significance 
two centuries later in the texts of nondual Kashmiri Shaivism.  48
Śaṅkara says: “The mirage of the universe is reflected in Brahman, 
like a city in a mirror.”  The idea being expressed here, without 49
elaboration, is that the experience of being a soul that observes a 
remote world—what we have been calling the subject-object 
divide—is merely an illusion. The reflection of a city on the 
surface of a mirror only appears to be a remote city; in truth, it is 
only the surface of the mirror that one is seeing. Likewise, the 
observed world only appears to be separate from oneself, in truth it 
is only oneself that one is seeing. 
This city-in-a-mirror simile is not the first time that the idea of 
reflection appears in Hindu philosophy. As we have already seen, 
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 350, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 47
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 91, italics added. See also 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 501, 503, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 
p. 116 [“My outward form comes and goes”; “I am untouched by 
change.”]; Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 2, 28, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, 
pp. 135–136 [asserting that the “external” world has actual existence].
 See, e.g., Spanda-Nirṇaya, propitiatory verses, coms. to Spandakārikā, 48
section 1, verses 1, 2, and 14–16; Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 2; 
Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13 and Yogarāja’s com. to verses 12–13.
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 291, translated in Prabhavananda and Isherwood, 49
Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 80, italics added. The city-
in-a-mirror simile also appears, without elaboration, in Śaṅkara’s 
Dakṣiṇāmūrti Stotra, stanza 1 (translation by Sw. Chinmayananda): “He 
who experiences, at the time of realization, his own immutable Self, in 
which the Self alone plays as the universe of names and forms, like a city 
seen in a mirror . . . .” (Italics added.)
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Śaṅkara frequently relies on the example of the sun reflected in 
water to describe the way the universal consciousness is modified 
by various media to take the illusory form of a multitude of souls. 
Śaṅkara’s sun-in-water example has its roots in the Brahma Sūtras, 
which date, at the latest, to the first centuries of the common era 
and probably earlier, and which assert that the individual soul is a 
“reflection”  of the universal consciousness. And in post-Śaṅkara 50
literature, several Vedānta scholars employ the analogy of 
reflection in that way, describing the individual soul as a reflection 
(pratibimba) and the universal consciousness (Brahman) as the 
prototype (bimba) that is the source of the reflection.  51
But the city-in-a-mirror simile is fundamentally different, for 
it describes the external world, not the individual soul, as a 
reflection, and it describes the universal consciousness (Brahman) 
as the medium in which the reflection of the external world is 
appearing. In light of those distinctions, Śaṅkara’s city-in-a-mirror 
simile might have its roots not in the Brahma Sūtras, but in the 
Yoga Sūtras, which also date to the first centuries of the common 
era. The Yoga Sūtras embrace the theory that one cannot be 
conscious of a thing without being that thing, and therefore the 
Yoga Sūtras assert that the mind (also called the “intelligence”) 
assumes the form of an external object in order to know that 
object. In other words, the mind or the intelligence knows an 
external object by reflecting it and then knowing itself. The Yoga 
Sūtras state: 
Although it is unchanging, consciousness becomes aware 
 Brahma Sūtras, sūtra II.3.50, translated in Radhakrishnan, The 50
Brahma Sutras, p. 420. The sūtra uses the word ābhāsa for “reflection.” 
The same word can mean “false appearance.”
 See, e.g., Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda XXIX.107–111, XXX.112–113; 51
Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya I.15–23, III.37–42, VI.1–10, 128–142; 
Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda IV.173.
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of its own intelligence (buddhi) by means of pervading 
the forms assumed by the intelligence (buddhi). The 
mind, colored by the seer as well as by that which is seen, 
knows all objects.  52
This idea, that the consciousness-pervaded mind assumes the form 
of the object that it knows, is perhaps the literary precursor to 
Śaṅkara’s assertion that “the universe is reflected in Brahman, like 
a city in a mirror.” 
We have said that Śaṅkara does not really close the subject-
object divide, but the city-in-a-mirror simile helps narrow the gap. 
It informs us the seeming remoteness of the material world—its 
objectivity—is an illusion, like the illusion of depth and distance 
that characterizes the image of a city on the flat surface of a mirror. 
According to this paradigm, consciousness is always conscious 
only of itself, and the world doesn’t exist as an objective thing 
separate from nondual consciousness. 
As it turns out, the city-in-a-mirror simile, if applied to all 
things, even to so-called inanimate things like rocks and clods of 
earth, solves the consciousness-matter puzzle that Śaṅkara has 
otherwise only seemed to complicate. Moreover, it does so without 
denying the reality of the external world. As argued in Part One, 
the objects of the observed world are not just consciousness (dream 
images), they are also conscious (dreamers). The things of the 
external world have their own intrinsic being because they are 
 Yoga Sūtras, sūtras IV.22–IV.23, translated in Bryant, The Yoga Sūtras, 52
pp. 443–446. See also id., sūtra IV.17. Perhaps drawing from the Brahma 
Sūtras, Vyāsa commentary to these sūtras (IV.17, IV.22, and IV.23) 
asserts that the mind (or intellect) reflects universal consciousness at the 
same time that it reflects the objects of the world. Thus, the mind or 
intellect acts as a mirror that mediates consciousness and matter. See also 
Ashṭāvakra Gītā I, 19 [“Just as a mirror exists within and without the 
image reflected in it, even so the Supreme Lord exists inside and outside 
this body.”].
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subjects as well as objects of consciousness. What the city-in-a-
mirror simile suggests is that subject and object are one, and 
therefore any object of consciousness is also a conscious subject, 
having the same ontological status as subjects. In short, the objects 
of the observed world have intrinsic being because they are 
thinkers as well as thoughts; they are conscious of themselves, and 
consciousness-of-self is the underlying stuff of existence. 
But to understand how that philosophical conclusion is 
derived from the city-in-a-mirror simile, we will turn to the texts of 
nondual Kashmiri Shaivism. 
3. Nondual Kashmiri Shaivism 
According to legend, the sage Vasugupta (9th century C.E.) 
had a dream in which Śiva told him to go to a particular rock near 
where he lived, and there, inscribed on the underside of that rock, 
he would find teachings that would benefit the world. Vasugupta 
thus discovered the seventy-seven sūtras (“aphorisms”) that 
constitute the Śiva Sūtras. This large rock sits beside a forest 
stream called the Harwan in what is now the Dachigam National 
Park near Srinagar. The sūtras allegedly discovered there 
constitute one of the primary texts of nondual Kashmiri Shaivism. 
Vasugupta is also credited with writing the Spandakārikā (“Verses 
on Vibration”), although the actual author of the latter work might 
have been his disciple Bhatta Kallata (9th century C.E.). Both these 
texts are written in a highly elliptical style, necessitating, as to 
each, an elucidating commentary. Kṣemarāja (10th to 11th century 
C.E.) provides us with such commentaries, and Kṣemarāja also 
wrote the Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam (“Heart of Self-Recognition”), a 
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summary of nondual philosophy.  Finally, Kṣemarāja’s teacher, 53
Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century C.E.), wrote a text called the 
Paramārthasāra (“The Essence of the Supreme Truth”),  and 54
Yogarāja (11th century C.E.) wrote a commentary on that work. 
Together, these four texts—Kṣemarāja’s commentaries on the Śiva 
Sūtras and the Spandakārikā, his own Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, and 
Yogarāja’s commentary on the Paramārthasāra—provide a useful 
introduction to nondual Kashmiri Shaivism. 
Like the Upanishads and the writings of Śaṅkara, these 
Kashmiri texts use theistic terminology in their presentation of 
philosophical ideas. But whereas the Upanishads and Śaṅkara refer 
to God primarily by way of an abstract concept—Brahman, the 
universal consciousness —the texts of Kashmiri Shaivism refer to 55
God using masculine names and honorifics that are usually 
associated with mythological figures—Śiva, Sadāśiva, Śambhu, 
Bhairava, Śaṁkara, and Īśvara. In the context of nondual Kashmiri 
Shaivism, these references should not be thought of as invoking 
the deities of myth. Instead, like the term Brahman, they are used 
to signify the universal consciousness. The texts also use feminine 
names and terms, such as Śakti, Parā, Parāparā, and Aparā, to 
describe God’s creative power. Masculine and feminine 
 The scholar Jaideva Singh (1893–1986 c.e.) translated and annotated 53
Kṣemarāja’s major works. The present book relies on Jaideva Singh’s 
translations, sometimes with minor, non-substantive edits. The 
translations have also been adjusted to make them more gender neutral. It 
is unquestionable that Jaideva Singh believed that the awakened state 
was equally available to women and men.
 Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra is an adaptation of an earlier 54
Vaiṣṇavite text by Ādiśeṣa (6th century C.E.).
 The Upanishads also sometimes use anthropomorphic names for God. 55
They refer, for example, to Purusha (the Cosmic Person), using that name 
semi-synonymously with Ātman (the “universal self” or “soul”), and they 
refer to the various deities of Vedic myth such as Indra, Agni, Soma, 
Varuna, Rudra, Yama, etc.
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iconography plays a significant part in Kashmiri Shaivism, but it 
would be a misinterpretation of the texts to imagine God in 
primarily mythological or gender-specific terms. In these texts, 
God is best described as dynamic consciousness—consciousness 
that has content, not consciousness in potentia. 
Moreover, the most important thing to consider in studying 
these texts is not their names for God but their repeated assertion 
that everything, even an inert lump of clay, has a conscious self. 
That emphasis, not the name used for God, is what distinguishes 
these Kashmiri texts philosophically from earlier texts.  56
a. The Śiva Sūtras 
Kṣemarāja’s commentary on the Śiva Sūtras begins with an 
introductory verse of praise, using Śaṁkara as a name for God. He 
says: 
That consciousness of Śaṁkara . . . is nondual in reality 
though having an appearance of duality . . . . [Its] form is 
this universe, from [its] unimpeded free will ever leaps 
forth [its] divine power which is a mass of bliss . . . .  57
Kṣemarāja thus makes clear, even before his commentary on the 
Śiva Sūtras begins, that dualism is a mere apparition. The divine 
consciousness only seems to be dualistic—that is, it only seems to 
stretch across a subject-object divide, giving rise to the mere 
appearance of a knower and a known. In reality, it is nondual—
conscious only of itself.  Moreover, the divine consciousness is 58
 The assertion that all things are forms of consciousness is 56
commonplace in the texts of Kashmiri Shaivism. Sample texts are set 
forth in Appendix One, section 3, page ___.
 Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, opening prayer.57
 On the nondual nature of true consciousness, see Singh, 58
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, pp. 4–6, 18–20.
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universal, free, and blissful. 
After this introductory verse of praise, Kṣemarāja introduces 
the first sūtra, making the following assertion: 
[I]t (the sūtra) at first teaches—in opposition to those who 
hold that there is a difference between . . . the human self 
and Īśvara (the “Supreme Lord”)—that consciousness of 
Śiva alone is . . . the self of the entire manifestation.  59
Here, Kṣemarāja makes a point that is central to the Upanishads 
and to Śaṅkara’s writings, that God’s universal consciousness is 
what each person experiences as the consciousness of his or her 
own soul. But Kṣemarāja also asserts that God’s universal 
consciousness is the “self [(i.e., the soul)] of the entire 
manifestation,” including also inanimate things. 
Many people believe that consciousness is a characteristic of 
living creatures and that if all living creatures tragically died in a 
horrible cataclysm, there would remain a material universe, 
hanging in space, but it would be known by no one and nothing. 
This error derives from the flawed Cartesian idea that 
consciousness is confined to bubble-like souls that inhabit and 
pilot bodies. But for Kṣemarāja, nondual consciousness-of-self 
(what he calls chaitanya) is the underlying stuff of existence, and 
therefore a universe known by no one and nothing is an 
impossibility. According to this view, the opposite of the word 
“conscious” is not “inert” or “inanimate”; rather, the opposite of 
the word “conscious” is “nonexistent,” for consciousness and 
being are the same thing. This idea is already familiar to us from 
the discussion in Part One. If it exists, it is conscious of itself, and 
that consciousness-of-self is the full extent of what existence is. 
Kṣemarāja next discusses the first sūtra: “Chaitanyamātmā.” 
Kṣemarāja explains that chaitanya, which means “the state of 
 Kṣemarāja’s intro. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1, italics added.59
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being conscious,” is used here as a reference to the universal 
nondual consciousness, and ātmā refers to the human “self” or 
“soul.” Therefore, the first sūtra can be rendered as “the human 
soul is the same as the universal consciousness.” Kṣemarāja goes 
on to explain that there cannot be many consciousnesses. Rather, 
all souls must share the same unified consciousness. As proof, he 
points out that nothing exists outside consciousness (i.e., 
consciousness and being are one), and therefore space, time, and 
form are only appearances in consciousness. Because space, time, 
and form have no existence independent of consciousness, they 
cannot serve to divide consciousness into parts.  60
Still expounding the first sūtra, Kṣemarāja says: 
Moreover, the aforesaid consciousness is the ātmā 
[(“soul”)] or nature of the entire universe consisting of 
both existent objects (like “jar” or “cloth”) [and] 
nonexistent but imagined objects ( l ike “sky-
flower”). . . . [¶] Every appearance owes its existence to 
the light of consciousness. Nothing can ever have its own 
being without the light of consciousness.  61
Once again, Kṣemarāja emphasizes that everything, animate or 
inanimate, has a conscious soul—a jar or a piece of cloth is just as 
conscious as a person reading a book. 
Kṣemarāja next quotes a nondual text called the 
Ucchuṣmabhairava Tantra, which asserts: “The knower and the 
 The assertion that space and time cannot divide consciousness into 60
parts or differentiate souls from one another is commonplace in the texts 
of nondual Kashmiri Shaivism. Sample texts are collected in Appendix 
One, section 4, page ___.
 Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1.61
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known are really the same principle.”  Similarly, he quotes the 62
following from the Spandakārikā (section 2, verse 3): “It is only 
the experien[cer] who always and everywhere exists in the form of 
the experienced.”  What both these verses are asserting is that the 63
subject-object divide is not real; consciousness is always conscious 
only of itself; the sweet knows the sweet. Thus, consistent with the 
nondual philosophy set forth in Part One, Kṣemarāja rejects 
consciousness-matter dualism. What appears as the known (a 
material object) is in reality only the knower’s own consciousness-
of-self. 
In summary, the first sūtra, as explicated by Kṣemarāja, 
asserts that God’s universal nondual consciousness is the 
consciousness that illuminates all things everywhere. As the 
Upanishads explain, one cannot know God as one would know an 
object, just as one cannot know one’s own soul as one would know 
an object. Rather, to know God is to participate in God. But 
nondual Kashmiri Shaivism adds an emphasis that does not come 
to the fore in earlier texts. These Kashmiri texts assert that even 
inanimate material things participate in God’s nondual 
consciousness in that same way. They, too, are conscious, and their 
consciousness-of-self is the foundation of their existence. 
Kṣemarāja returns to these same ideas in his commentary to 
the fourteenth sūtra: “Dṛśyam śarīram.” Kṣemarāja explains that 
the word dṛśyam, from the Sanskrit root dṛś (“seeing,” “viewing,” 
“looking at”), refers to all knowable phenomena, whether an inner 
state or an outer material object, and the word śarīram means 
“body.” Therefore, the sūtra can be rendered as: “That which 
presents itself to one’s consciousness is one’s body.”  Kṣemarāja’s 64
 Quoted in Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1.62
 Quoted in Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1.63
 Jaideva Singh translates the sūtra as follows: “All objective 64
phenomena, outer or inner, are like [the practitioner’s] own body.”
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explains: 
Whatever is perceptible whether inwardly or outwardly, 
all that appears to [the expert practitioner] like his or her 
own body, i.e., identical with his or her own self and not 
as something different. . . . His or her feeling is ‘I am 
this,’ just as the feeling of Sadāśiva with regard to the 
entire universe is ‘I am this.’  65
Thus, Kṣemarāja presents a philosophical system that matches 
the philosophical system set forth above in Part One. Most people 
identify with a physical human body, or perhaps with the brain of 
such a body, but they do not identify with the surrounding objects 
that their senses perceive, such as a chair or the sweetness of a cup 
of tea. But the truth is that all consciousness is consciousness-of-
self, and one is aware of an external object only because it is 
reflected and represented in one’s own self. Moreover, external 
objects only appear to be material because of being perceived 
through the mediation of the senses. Their true form is their own 
consciousness-of-self. And because any divisions that appear in 
consciousness are themselves just consciousness, a wise person 
recognizes that all perceptions are nothing but self.  66
b. The Spandakārikā and the Spanda-Nirṇaya 
The Spandakārikā is a collection of verses attributed to 
Vasugupta but perhaps written by his disciple Bhatta Kallata (9th 
century C.E.). The title means “Verses on Vibration,” referring to 
the theory that “vibration” or “pulse” (Sanskrit: spanda) plays a 
critical role in the underlying structure of the universe. 
 Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 14.65
 See also Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 15 [“the appearance of 66
everything as it is in its essential reality, devoid of the distinction 
between subject and object, [as] a component of oneself”].
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Metaphorically speaking, one can think of the universe as the 
interference patterns that result from countless interactions among 
countless waves, leading to ever increasing degrees of 
diversification and complexity.  For our purposes, however, the 67
vibrational foundation of the universe is relevant only for what it 
tells us about consciousness. 
The Spandakārikā has been explicated in several important 
commentaries. Kṣemarāja’s commentary is called the Spanda-
Nirṇaya, meaning “The Comprehensive Study of Vibration.” In the 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, Kṣemarāja employs the city-in-a-mirror simile 
that Śaṅkara mentioned in passing in Crest-Jewel of 
Discrimination, but Kṣemarāja develops that simile, using it to 
explain that consciousness is nondual, despite appearing to be dual. 
His commentary is in the traditional form of a series of objections 
and replies. He writes: 
[Objection:] “Well, if this world has come out (i.e., 
separated) from that Exquisite Mass of Light [(i.e., from 
universal consciousness)], then how can it be manifest, 
for nothing can be manifest outside Light [(i.e., nothing 
exists outside consciousness)]?” . . . [¶] [Reply:] . . . “That 
(i.e., the world) has not come out from Him [(i.e., from 
universal consciousness)] as does a walnut from a bag. 
Rather, the self-same Lord—through his absolute freedom, 
manifesting the world, on His own background, like a city 
in a mirror, as if different from Him, though non-different
 See Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 1 67
[“Vibhava means the infinite variety of junction and disjunction of the 
group of Śaktis [(“powers”)] whose highest raison d’etre consists in 
manifestation. . . . Thus the Lord by mutually joining and disjoining in 
various ways all the objective phenomena which are of the nature of 
consciousness and exist in Him as identical with Him is the cause of the 
manifestation and absorption of the universe.”].
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—abides in Himself.”  68
In other words, the universal consciousness—called “Lord” in this 
text—is both one and alone. The world does not come into 
existence as something separate from consciousness (“as does a 
walnut from a bag”). Rather, the world comes into existence as 
consciousness (“on His own background, like a city in a mirror”), 
and the separation is only apparent. 
Later in his commentary, Kṣemarāja returns to the city-in-a-
mirror simile. He writes: 
[The creator] manifests innumerable [objective] things 
like body, blue [sky], etc., which, though non-different 
from the essential nature of consciousness, appear as 
different, like reflections in a mirror (which though non-
different from the mirror appear as different).  69
Kṣemarāja is again asserting that objects of consciousness are not 
different from the consciousness that observes them, just as a 
reflection of a city in a mirror is not different from the mirror’s 
shiny reflective surface. Consciousness is always conscious only of 
itself, and the subject-object divide is an illusion. 
In section 2, verses 3 and 4, the Spandakārikā again asserts the 
identity of subject and object in a text that we already encountered 
in Kṣemarāja’s commentary on the Śiva Sūtras: 
Since the limited individual self [or soul] is identical with 
the whole universe, . . . hence, whether in the word, 
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 2, italics 68
added. See also Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 
1 [“This power . . . goes on presenting [everything] on its own 
background like the reflection of a city in a mirror.”].
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verses 14–16.69
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object, or thought, there is no state which is not Śiva [(i.e., 
universal consciousness)]. It is the experien[cer] who, 
always and everywhere, abides in the form of the 
experienced, i.e., it is the Divine Himself who is the 
essential experien[cer], and it is He [(God, or universal 
consciousness)] who abides in the form of the universe as 
His field of experience.  70
By saying that the experiencer (the subject) takes the form of the 
experienced (the object), the Spandakārikā is making clear that all 
objects of consciousness, even inanimate objects, are also 
experiencers of consciousness. The collapse of subject and object 
into one—which is the essence of the city-in-a-mirror simile—
necessarily implies the consciousness of all things, even things that 
appear to be material and inert. 
The Spandakārikā brings these ideas to a powerful conclusion 
in section 2, verses 6 and 7. These two verses assert: 
This only is the manifestation of the object of meditation 
in the meditator’s mind: that the aspirant with resolute 
will has the realization of his or her identity with that 
(object of meditation). [¶] This alone is the acquisition of 
ambrosia leading to immortality; this alone is the 
realization of Self; this alone is the initiation of liberation 
leading to identity with Śiva.  71
In South Asian religious tradition, one uses the mantra of one’s 
personal deity as a support in meditation, culminating (one hopes) 
in the manifestation of that deity before oneself in physical form. 
But this text asserts that the manifestation of one’s mantra deity 
 Spandakārikā, section 2, verses 3–4, italics added.70
 Spandakārikā, section 2, verses 6–7, italics added.71
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occurs only in the realization that one actually is the deity that one 
has been meditating upon. Moreover, one’s immortality, one’s self-
realization, and one’s identity with Śiva are all none other than the 
direct experience of that subject-object unity. As Kṣemarāja 
affirms, quoting another text: “One should worship Śiva by 
becoming Śiva.”  Any other form of worship is at best merely a 72
preparation for worship. 
c. The Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam 
The Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam was written by Kṣemarāja with the 
purpose of making the ideas of nondualism available to the non-
expert. He says: 
In this world, there are some devoted people who are 
undeveloped in reflection and have not taken pains in 
studying difficult works like Logic and Dialectics, but 
who nevertheless aspire after Samāveśa [(“merging” or 
“identification”)] with the highest Lord . . . . For their 
sake, the truth of the teaching of Īśvara-pratyabhijñā [(a 
9th century C.E. work by Utpaladeva)] is being explained 
briefly.  73
Below is the first sūtra of the Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, followed 
immediately by an excerpt taken from Kṣemarāja’s commentary: 
Sūtra 1: 
The absolute chiti [(“nondual consciousness”)] of its 
own free will is the cause of the [effectuation] of the 
universe. 
Kṣemarāja’s commentary: 
. . . It is only when chiti, the ultimate consciousness-
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 2, verses 6–7.72
 Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, Intro.73
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power, comes into play that the universe comes forth into 
being (lit.: “opens its eyelids”) and continues as existent, 
and when [chiti] withdraws its movement, the universe 
also disappears from view (lit.: “shuts its eyelids”).  74
What this text is saying is that consciousness and being are the 
same thing. An object that is outside consciousness is not inert or 
inanimate; it is non-existent. 
The second sūtra explains that consciousness does not give 
rise to the universe in a dualistic sense—that is, with the objective 
universe existing as a thing separate from, and observed by, a 
conscious soul. Rather, consciousness creates the universe within 
consciousness: 
By the power of her own will (alone), she [(i.e., chiti, or 
nondual consciousness)] unfolds the universe upon her 
own screen (i.e., in herself as the basis of the universe).  75
According to this verse, that which appears in the form of knower 
and known (subject and object) is actually consciousness conscious 
only of itself, an idea that has become familiar to us. Kṣemarāja 
then uses the city-in-a-mirror simile to explain the point further: 
She [(i.e., chiti, or nondual consciousness)] unfolds the 
previously defined universe (i.e., from Sadāśiva down to 
the earth) like a city in a mirror, which though non-
different from [the surface of the mirror] appears as 
different.  76
 Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, sūtra 1 and com. to sūtra 1.74
 Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, sūtra 2.75
 Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 2.76
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As we have discussed at some length in Part One, we cannot 
be conscious of a thing without being that thing, and therefore in 
our knowing of any external object, we are only conscious of the 
effects that object is having on our own self, and from those 
effects, we are merely inferring the external object. Like the 
reflection of a distant city in the flat surface of a mirror, objects 
appear to be remote, but it is only the shiny surface of the mirror 
that we are seeing when we look at the reflected city, and it is only 
our own self that is the content of our conscious experience when 
we look at an external object. 
In his commentary to the ninth sūtra, Kṣemarāja goes on to 
explain that by relying on sense organs as a means of acquiring 
knowledge about the surrounding world, universal consciousness 
takes the form of an individual soul. This point, too, is familiar to 
us from the discussion of nondual consciousness in Part One. 
Kṣemarāja states: 
When the highest Lord, whose very essence is 
consciousness, conceals, by His free will, pervasion of 
non-duality and assumes duality all round, then His will 
and other powers, though essentially non-limited, assume 
limitation. . . . By assuming extreme limitation, beginning 
with the acquisition of an inner organ [(i.e., the psyche)] 
and organs of perception [(i.e., the senses)], [the universal 
consciousness] acquires māyiya-mala, which consists in 
the apprehension of all objects as different [from itself].  77
Imagine, a person who, since birth, is only permitted to see 
and hear through a camera and microphone located somewhere 
inside his or her own body. This person will inevitably view 
internal bodily organs as if they were external. Likewise, when 
consciousness—which is infinite and universal—shines through 
 Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 9.77
64
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
the brain and “organs of perception” of a body, it assumes the 
contracted form of an individual soul imagining the objects of its 
sensory perception to be external to it. The universal consciousness 
then believes “I am small” and “the external world is vast,” but it is 
only the perceptive capacity of the brain and sense organs that is 
small. In truth, the universal consciousness is unbound, and the 
entire world is internal to it, as the following verse from the Īśvara 
Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpaladeva (book 1, ch. 5, v. 7) describes: 
The Divine Being whose essence is Chit (Universal 
Consciousness) makes the collection of objects that are 
internally contained appear outside by His Will, . . . .  78
In other words, the individual soul is what the universal 
consciousness appears to be when it illuminates the functioning of 
a brain and sense organs. But in doing so, it undergoes no actual 
change. 
Consider the example of water moving in a fast-flowing 
cascade, forming itself into numerous whirlpools and eddies that 
dissipate over time and then reappear. In the same way, universal 
consciousness, which is dynamic and ever-changing, configures 
itself into corporeal systems that gather information through sense 
organs, just as the whirlpools gather water from the surrounding 
area, and while the universal consciousness is so configured, it 
imagines itself to be an individual soul knowing an external 
material world, but in truth it never ceases to be the universal 
consciousness. Kṣemarāja describes the process in terms of 
concealment and grace: 
 Quoted in Singh, Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, p. 19. Consider also the 78
following verse from the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpaladeva 
(book 1, ch. 6, v. 7), quoted by Kṣemarāja in Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. 
to sūtra 10: “[T]he Lord [(i.e., the universal consciousness)], entering 
into the body, etc., causes the objects to appear outwardly . . . , though 
[these objects are actually] appearing within Himself.”
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[W]hen the great Lord, who is consciousness, entering 
into the sphere of the body . . . , makes objects . . . appear 
in definite space, time, etc., then with . . . reference to 
[their] appearance as different [from the observer], it is 
His act of concealment. With reference to the appearance 
of every thing as identical with the light (of 
consciousness), it is His act of grace.  79
d. The Paramārthasāra 
The foregoing texts present the views of Kṣemarāja, either in 
his commentaries on the Śiva Sūtras and the Spandakārikā, or in 
his own work, the Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam. But Kṣemarāja’s disciple, 
Yogarāja, further develops the theory of universal nondual 
consciousness in his commentary on Abhinavagupta’s 
Paramārthasāra. Significantly, Yogarāja’s commentary on the 
Paramārthasāra asserts, even more explicitly than previous texts, 
that all things are conscious, and Yogarāja further develops the 
city-in-a-mirror simile to explain the nondual nature of that 
consciousness. 
The first verse of Abhinavagupta’s Paramārthasāra refers to 
the universal nondual consciousness as Śambhu, an alternative 
name for Śiva. It says that Śambhu is “without beginning” and 
“one” but also “existent in all beings.”  Yogarāja’s commentary 80
then explains that all things are conscious as a result of partaking 
of the universal consciousness. He says: 
 Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 10.79
 Paramārthasāra, verse 1. The translations quoted herein from 80
Yogarāja commentary on the Paramārthasāra are by Prof. Deba Brata 
SenSharma, sometimes with minor, non-substantive edits. See 
SenSharma, Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of 
Yogarāja.
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Whatever is different from him [(i.e., universal 
consciousness)] is unmanifest and is therefore 
nonexistent: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Śambhu is . . . the innermost 
divine Self of all, and has assumed infinite forms, despite 
his being of the nature of the supreme Self.  81
By asserting that “Śambhu is . . . the innermost divine Self of all,” 
Yogarāja makes clear that the objects of consciousness are not 
mere dream images. Rather, all things—even inanimate things—
have a conscious self, making them subjects as well as objects. 
The idea that a rock or a clod of earth is conscious leaves one 
to wonder what the rock or clod is thinking about, but verse 8 of 
the Paramārthasāra explains that, although all things have a 
conscious self, all things do not have anything like a human soul, 
or even an animal soul. Rather, the consciousness that 
characterizes all things is just consciousness-of-self. That 
consciousness-of-self can take the form of an individual soul 
knowing an outside world only when a particular physical system 
is constructed in such a way as to produce, in one place, a 
representation of the outside world—as is true, for example, of a 
body with a brain and sense organs. To make this point, the 
Paramārthasāra draws an analogy to Rāhu. 
Rāhu is the ascending lunar node (the place where the moon’s 
orbit intersects the ecliptic when ascending from the southern 
ecliptic hemisphere to the northern ecliptic hemisphere). In 
astronomy, this node is merely a location in space, but if the moon 
happens to be “full” (directly opposite the sun, on the far side of 
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 1, quoting Spandakārikā, 81
section 2, verse 3, italics added. Jaideva Singh translates the same verse 
of the Spandakārikā as follows: “It is the experien[cer] himself who, 
always and everywhere, abides in the form of the experienced, i.e., it is 
the Divine Himself who is the essential Experien[cer], and it is He who 
abides in the form of the universe as His field of experience.”
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the earth) when this intersection occurs, we experience it as a lunar 
eclipse. In Vedic astrology, which focuses on how things appear to 
an earthly viewer, this ascending lunar node is thought to be an 
invisible planet that becomes visible during the eclipse. Using that 
invisible planet as an analogy, verse 8 states: 
Just as the invisible Rāhu (the shadow of the earth), when 
appearing on the disc of the moon [at the time of a lunar 
eclipse,] becomes visible, in the same way, the Self 
though present everywhere becomes perceptible in the 
mirror of the intellect (buddhi) by [the perception of] 
sense objects.  82
In other words, consciousness is everywhere, but what makes the 
consciousness of a lump of clay different from that of a person is 
the absence, in the former case, of a brain and sense organs that 
can make the consciousness “perceptible in the mirror of the 
intellect.” 
In commenting on this verse, Yogarāja distinguishes between 
the absolute “I” and the relative “I.” The relative “I” is the “I” that 
appears in the sentence: “I hear the sound.” This relative “I” exists 
as a subject in relation to a known object, and it depends on the 
knowing of the object for its existence. When an object is known, 
even if the object is only a mental image, then the relative “I” is 
also known. When there is no object known, as in dreamless sleep, 
the relative “I” disappears. Thus, the relative “I” is the “I” of 
subject-object dualism, which, as we have seen, is illusory. By 
contrast, the absolute “I” is the nondual consciousness that 
constitutes one’s true self. It never disappears, even in dreamless 
sleep, and according to verse 8, it is “present everywhere”—that is, 
in all things. Yogarāja explains: 
 Paramārthasāra, verse 8, italics added, all textual additions by 82
SenSharma.
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Although Rāhu remains constantly moving about in the 
sky and is not ordinarily visible, when it happens to settle 
down on the disc of the moon at the time of a lunar 
eclipse, it is seen and recognised as “this is Rāhu.” . . . In 
the same way, although the Self exists in all [things], 
constituting the innermost being [of all things], . . . it is 
not perceived by all as “this is the Self.” But when an 
object of cognition is revealed by being reflected in the 
intellect-mirror . . . of embodied beings [(i.e., beings that 
have a brain and sense organs)], the Self becomes an 
object of cognition [along with the external object], as in 
the cognition of sound in the form of “I hear the 
sound.” . . . [By contrast,] the Self [(i.e., nondual 
consciousness)], though existent in a lump of clay, 
appears as non-existent to the cognisor on account of its 
being covered by a thick veil of tamas (darkness) . . . . 
[¶] . . . But from the point of view of the supreme Lord, the 
distinction between the inanimate and the animate does 
not exist, and the world’s conventional understanding of 
their difference has no significance.  83
Yogarāja is making a striking assertion here. Everything, 
everywhere, is conscious, but only organisms that have a brain and 
sense organs are constructed in such a way that the consciousness
—which is universal and nondual—assumes the form of an 
individual soul knowing various objects of perception. This 
assertion, that all things are conscious, is certainly implied or said 
without elaboration in earlier texts, but here it is spelled out in 
some detail. 
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 8, italics added, underlined 83
textual additions by the present author, all other textual additions by 
SenSharma.
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Verses 12 and 13 of the Paramārthasāra present what is 
perhaps the quintessential statement of the city-in-a-mirror simile, 
using it to illustrate that consciousness is always nondual, despite 
appearing to us in the form of a subject knowing an object. Verses 
12 and 13 state: 
Just as variety in the form of a city, village, etc., when 
seen in a mirror is not separate [from the mirror’s flat 
surface], yet it [(the variety of objects)] appears 
differentiated [in the mirror] as a city, village, etc., and 
also as different from the mirror. Similarly the universe, 
though not existing as different from pure self-experience 
of the highest Bhairava [(i.e., universal consciousness)], 
appears as the world, differentiated and different from 
[Bhairava] . . . .  84
Yogarāja’s commentary explicates these important verses in 
great detail, but to understand his commentary, one must consider 
that mirrors in 11th century Kashmir were made of polished metal, 
usually an alloy of copper. Thus, when Yogarāja describes a “clear 
mirror,” he is referring to something whose reflective surface was 
unmistakably visible to the observer, and the term “clear” meant 
only that a discernible reflection, not a vague blur, appeared within 
the mirror. Here is Yogarāja’s commentary: 
When reflected with all their distinct traits and individual 
features in a clear mirror, a city, a village, hamlets, the 
walls surrounding them, buildings, fields, big rivers, 
rivulets, fire, trees, mountains, animals, birds, men, 
women, etc., all appear to relinquish their separate 
existence and give up their traits[, all manifesting instead 
 Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13, underlined textual additions by the 84
present author, all other textual additions by SenSharma.
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as the same visible mirror-surface in which they are all 
reflected]. But even while manifesting themselves as non-
different from the mirror, they retain their individual 
existence and are manifested individually with their 
characteristic traits. A jar is manifest [in the mirror] 
differentiated from cloth, and vice versa. All the objects 
reflected in the mirror are perceived there [as the mirror 
surface but also as objects] differentiated from each 
other.  85
Yogarāja thus makes the point that the metallic surface of the 
mirror is visible in addition to the reflections that appear within it, 
and thus the reflections are not mistaken for a real jar or a real 
piece of cloth; they are known to be mere appearances in a 
mirror.  He continues: 86
Despite persons having the experience of objects in a 
mirror, the knowledge that ‘this is a mirror’ remains an 
uncontradicted experience. [¶] Objects like a pot [though 
appearing in the mirror] do not characterize the mirror [or 
change its essential nature], causing us to have the 
experience ‘this is a pot-mirror’ or ‘this is a cloth-mirror,’ 
thus obliterating the very existence of the mirror as a 
reflecting medium. . . . 
. . . 
As in the example of a city reflected in a mirror 
described above, after the dissolution of all impurity 
[from one’s vision], the universe is experienced as non-
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13, underlined textual 85
additions by the present author, all other textual additions by SenSharma.
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13 [“[No reflection] is 86
perceived in the mirror as existing apart from it, the reflecting 
medium.”].
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different from [that which illumines and reveals it]: the 
illumination-nature of the highest Bhairava, which is the 
absolutely pure light of consciousness of the supreme 
Lord Śiva, accompanied by the highest bliss.  87
What Yogarāja is saying here is that just as the reflection of a 
city in a mirror is seen to be non-different from the metallic surface 
of the mirror in which it appears, and one necessarily is aware of 
the metallic mirror-surface that is the underlying substratum of the 
refection, so the universe is seen, by a self-realized person, to be 
non-different from the divine consciousness in which the universe 
appears, and one necessarily is aware of the divine consciousness 
as the underlying substratum. Moreover, like the objects in the 
mirror, which retain their characteristic traits and differentiation 
from each other, so “[t]he universe . . . is composed of 
experiencers and the experienced [(subjects and objects)], which 
are distinct from each other and are of infinite variety,”  despite 88
being non-different from the universal consciousness in which they 
appear. 
Yogarāja next discusses the limitations of the city-in-a-mirror 
simile, at least when that simile is used to describe the totality of 
all consciousness rather than just the consciousness of a single 
person: 
The distinction between the manifestation of objects 
through their reflection in a mirror and the manifestation 
of the universe by the light of consciousness . . . lies in the 
fact that the objects like the city and so on are external to 
the mirror when these are reflected in its clear surface. 
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13, all textual additions 87
by SenSharma.
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13, all textual additions 88
by SenSharma.
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Moreover these objects are not created by the mirror 
during the process of reflection. Therefore, the perception 
in the mirror that “this is an elephant” is undoubtedly a 
delusion[, for it is a metallic mirror reflecting an elephant, 
not an elephant]. [¶] The divine illumination[, by 
contrast,] . . . experiencing the universe [projected upon] 
its own Self as the canvas [or reflecting surface,] out of its 
own free will, has [only] consciousness[, not the existence 
of some external object,] as the material cause. . . . This 
self-knowledge is the distinguishing feature of the divine 
illumination, differentiating it from the inert reflecting 
power of the mirror.  89
Just as a reflection of a city in a metallic mirror takes the form 
of a distant city, when in reality it is non-different from the metallic 
surface of the mirror, likewise the universal consciousness creates 
the illusion of a multitude of subjects each knowing a vast external 
world, when in reality the universal consciousness has no spatial 
dimensions, and it is always nondual—conscious only of itself. But 
as Yogarāja explains, the surface of a metallic mirror reflects light 
shining from an actual distant city, and in so doing, the mirror’s 
surface isn’t conscious of the image it is reflecting. By contrast, the 
universal consciousness manifests images of cities and the like on 
the “canvas” of consciousness, without there being an object 
outside consciousness that is the source of those images, and the 
universal consciousness is conscious of those images by reason of 
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 12–13, underlined textual 89
additions by the present author, all other textual additions by SenSharma. 
See also Paramārthasāra, verses 48–49 [“It is in ‘me’ that the universe 
reveals itself as [inanimate objects like] jars, as in a mirror. . . . It is the 
supreme ‘I’ (aham) alone who takes the form of the universe, like a body 
composed of hands, feet, etc. In all, it is the ‘I’ (aham) alone who is 
manifest as illumination in all of its modes.” (textual addition by 
SenSharma)].
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being conscious of itself.  90
Yogarāja’s critique of the city-in-a-mirror simile is valid 
insofar as he is pointing out that, although a real city exists outside 
the metallic mirror, nothing exists outside the universal 
consciousness. At the universal level, the images that appear in 
consciousness appear there without being the reflections of an 
external thing. But as Yogarāja has previously explained, the city-
in-a-mirror simile also describes the human intellect, which is the 
consciousness-of-self that illuminates the human brain, and 
needless to say, things do exist outside a human brain. Thus, as 
regards the sensory perceptions that a person has of the 
surrounding world, the city-in-a-mirror simile remains quite apt. 
Whatever seemingly external thing one might be perceiving, one is 
actually only conscious of one’s own self in which the external 
thing is being reflected. One’s sense of separation from the content 
of one’s consciousness is only an illusion. The subject-object 
divide is a misinterpretation of the facts. 
But the most important point stated repeatedly in the 
Paramārthasāra is that the nondual consciousness that is so aptly 
illustrated by the city-in-a-mirror simile describes the 
consciousness of everything, not just the consciousness of living 
creatures. For example, verse 30 asserts that it is only because of 
our dualistic vision, mediated through the senses, that we 
“experience the non-self [(i.e., inertness)] in things which in fact 
are identical with the Self [(i.e., consciousness)].”  Indeed, even 91
an earthenware jar is fully conscious. Therefore, verse 74 states 
that for an awakened person, “[e]ither his own body or 
another’s . . . or any [external] object like a jar etc. is his 
 These points are explained by Swami Lakshmanjoo Raina (1907–1991 90
C.E.) in his introductory book on Kashmiri Shaivism. See Lakshmanjoo, 
Kashmir Shaivism: The Secret Supreme, pp. 29–32.
 Paramārthasāra, verse 30, all textual additions by the present author.91
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temple” —that is, the locus of God or consciousness. Yogarāja 92
elaborates the point as follows: 
Not only is the physical body a location of pure 
consciousness and therefore rightly described as a temple, 
but everything else is also the locus of pure consciousness 
and must be regarded as a temple. . . . [The reference to 
“jars” in the verse] impl[ies] the five types of sense-
objects, which are the objects enjoyed through the [five] 
senses—the eyes[, ears, tongue, nose, and skin]—and 
which are also pervaded by pure consciousness.  93
This teaching, that the objects of the world are not just 
consciousness but also conscious, is a logical outgrowth of the 
city-in-a-mirror simile, which eliminates the subject-object divide 
without privileging one or the other side of that divide. If the 
teaching is categorized as idealism, it is very different from the 
notion that all things are merely the dream images of a lonely 
dreamer. Rather, all things are the dream images of themselves, 
having their own intrinsic being despite being only consciousness. 
This idealism, then, is a diffuse idealism that merges idealism and 
materialism into one. One could just as accurately describe it as 
materialism that focuses on what matter is, not how matter acts. 
4. The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha and the Tripurā Rahasya 
The last South Asian texts that we will discuss are the Yoga 
Vāsiṣṭha and the Tripurā Rahasya. Both texts develop ideas that 
are only outlined in the 11th century texts of nondual Kashmiri 
 Paramārthasāra, verse 74, italics added, textual addition by 92
SenSharma.
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 74, italics added, underlined 93
textual additions by the present author, all other textual additions by 
SenSharma.
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Shaivism, and they integrate those ideas into mainstream 
Hinduism. It seems likely, therefore, that the current recensions of 
both texts date to a period after the 11th century. They both rely 
heavily on nondual Kashmiri Shaivism, popularizing its ideas, 
using the accessible format of a dialogue between a teacher and a 
student. 
a. The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha 
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha (“Vāsiṣṭha’s Union”; i.e., his method for 
attaining divine union) is a long text that covers a lot of ground. It 
is not always internally consistent, although the inconsistencies are 
mostly superficial, reflecting the effort of the author to harmonize 
different schools and traditions. The text consists of a series of 
entertaining stories, interwoven with philosophical commentary 
that draws from South Asian folk traditions, Buddhism, Śaṅkara’s 
Vedānta, and, in particular, nondual Kashmiri Shaivism. As noted, 
Yoga Vāsiṣṭha elucidates the ideas of the latter tradition, and 
therefore the final redaction of the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha probably dates to 
the 11th century C.E. or later. Because an abbreviated version of the 
Yoga Vāsiṣṭha was translated into Persian in the 14th or 15th 
century C.E., it seems reasonable to date the text to somewhere 
between the 11th and 15th centuries. The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha is very 
repetitive. For our purposes, it is most useful to focus on select 
passages that seem to be rooted in nondual Kashmiri Shaivism, 
using those passages as evidence of the continuing development of 
the latter tradition. 
Consistent with the principal texts of nondual Kashmiri 
Shaivism, the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha asserts not only that all things are 
consciousness, but that all things are themselves conscious. 
Seeming to draw directly from Yogarāja’s commentary to verse 8 
of the Paramārthasāra, the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha asserts that the 
consciousness of an inanimate thing such as a rock is like the 
consciousness of a person in dreamless sleep; it is fully present but 
not hooked up to a functioning brain and to functioning sense 
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organs, and so, like light shining through empty space, it goes 
unnoticed. In addition, the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha repeatedly makes the 
point that all consciousness is consciousness-of-self; the illusion of 
subject-object consciousness arises only because of the way the 
content of consciousness is configured. These are ideas that are 
familiar to us both from the general discussion of nondual 
consciousness in Part One and from our review of the principal 
texts of nondual Kashmiri Shaivism. 
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha also makes frequent use of the city-in-a-
mirror simile or some variant thereof. As in earlier texts, the point 
of the mirror simile is to emphasize that the apparently vast world, 
with all its complexity and differentiation, exists within a 
measureless point of undifferentiated consciousness, just as a large 
city or a mountain is reflected in the surface of a small mirror. And 
as noted, the mirror simile further serves to teach that the universe, 
despite the illusion of subject-object dualism, is nothing but 
nondual consciousness, just as the reflection in a mirror is nothing 
but the mirror. 
Building on nondual Kashmiri Shaivism, the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha 
spells out much more precisely than earlier texts how universal 
nondual consciousness-of-self becomes what we experience 
(falsely) as an individual soul that knows an objective world. 
Employing the mirror simile, the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha first explains that 
the soul, witnessing, within itself, a reflection of various external 
actions, imagines it is the doer of those actions, when in reality the 
actions merely unfold spontaneously: 
Even as a mountain is reflected in a mirror and is seen as 
if it were in the mirror, the jīva [(individual soul)] reflects 
the external objects and activities, and soon begins to 
think that they are all [initiated] within itself and that he is 
the doer of the actions and the experiencer of the 
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experiences. (III, 13.)  94
The text goes on to explain that the individual soul seeks 
information about the surrounding world, and that seeking is what 
causes the sense organs to continue to evolve. Moreover, sensory 
perception, far from being a true and accurate form of knowing, is 
constrained by the limitations of the sense organs, which present 
the world to the soul in a way that makes it appear to be a material 
thing rather than the nondual consciousness that it is. The Yoga 
Vāsiṣṭha states: 
When the jīva [(the individual soul)] wishes to see, 
eyes are formed in the gross body. Even so the skin 
(tactile sense), ears, tongue, nose, and the organs of action 
are formed as a result of the appropriate desire arising in 
the jīva [(the individual soul)]. Thus abides in the body, 
the jīva, which has the extremely subtle body of [nondual] 
consciousness, imagining various external physical 
experiences and various internal psychological 
experiences. Thus, resting in the unreal [(i.e., what is 
presented by the sense organs)], which however appears 
to be real, Brahman [(i.e., the nondual consciousness)], 
now appearing to be jīva [(an individual soul)], becomes 
confused. 
This same Brahman, which has come to regard itself 
as a finite jīva and endowed with a physical body, 
apprehends the external world, which on account of the 
veil of ignorance appears to be composed of matter. . . . 
But all this is mere imagination or thought. Even 
now, nothing has ever been created; the pure infinite 
 The translations quoted herein from the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha are by Swami 94
Venkatesananda, sometimes with minor, non-substantive edits. See 
Venkatesananda, The Supreme Yoga.
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space alone exists. . . . Cosmic consciousness alone exists 
now and ever; in it are no worlds, no created beings. That 
consciousness reflected in itself appears to be 
creation. . . . (III, 13.) 
This wonderful text is making a point that we elaborated in 
some detail in Part One. The jīva—the individual soul—is and 
always was universal nondual consciousness. Its sense of being an 
individual located in a particular time and place is merely an 
illusion created by sensory perception. The text continues: 
[T]here is neither one jīva [(i.e., individual soul)], nor 
many, nor a conglomerate of jīvas. Jīva is only a name! 
What exists is only Brahman [(i.e., universal nondual 
consciousness)]. . . . [What is really] [o]ne alone appears 
as diverse on account of ignorance; we do not experience 
this ignorance, which disappears on enquiry even as 
darkness vanishes when light is brought in to look at it. 
Brahman alone is the cosmic soul and [also] the millions 
of jīvas [(i.e., individual souls)]. There is naught else. 
By the apprehension of the perceived or the 
knowable [(i.e., by the subject-object consciousness of 
sensory perception)], [nondual] consciousness becomes 
jīva (the living soul) and is apparently involved in 
repetitive history (samsara). When the false notion of a 
knowable apart from the knower (consciousness) ceases, 
it regains its equilibrium. (III, 14.) 
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha thus beautifully explains that subject-object 
consciousness is a misinterpretation of the facts. In truth, “the 
universe does not exist as universe, independent of consciousness.” 
(III, 14.) Moreover, its apparent materiality is merely an effect of 
sensory perception, which is a mediated form of knowing and 
therefore flawed: 
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One can say that this world-appearance is real only so far 
as it is the manifestation of consciousness and because of 
direct experience; and it is unreal when it is grasped with 
the mind and the sense organs. (III, 61.) 
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha returns repeatedly to these same basic 
ideas, rephrasing them in numerous ways. The passage quoted 
below again explains (1) that consciousness is always conscious 
only of itself, (2) that subject-object consciousness is an illusion, 
and (3) that what appears to be material when known through the 
senses is actually nothing but consciousness. The text states: 
It is not as if the subject illumines the object, which 
has no luminosity of its own, but since consciousness is 
all this, everything is self-luminous, without requiring a 
perceiving intelligence. It is by the action of 
consciousness becoming aware of itself that intelligence 
manifests itself, not when consciousness apprehends an 
inert object.  
It is not correct to say that there is a mixture in this 
universe of the sentient and the inert, for they do not 
mix. . . . [A]ll things are full of consciousness and when 
this consciousness comprehends itself there is know[ing]. 
(III, 121.) 
According to the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha, it is nondual consciousness that 
becomes the conscious individual soul, and it is the same nondual 
consciousness that becomes the material object: 
Consciousness reflecting in consciousness shines as 
consciousness and exists as consciousness; yet, to one 
who is ignorant (though considering oneself as wise and 
rational) there arises the notion that there has come into 
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being and there exists something other than this 
consciousness. (IV, 36.) 
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha often seizes upon ideas introduced in the 
primary texts of nondual Kashmiri Shaivism, and it then elaborates 
and develops those ideas. In the following example, the Yoga 
Vāsiṣṭha explains how nondual consciousness comes to imagine 
that it is a person knowing a world: 
Thus, the natural combination of atomic particles and 
molecules ([taking the form of a brain and sense organs] 
in-dwelt by consciousness) apparently acts as a dividing 
wall, thus giving rise to the divisions of “I,” “you,” etc., 
and these then appear to be outside of consciousness, as 
its object. In fact, all these are but reflections in the 
consciousness which, becoming aware of them within 
itself, bestows upon them their apparent individuality. 
Consciousness tastes itself, the awareness being non-
different from consciousness, and that appears to give rise 
to the ego-sense, etc., naught else. The crystal of this 
infinite consciousness reflects its own light of 
consciousness which is present in all these combinations 
of atomic particles, and they then gain an apparent self-
consciousness and think “I am,” etc. 
In reality, because the inner awareness in all these 
combinations is non-different from the infinite 
consciousness, there is no subject-object relationship 
between them: hence, one does not experience the other, 
gain the other, or change or modify the other. . . . 
[But] . . . all that I [(the sage Vāsiṣṭha)] have said above is 
but a play of words to help your comprehension: There is 
no such thing as “I” or “the world” (the combination of 
atomic particles, etc.). There is neither mind, nor an object 
of knowledge, nor the world illusion. Just as water 
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acquires the appearance of a whirlpool with a personality 
of its own, consciousness seems to give the appearance of 
“I” etc., within itself. But consciousness is consciousness 
only, whether it thinks of itself as lord Śiva [(the universal 
soul)] or as a little jīva [(an individual soul)]! 
. . . [T]here is no real and essential distinction 
between the individual (jīva) and the cosmic being (Śiva). 
Know all this to be undivided and indivisible infinite 
consciousness. (V, 57.) 
As we read in the Upanishads, even the cosmic forces (the 
“gods”) are subordinated to consciousness, their individuality 
being a mere appearance. The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha states: 
It is consciousness alone which takes the form of Śiva 
[(the universal soul)] and Pārvati [(the dynamic creative 
energy)], of Brahmā, the creator, and the numerous other 
beings. This consciousness is like a mirror which holds a 
reflection within itself, as it were, without undergoing any 
modification thereby. Without undergoing any 
modification in itself, this consciousness appears as all 
these countless beings in this universe. (VI, 1:30.) 
In the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha we see the full flowering of the ideas that 
I outlined in Part One of this book. The individual soul imagines 
that it is knowing an external object, say, a chair or the sweetness 
of a cup of tea, but in reality the soul is conscious only of itself, 
and its knowing of the chair or the sweet tea is nothing other than 
its consciousness of the reflection of those things within itself. 
Moreover, the external things that give rise to those reflections are 
themselves just consciousness. They only appear to be material 
when knowledge of them is mediated by the sense organs. Their 
true being is nothing over and above their consciousness-of-self. 
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha explains the point this way: 
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Apart from the pure consciousness, there are neither 
the senses, nor the mind, nor even their objects. It is that 
consciousness alone which appears as the objects in 
nature and as the senses in the person. When that 
consciousness has apparently become the subtle body 
(puryaṣṭaka), it reflects the external objects. 
The eternal and infinite consciousness is indeed free 
of all modifications; but when there arises the notion of “I 
am” in it, that notion is known as the jīva [(the individual 
soul)]. . . . The same consciousness . . . thinks “I am the 
body,” “I am the tree,” etc. Thus self-deluded it rises and 
falls, until it attains a pure birth and is spiritually 
awakened. Then, by being devoted to the truth, it attains 
self-knowledge. 
I [(the sage Vāsiṣṭha)] shall now tell you how it 
perceives the objects. I said that on account of the notion 
of “I am,” consciousness abides as jīva [(the individual 
soul)] in the body. When its senses descend upon similar 
bodies outside itself, there is contact between the two, and 
there is desire to know [those outside bodies]. When there 
is this [sensory] contact, the object is reflected within 
oneself, and the jīva [(i.e., the individual soul)] perceives 
this reflection, though it believes that the reflection is 
outside! The jīva knows only this reflection, which means 
it knows itself. This [sensory] contact is the cause of the 
perception of external objects; hence, it is possible only in 
the case of the ignorant one whose mind is deluded and 
not in the case of the liberated sage. . . . The self [(i.e., 
universal nondual consciousness)] is all-in-all all the time. 
(VI, 1:50.) 
In brief, the individual soul is conscious only of itself, but it sees 
past itself, gathering information about the things that are reflected 
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therein, and as a result, the feeling arises of being a subject 
knowing a material object. 
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha goes on to explain that all things, including 
material things, are the same universal nondual consciousness: 
This supreme consciousness alone exists. . . . 
It is this consciousness that is known by various 
names—Brahman, supreme self, etc. In it there is no 
division into subject-object and their relation 
(knowledge). Consciousness becomes conscious of its 
own consciousness; it cannot be realized otherwise (as an 
object of consciousness). It is this consciousness alone 
that is manifest as the mind, intellect and the senses. This 
world-appearance, too, is but consciousness apart from 
which nothing is. Consciousness does not undergo any 
change: the only apparent change is the illusory 
appearance, which is illusory and therefore not real! In an 
imagin[ed] ocean, imagin[ed] waves arise. The mind-stuff 
itself is the ocean and the waves are of the mind-stuff, too. 
Even so the world-appearance arises in consciousness and 
is therefore non-different from it. 
. . . 
. . . 
The seer (subject) and the seen (object) are in reality 
the one pure consciousness. . . . [A]ll that is (whether 
sentient or insentient) is pure consciousness. (VI, 1:78.) 
And because time and space, too, are merely ideas that arise in 
consciousness, there is nothing that can truly separate 
consciousness into parts. Therefore, despite the experience of 
individuality and diversity, consciousness remans ever one: 
The perception or the experience of “the world” 
exists within the atomic particle of infinite consciousness. 
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Just as the reflection in a mirror is only mirror, however, 
[likewise the world] is non-different from the infinite 
consciousness. This infinite consciousness is 
beginningless and endless; that itself is called 
creation. . . . I am a particle of consciousness but I am one 
with the infinite consciousness on account of the 
realization of this truth, even as water is the same as 
water.  
. . . All this happened within it, and within it I saw the 
three worlds—not outside. (VI, 2:144.) 
It is difficult to imagine that we are viewing the world inside 
out, that the only thing we can ever really know is our own self, 
and that even that thing which we feel to be “other” is made of the 
same consciousness as ourselves. It is difficult to imagine that the 
soul of the entire cosmos and one’s own soul are the same nondual 
consciousness, ever conscious of itself, ever delighting in itself. It 
is difficult, but not impossible. 
b. The Tripurā Rahasya 
The Tripurā Rahasya (“Mystery of Three Cities” or “Mystery 
of the Trinity”) is a South Indian Śakti text popularized by Ramana 
Maharshi (1879–1950 C.E.). As said, it draws many of its most 
penetrating ideas from nondual Kashmiri Shaivism, but it 
emphasizes the goddess Tripurā rather than the god Śiva, which 
philosophically speaking means that it emphasizes the appearance 
of dynamic images within consciousness rather than emphasizing 
consciousness per se. The Tripurā Rahasya describes this 
distinction as follows: “Śiva is absolute Awareness, without any 
form. Sri Tripurā is Śakti (energy) and Witness of the whole.”  95
But don’t imagine that this distinction implies dualism. 
 Tripurā Rahasya, ch. xi, vv. 41–45, translated in Ramanananda 95
Saraswathi, Tripura Rahasya, p. 83.
85
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
Consciousness is always conscious only of itself. The images that 
appear in consciousness are just consciousness, a point that the 
Tripurā Rahasya makes explicitly: 
My concrete form is the eternal couple—the Supreme 
Lord [(Śiva)] and Energy [(Śakti)]—always in undivided 
union and abiding as the eternal consciousness pervading 
the three phenomenal states of waking, dream and 
sleep . . . .  96
Like the primary texts of Kashmiri Shaivism and also like the 
Yoga Vāsiṣṭha, the Tripurā Rahasya makes frequent use of the city-
in-a-mirror simile to explain nondual consciousness. For present 
purposes, however, a passage discussing how the universal 
consciousness becomes an individual soul will provide a taste of 
how the Tripurā Rahasya approaches the mind-body problem. The 
passage begins by making the point made in Part One that 
extension in space—the definitional characteristic of matter 
according to Descartes—is merely an idea appearing within 
consciousness, which actually has no location or spatial dimension. 
Thus, what appears to an observer of a material object as the 
object’s spatial extension is just the object’s own consciousness-of-
self: 
Diversity is visible only in space, and this space is in the 
Self [(i.e., universal consciousness)], which in turn 
projects it at the moment when differentiation starts . . . . 
What you perceive as space . . . is the expanse wherein all 
creatures exist, and it forms their Self or consciousness. 
What they look upon as space is your Self. Thus, the Self 
[(consciousness)] in one is space [(spatial extension)] in 
 Tripurā Rahasya, ch. xx, vv. 31–40, translated in Ramanananda 96
Saraswathi, Tripura Rahasya, p. 176.
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another, and vice versa. The same thing cannot differ in 
its nature. Therefore, there is no difference between space 
[(spatial extension)] and Self [(consciousness)]—which is 
full and perfect Bliss-Consciousness.  97
The same passage then goes on to describe the series of steps, 
beginning with the idea of spatial extension, by which nondual 
consciousness takes the illusory form of a soul knowing a material 
world: 
Thus in the transition from the Absolute to the 
individual, space is the first veil cast off. The clear, 
concentrated Self becomes pure, tenuous, susceptible 
space in which hard, dense, crowded, or slender things are 
conceived. They manifest as the five elements of which 
the body is composed. The individual then encases 
himself in the body like a silkworm in its cocoon. Thus 
the Absolute shines as awareness in the body (namely, “I 
am the body”), just as a candle lights the covering globe. 
The individual consciousness is thus found to be only the 
radiance of the Self [(universal consciousness)] reflected 
in the body, which it illumines like an enclosed lamp 
illumining the interior of its cover. 
Just as the light of the lamp spreads out through holes 
made in the cover, so also the light of [universal] 
Intelligence extends from within, through the senses, to 
the external world.  98
According to this beautiful passage, it is only the filtering of 
 Tripurā Rahasya, ch. xviii, vv. 106–113, translated in Ramanananda 97
Saraswathi, Tripura Rahasya, p. 152.
 Tripurā Rahasya, ch. xviii, vv. 106–113 and 114, translated in 98
Ramanananda Saraswathi, Tripura Rahasya, pp. 152–153.
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pure nondual consciousness through the limitations of a body (a 
brain and sense organs) that gives rise to a soul knowing an 
external material world. Moreover, the material body that acts as 
the filter is itself just a conglomeration of ideas arising in 
consciousness. Everything is just a configuration of universal 
nondual consciousness, not different from that consciousness in 
any way. 
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Part Three: Spinoza’s Nondualism 
By decree of the angels and by the command of the holy 
men, we excommunicate, expel, curse and damn Baruch 
de Espinoza, with the consent of God, Blessed be He, and 
with the consent of the entire holy congregation, and in 
front of these holy scrolls with the 613 precepts which are 
written therein; cursing him with the excommunication 
with which Joshua banned Jericho and with the curse 
which Elisha cursed the boys and with all the castigations 
which are written in the Book of the Law. Cursed be he 
by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he 
lies down and cursed be he when he rises up. Cursed be 
he when he goes out and cursed be he when he comes in. 
The Lord will not spare him, but then the anger of the 
Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and 
all the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon 
him, and the Lord shall blot out his name from under 
heaven. And the Lord shall separate him unto evil out of 
all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of the 
covenant that are written in this book of the law. But you 
that cleave unto the Lord your God are alive every one of 
you this day. (Amsterdam, July 27, 1656.) 
—Decree of Excommunication against Baruch Spinoza 
As the foregoing quotation makes clear, Baruch Spinoza 
(1632–1677 C.E.) was not just rejected by his own Jewish 
community; that community also cursed and damned him in the 
strongest terms. And lest we delude ourselves that this curse and 
condemnation is just an artifact of a bygone age, we should 
consider that it was reaffirmed as recently as December 6, 2015, by 
Amsterdam’s chief rabbi, after a formal hearing. Spinoza stands 
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among the greatest philosophers, and like other innovative thinkers 
before him, he was both hated and disclaimed for his ideas. But 
notwithstanding the curse that “the Lord shall blot out his name,” 
Spinoza’s name is today known and respected throughout the 
world. Albert Einstein wrote poetry in praise of Spinoza. David 
Ben-Gurion sought to have the ban on Spinoza rescinded. People 
from all backgrounds continue to read Spinoza’s books and letters; 
they contemplate and discuss his ideas; and they admire the 
simplicity of his way of life. 
Spinoza—the excommunicated Jew known for his expertise in 
Cartesian philosophy—recognized the problems that beset 
consciousness-matter dualism, and he boldly asserted that 
consciousness and matter are the same thing. In other words, 
Spinoza’s answer to the mind-body problem is very similar to what 
we have found in the texts of nondual Kashmiri Shaivism. The 
South Asian texts persuasively argue that consciousness is 
universal, not individual; that it is nondual, not riven in two by an 
unbridgeable subject-object divide; and that it is the underlying 
being of all things, not just of human souls. Spinoza’s ideas so 
closely conform to nondual Kashmiri Shaivism that one might 
wonder whether he had access to South Asian sources, perhaps as a 
result of contacts European Jews had with Jews in Persia. As 
mentioned, the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha was translated into Persian in the 
14th or 15th century C.E., making the ideas of Vedānta and nondual 
Kashmiri Shaivism potentially available to Persian-speaking 
Jewish intellectuals. It is intriguing to speculate that Spinoza might 
have been a student—indirectly, that is—of Kṣemarāja and 
Yogarāja. That said, I think multiple independent discovery better 
explains the close parallel between South Asian nondualism and 
the nondual ideas of this great 17th century Jewish-Dutch 
philosopher. 
What is most relevant to us, however, is that Baruch Spinoza 
picks up where Kashmiri Shaivism leaves off, filling in missing 
details and adding a measure of logical rigor and precision that is 
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sometimes lacking in the Sanskrit texts. Therefore, whether 
Spinoza arrived at his ideas independently or drew them from 
South Asian sources, his contribution to nondual thought cannot be 
discounted. 
Spinoza’s primary philosophical work, the Ethics, presents his 
theories in the form of a mathematical proof. Writing to his friend 
Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the Royal Society, Spinoza said: 
But I can think of no better way of demonstrating these 
things clearly and briefly than to prove them in the 
geometr ic manner and subject them to your 
understanding. (Letter 2.) 
In the Ethics, this “geometric manner” of proof comes to its full 
fruition, complete with definitions, axioms, propositions, 
demonstrations, corollaries, laws, and postulates. Using these tools, 
Spinoza makes his way, point by point, to the most profound 
philosophical conclusions, applying only reason and logic at each 
step. But the language Spinoza employs is often specially and 
precisely defined, and his conclusions are counterintuitive, directly 
opposed to the Cartesian dualism of everyday human experience. 
As a result, a student of Spinoza can spend an hour, or even a day, 
studying a single paragraph. When such difficult passages are 
encountered, one is best advised to consult the Latin original and to 
remind oneself of Spinoza’s technical, non-colloquial use of 
various terms. 
As noted, Spinoza was the leading expert of his time on 
Cartesian philosophy, and he employs many Cartesian terms and 
ideas in his own philosophical works. Spinoza uses spatial 
extension to describe matter, and he uses the phrase “mode of 
extension” to describe various material forms. He uses the term 
“body” in its broadest sense, including within its scope inorganic 
things such as planetary bodies. A body, for Spinoza, is a thing that 
moves or rests as a unified whole (see Ethics, IIP13, L1), and 
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Spinoza also accepts that a body might be built up from other 
bodies (IIP13, “Definition”). Spinoza uses the term “idea” for the 
content of consciousness. He says: 
By idea I understand a concept of the mind which the 
mind forms because it is a thinking thing. (Id., IID3.) 
Spinoza’s most profound point of departure from Cartesian 
philosophy is his assertion of thought-matter equivalence. More 
specifically, he argued that thought and matter are two ways of 
comprehending the same thing, which Spinoza called 
“substance” (Latin: substantia). We find a precursor to this idea in 
the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha, which, as we will recall, explains that 
everything is actually consciousness and that the apparent 
materiality of observed objects is only an effect of sensory 
perception: 
One can say that this world-appearance is real only so far 
as it is the manifestation of consciousness and because of 
direct experience; and it is unreal when it is grasped with 
the mind and the sense organs. (III, 61.) 
And, as we will again recall, the Tripurā Rahasya makes the same 
point, asserting that what appears to an observer of an object as 
spatial extension (i.e., materiality) appears from the object’s point 
of view as self (i.e., consciousness).  But Spinoza makes thought-99
matter equivalence central to his philosophical system, and 
because thought and matter are really the same thing, the world of 
thought and the world of matter are fully isomorphic. Therefore, 
every thought that arises in a human mind is also a material thing, 
and every bit of matter is also a thought. In the Ethics, Spinoza 
 Tripurā Rahasya, ch. xviii, vv. 106–113, translated in Ramanananda 99
Saraswathi, Tripura Rahasya, p. 152.
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writes: 
The order and connection of ideas [(i.e., thoughts)] is the 
same as the order and connection of things [(i.e., material 
objects)]. (Ethics, IIP7.) 
[T]he thinking substance [(i.e., consciousness)] and the 
extended substance [(i.e., matter)] are one and the same 
substance, which is now comprehended under this 
attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension 
[(i.e., a distinct material object)] and the idea of that mode 
[(i.e., the thought corresponding to that object)] are one 
and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. (Id., IIP7, 
Schol.)  100
In the above quotation, after the phrase “the idea of that 
mode,” I added, as a clarification, “the thought corresponding to 
that object.” Some readers of Spinoza might argue that the phrase 
“the idea of that mode” refers to the mental image a person has 
have of a particular object when observing or recalling the object. 
Thus, if “a mode of extension” is an apple, then “the idea of that 
mode” is the mental image of the apple in the mind of person 
observing the apple. I reject that reading, because it is premised on 
dualistic subject-object consciousness, not nondual consciousness-
of-self. 
Perhaps it is useful at this point to recall the discussion of 
thought-matter equivalence in Part One. Thought-matter 
 Some scholars have suggested that Spinoza derived his theory of 100
thought-matter equivalence from medieval Jewish philosophers such as 
Abraham Ibn Ezra and Maimonides, who, relying on Aristotle 
(Metaphysics XII, 7 and 9), asserted that God is the object of his own 
thoughts, that is, that for God, a thought and an object of thought are the 
same thing. Spinoza, however, develops this principle in a way that goes 
far beyond anything said by Aristotle or previous Jewish philosophers.
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equivalence does not mean that a person’s apple-thought is the 
same as an apple; rather, it means that a person’s apple-thought is 
the same as a brain representing an apple in the form of neural 
spiking frequencies. Likewise, a person’s thought of an apple must 
be distinguished from an apple’s own thoughts—that is, its own 
consciousness-of-self. 
As noted, some readers of Spinoza wrongly conclude, based 
on Spinoza’s assertion of thought-matter equivalence, that Spinoza 
is claiming an equivalence between a mental image of an apple and 
a material apple, and on that basis they doubt Spinoza’s 
philosophy. But we know that a mental image of an apple is 
mediated by the senses, and highly unreliable, so how could it ever 
be the same thing as a material apple? Moreover, many people 
might look at the same material apple at the same time, and each 
would then have a mental image of the apple. If when Spinoza 
speaks of “a mode of extension” and “the idea of that mode,” he is 
referring to a material object and the mental image of that object, 
then a single material object, such as an apple on a table in a 
crowded room, might have many “ideas” associated with it, which 
would be incompatible with the one-to-one correspondence 
Spinoza claims to exist between the world of thought and the 
world of matter. 
But all this confusion disappears if we put aside subject-object 
consciousness and recall that consciousness is always conscious 
only of itself. As Spinoza says: 
The human mind does not perceive any external body as 
actually existing, except through the ideas of the 
affections of its own body. (Ethics, IIP26.) 
Because consciousness is always conscious only of itself, the only 
“idea” that corresponds to a material apple is the apple’s own 
consciousness (its consciousness-of-self, that is), and the only 
“mode of extension” that corresponds to a person’s mental image 
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of an apple is the person’s own brain representing an apple in the 
form of neural spiking frequencies. In short, when Spinoza asserts 
that “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the 
same thing” (Ethics, IIP7, Schol.), he is necessarily making a 
statement about the consciousness a material thing has of itself, not 
the consciousness a person might have of the material thing.  101
With the benefit of that clarification, we are ready to proceed 
to Spinoza’s revolutionary assertion of mind-body equivalence. 
Spinoza talks about “the object of the idea constituting the human 
mind.” (Ethics, IIP12.) Here, he cannot possibly be referring to a 
remote object—such as an apple—that a human mind might form a 
mental image of after perceiving the object sensorially. Indeed, 
Spinoza is very careful not to define the term “idea” in terms of 
sensory perception. (See Ethics, IID3, Exp.) So, what does Spinoza 
mean by “the object of the idea constituting the human 
mind.” (Ethics, IIP12.) According to thought-matter equivalence, 
every “idea” must correspond uniquely with a single material 
object, because it is not actually different from that object. 
Therefore, when Spinoza speaks of “the object of the idea 
constituting the human mind,” he is necessarily referring to 
something that actually is the human mind in a material form. In 
other words, he is referring to some material thing whose 
consciousness-of-self constitutes the human mind. And what could 
that be if not the human body, or, more precisely, the brain and 
sense organs of that body? 
It follows, then, that whatever occurs physically in a healthy 
human brain will necessarily manifest itself as a thought in the 
human mind that corresponds to that brain. And not surprisingly, 
Spinoza makes precisely that point. He says: 
Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting 
the human mind . . . there will necessarily be an idea of 
 See, e.g., Della Rocca, Spinoza, pp. 104–108, 111–112.101
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that thing in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea 
constituting a human mind is a body, nothing can happen 
in that body which is not perceived by the mind. (Ethics, 
IIP12.) 
Continuing the same topic, Spinoza states explicitly that the human 
body (or some component of it, such as the brain and sense organs) 
is, in fact, the material form of the human mind. Spinoza says: 
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the 
body, or a certain mode of extension which actually 
exists, and nothing else. (Ethics, IIP13.) 
That powerful statement resolves the mind-body problem by 
asserting that the mind is the body. 
Thus, Spinoza completely rejects the consciousness-matter 
dualism that Śaṅkara insisted upon. As we will recall, Śaṅkara 
believed that all consciousness is one and that it appears to be 
differentiated only because it illuminates different material vessels. 
Spinoza would certainly agree. But Śaṅkara also argued that 
consciousness and matter are completely distinct and that the mind 
and body are therefore also distinct: 
It is a well-ascertained truth that that notion of identity of 
the individual Self with the not-Self,—with the physical 
body and the like—which is common to all mortal 
creatures is caused by avidyā [(“ignorance”)], just as a 
pillar (in darkness) is mistaken (through avidyā) for a 
human being. . . . Similarly consciousness never actually 
pertains to the body; neither can it be that any attributes 
of the body—such as pleasure, pain and dullness—
actually pertain to Consciousness, to the Self; for, like 
decay and death, such attributes are ascribed to the Self 
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through avidyā.  102
Spinoza says exactly the opposite: The mind is the body. 
Moreover, because thought and matter are the same thing 
comprehended in two different ways, Spinoza universalizes his 
assertion of mind-body equivalence. All material bodies, 
everywhere, have minds, at least when the word “mind” is 
understood in the broadest possible sense. Here, Spinoza clearly 
adopts the view from nondual Kashmiri Shaivism that all things 
are conscious. But, again consistent with nondual Kashmiri 
Shaivism, Spinoza qualifies the point, noting that the perceptive 
capacity of any particular mind depends on the suppleness 
(receptivity) of the material thing that has that mind. Spinoza 
explains: 
[T]he things we have shown so far are completely general 
and do not pertain more to man than to other individuals, 
all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless 
animate [(i.e., conscious)]. . . . And so whatever we have 
said of the idea of the human body must also be said of 
the idea of any [material] thing. . . . [I]n proportion as a 
body is more capable than others of . . . being acted on in 
many ways at once, so its mind is more capable than 
others of perceiving many things at once. And in 
proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself 
alone, and as other bodies concur with it less in acting, so 
its mind is more capable of understanding distinctly [(i.e., 
the mind then has thoughts that express its own essence 
rather than thoughts it is caused to have by external 
influences)]. (Ethics, IIP13, Schol.) 
 Bhagavadgītābhāṣya XIII, 2, translated in Mahādeva Śāstri, The 102
Bhagavad-Gītā, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, 
p. 278, italics added.
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The parallel here to Kashmiri Shaivism could not be more 
clear. Yogarāja, as we will recall, asserted that everything is 
conscious, but only organisms that have sense organs, a brain, and 
a central nervous system are constructed in such a way that the 
universal consciousness-of-self takes the form of an individual 
soul. He said: 
Although Rāhu remains constantly moving about in the 
sky and is not ordinarily visible, when it happens to settle 
down on the disc of the moon at the time of a lunar 
eclipse, it is seen and recognised as “this is Rāhu.” . . . In 
the same way, although the Self exists in all [things], 
constituting the innermost being [of all things], . . . it is 
not perceived by all as “this is the Self.” But when an 
object of cognition is revealed by being reflected in the 
intellect-mirror . . . of embodied beings [(i.e., beings that 
have sense organs, a brain, and a central nervous 
system)], the Self becomes an object of cognition [along 
with the external object], as in the cognition of sound in 
the form of “I hear the sound.” . . . [By contrast,] the Self 
[(i.e., nondual consciousness)], though existent in a lump 
of clay, appears as non-existent to the cognisor on account 
of its being covered by a thick veil of tamas 
(darkness) . . . . [¶] . . . But from the point of view of the 
supreme Lord, the distinction between the inanimate and 
the animate does not exist, and the world’s conventional 
understanding of their difference has no significance.  103
If Spinoza had been schooled in 11th century Kashmir, his ideas 
 Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 8, italics added, underlined 103
textual additions by the present author, all other textual additions by 
SenSharma.
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could not have tracked Yogarāja’s statement more faithfully. 
Moreover, these same ideas are, as we have seen, expounded in 
considerable detail in the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha and the Tripurā Rahasya, 
each of which make numerous statements that seem to be direct 
precursors to what Spinoza asserts: Consciousness and matter are 
the same thing; consciousness is always conscious only of itself; 
and although all things are conscious, only things with brains and 
sense organs experience that consciousness as an individual soul 
knowing a material world. 
As noted, Spinoza concedes that the so-called “body” that is 
the material counterpart of the human mind may refer only to some 
material component of the human body, such as the brain and sense 
organs. Moreover, because information received sensorially is 
mediated and inferential, Spinoza argues that it is necessarily 
imperfect, and this imperfect knowledge applies even to one’s 
knowing of the parts of one’s own body: 
The human mind does not involve adequate knowledge of 
the parts composing the human body. (Ethics, IIP24.) 
And if the human mind has inadequate knowledge of the parts of 
the human body, how much less adequate is its knowledge of 
things outside the human body, things that the sense organs 
represent to the mind in a fragmented and distorted way. Spinoza, 
who made his living as a lens grinder, providing spectacles and 
scientific instruments to the Dutch community, was well aware of 
the inadequacy of the information we receive by way of the eyes 
and other parts of the human body. He therefore concludes: 
The idea of any affection of [(i.e., any external effect 
upon)] the human body does not involve adequate 
knowledge of an external body. (Ethics, IIP25.) 
In other words, all perception of external things is necessarily 
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flawed, being mediated, inferential, and based on distorted and 
grossly inadequate data. Spinoza makes a similar point in his next 
proposition, which was already quoted above: 
The human mind does not perceive any external body as 
actually existing, except through the ideas of the 
affections of its own body. (Ethics, IIP26.) 
In these two propositions, Spinoza is making the important 
point that because we cannot be conscious of a thing without being 
that thing, we can have no consciousness of any external thing’s 
actual existence. Instead, all knowledge of external things is 
mediated and inferential, known only from the effects those things 
have on us. Moreover, those effects are muddled up with effects 
from many sources at once, giving rise to a necessarily confused 
knowledge of the external world: 
[And t]he ideas of the affections of the human body, 
insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not 
clear and distinct, but confused. (IIP28.) 
And it bears repeating here that Spinoza universalizes all these 
principles. He says: 
[T]he things we have shown so far are completely general 
and do not pertain more to man than to other individuals, 
all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless 
animate [(i.e., conscious)]. . . . [I]n proportion as a body is 
more capable than others of . . . being acted on in many 
ways at once, so its mind is more capable than others of 
perceiving many things at once. (Ethics, IIP13, Schol.) 
Again, we find that Spinoza’s epistemological model is 
virtually indistinguishable from that of the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha, which 
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states: 
When [the body’s] senses descend upon similar bodies 
outside itself, there is contact between the two and there is 
desire to know (to become one with) them. When there is 
this contact the object is reflected within oneself and the 
jīva [(i.e., the individual soul)] perceives this reflection, 
though it believes that the reflection is outside! The jīva 
knows only this reflection, which means it knows itself. 
This contact is the cause of the perception of external 
objects . . . . (VI, 1:50.) 
Likewise, Spinoza’s assertion of thought-matter equivalence 
(see Ethics, IIP7, Schol., IIP12, IIP13) is foreshadowed in the Yoga 
Vāsiṣṭha, which asserts that all things, including both thought and 
matter, are the same universal nondual consciousness: 
This supreme consciousness alone exists. . . . 
It is this consciousness that is known by various 
names—Brahman, supreme self, etc. In it there is no 
division into subject-object and their relation 
(knowledge). Consciousness becomes conscious of its 
own consciousness; it cannot be realized otherwise (as an 
object of consciousness). It is this consciousness alone 
that is manifest as the mind, intellect and the senses. This 
world-appearance, too, is but consciousness apart from 
which nothing is. . . . 
. . . 
. . . 
The seer (subject) and the seen (object) are in reality 
the one pure consciousness. . . . [A]ll that is (whether 
sentient or insentient) is pure consciousness. (VI, 1:78.) 
In this quotation, the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha is asserting that the underlying 
101
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
being of all things is their consciousness-of-self, a point that 
Spinoza also fully embraces. (See Ethics, IIP13, Schol.) 
Spinoza’s philosophical system is set forth and defended in 
exquisite detail in the Ethics, but Spinoza beautifully summarized 
his philosophy in a letter he wrote to his friend Henry Oldenburg. 
In that letter, he describes the entire universe as a single unified 
material body with a single unified mind, what he called the 
“infinite intellect,” and he describes the human body and human 
mind as a finite participant in that infinite universal being—a being 
that obviously corresponds to Brahman or Śiva in South Asian 
philosophy. Here are Spinoza’s words: 
Now . . . all bodies are surrounded by others, and are 
determined by one another to existing and producing an 
effect in a certain and determinate way . . . . From this it 
follows that every [seemingly individual] body . . . must 
be considered as a part of the whole universe, must agree 
with the whole to which it belongs, and must cohere with 
the remaining bodies. And since the nature of the universe 
is not limited, . . . but is absolutely infinite, its parts are 
restrained in infinite ways . . . and compelled to undergo 
infinitely many variations. . . . You see, therefore, how 
and why I think that the human body is a part of Nature 
[(i.e., an interdependent part of the physical universe)]. 
But . . . I maintain that there is also in Nature an infinite 
power of thinking, which, insofar as it is infinite, contains 
in itself objectively the whole of Nature [as the content of 
its consciousness-of-self], and whose thoughts proceed in 
the same way as Nature itself, its object [of 
consciousness], does. Next, I maintain that the human 
mind is this same power, not insofar as it is infinite and 
perceives the whole of Nature, but insofar as it is finite 
and perceives only the human body. For this reason I 
maintain that the human mind is a part of a certain infinite 
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intellect. (Letter 32.) 
The universe, for Spinoza, is a single interdependent and 
indivisible unity that, because of its infinitude, includes every 
possibility. And just as everything, everywhere, is conscious of 
itself directly, by being itself, likewise the universe, in its entirety, 
is conscious of itself directly, by being itself. This universal 
consciousness is what Spinoza called the “infinite power of 
thinking,” but he also called it “God,” and it necessarily exists, 
because all material things are interdependent parts of a single 
unified whole, and thought and matter are the same thing. 
As for the human mind, it, according to Spinoza, is the 
fraction of that “infinite intellect” that has only the human body (or 
perhaps just the human brain) as the content of its consciousness, 
being forced to infer everything that is outside that body by 
interpreting the modifications that occur inside that body. 
Spinoza’s assertion that the human mind is what the universal 
consciousness looks like when it illuminates a human body is, of 
course, familiar to us from Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. It also aligns with 
Kṣemarā ja’s commentary to the ninth sū tra of the 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, which says: 
When the highest Lord, whose very essence is 
consciousness, conceals, by His free will, pervasion of 
non-duality and assumes duality all round, then His will 
and other powers, though essentially non-limited, assume 
limitation. . . . By assuming extreme limitation, beginning 
with the acquisition of an inner organ [(i.e., the psyche)] 
and organs of perception [(i.e., the senses)], [the universal 
consciousness] acquires māyiya-mala, which consists in 
the apprehension of all objects as different [from itself].  104
 Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 9.104
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And of course, the same point is repeated in the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha and 
the Tripurā Rahasya, as we have seen: 
The individual then encases himself in the body like a 
silkworm in its cocoon. Thus the Absolute shines as 
awareness in the body (namely, “I am the body”), just as a 
candle lights the covering globe. The individual 
consciousness is thus found to be only the radiance of the 
Self [(universal consciousness)] reflected in the body, 
which it illumines like an enclosed lamp illumining the 
interior of its cover. 
Just as the light of the lamp spreads out through holes 
made in the cover, so also the light of [universal] 
Intelligence extends from within, through the senses, to 
the external world.  105
In other words, the universal consciousness—or “infinite 
intellect,” to use Spinoza’s term—appears as a human soul, just as 
a lamp appears to have a pattern when filtered the holes in the 
lamp cover. But because, under the laws of physics, all things are 
interdependent, there is no reasoned basis for declaring any part to 
be truly distinct from any other part, or from the whole. Thus, the 
human body is not really an independent thing. Rather, argues 
Spinoza, “the whole of nature is one individual.” (Ethics, IIP13, 
L7, Schol.) And for like reason, the human mind is not really an 
independent thing. It only appears to be a distinct mind, having 
solely its own thoughts. In truth, its thoughts are part of a vast 
interconnected system of thought. 
In conclusion, we find in the above-quoted selections from 
Spinoza’s writings all the principles that this book has heretofore 
considered both in the abstract (in Part One) and in the leading 
 Tripurā Rahasya, ch. xviii, vv. 106–113 and 114, translated in 105
Ramanananda Saraswathi, Tripura Rahasya, pp. 152–153.
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texts of South Asian nondualism (in Part Two). Consciousness is 
nondual. Therefore, one cannot be conscious of a thing without 
being that thing. Moreover, one’s consciousness is not something 
distinct from one’s being. Rather, consciousness and being are the 
same thing. Matter, by contrast, is only how a thing appears when 
knowledge of it is mediated by sense organs and thus inferential. 
When a thing is known as it is in itself, by being that thing (i.e., the 
noumenon), it turns out to be nothing but consciousness. 
Therefore, the mind is the body. The critical error that lies at the 
core of the mind-body problem is the subject-object divide, which 
gives rise to an imagined distinction between consciousness and 
matter. When the realization arises that all consciousness is 
nondual consciousness-of-self, the riddle of consciousness is 
solved. 
This philosophy is a synthesis of materialism and idealism, 
and therefore it is sometimes called “neutral monism.” 
Significantly, it answers many of the questions raised by other 
solutions to the mind-body problem. First, it denies that the 
ontological division between the mental and the physical, and thus 
it solves the problem of how something immaterial (a mind) can 
have a causative effect on something material (a body). Thoughts 
lead to other thoughts, and material events lead to other material 
events, and both progressions describe the same progression—their 
difference being only apparent. 
In addition, neutral monism answers ontological questions 
about matter, space, and time, questions that the materialist leaves 
open. Matter is not different from consciousness. And, 
consciousness has no location, for location is only an idea arising 
in consciousness. And, consciousness didn’t arise at a particular 
time, nor will it cease at a particular time, for time, too, is just an 
idea arising in consciousness. Consciousness is, and because it is 
ontologically anterior to space and time, it can’t not be. 
Finally, neutral monism parries the accusation of solipsism 
that is often directed against idealism. It is true that only one thing 
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exists—nondual consciousness—but nondual consciousness is to 
be distinguished from a lonely dreamer dreaming of an unreal 
world full of friends. Rather, that nondual consciousness takes the 
form of a real universe, conscious of itself by being itself, and 
configuring itself into countless perspectives of knower and 
known, as an expression of its absolute freedom. The idealism 
Spinoza presents to us is a diffuse idealism in which perceived 
things have intrinsic being, because they themselves are the locus 
of the consciousness that is their own existence. Thus, the 
universal consciousness is only, but it is not lonely. It delights in its 
consciousness of itself, and it is conscious of itself simultaneously 
from countless perspectives so as to delight all the more. 
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Part Four: Some Problems and Ramifications 
1. The Evolution of the Soul 
To suppose that the eye with all its inimitable 
contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, 
for admitting different amounts of light, and for the 
correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could 
have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely 
confess, absurd in the highest degree. When it was first 
said that the sun stood still and the world turned round, 
the common sense of mankind declared the doctrine false; 
but the old saying of Vox populi, vox Dei [(“The voice of 
the people is the voice of God”)], as every philosopher 
knows, cannot be trusted in science. Reason tells me, that 
if numerous gradations from a simple and imperfect eye 
to one complex and perfect can be shown to exist, each 
grade being useful to its possessor, as is certainly the case; 
if further, the eye ever varies and the variations be 
inherited, as is likewise certainly the case and if such 
variations should be useful to any animal under changing 
conditions of life, then the difficulty of believing that a 
perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural 
selection, though insuperable by our imagination, should 
not be considered as subversive of the theory. (The Origin 
of Species, 6th edition, pp. 143–144.) 
—Charles Darwin (1809–1882 C.E.) 
We have seen that consciousness-of-self is not just a special 
attribute of neural cells. Rather, consciousness-of-self is the 
intrinsic stuff of all being. The entire material universe is, as a 
whole and in each of its parts, conscious of itself, not as a subject 
is conscious of an object, but simply by being itself. And to the 
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extent that any part of the material universe—say, a brain, or 
perhaps some component of a brain—is configured to reflect and 
represent the detailed characteristics of the world that surrounds it, 
that part’s knowing of itself can result in an inference about the 
characteristics of the surrounding world, and when it does, there 
becomes associated with that part what we call an “individual 
soul” or “subject-object duality.” 
There are, within the infinite universe, discrete systems that 
function more or less as units, at least for a time. Their 
individuality may be only apparent, but these discrete systems 
nonetheless have a certain degree of separate existence, and they 
tend to maintain their distinct form longer if chance has 
constructed them in a way that predisposes them to self-
preservation. Thus, in the fullness of time, discrete systems that are 
self-preserving in design will necessarily become more prevalent 
in a universe governed by chance, while those that are less self-
preserving will tend to dissipate and disappear. And two traits that 
vastly increase the self-preserving nature of any discrete system is 
its ability to recognize destructive forces in its environment and its 
ability to respond defensively to avoid those forces. 
If some component within one of these discrete systems is 
configured to reflect and represent the changes that are occurring 
outside the system, then that component’s consciousness-of-self 
will take the form of an inference about the characteristics of the 
external world. Moreover, the system might evolve an internal 
catalog of common external threats, allowing it to recognize such 
threats as they approach. And if the recognition of a particular 
threat happens to initiate a successful defensive response, then the 
self-preserving nature of the entire system will be exponentially 
enhanced, and as a result, the probability of finding that particular 
system somewhere in the universe will exponentially increase. And 
if the system has all the foregoing traits, and it also happens to 
evolve the ability to build new systems with similar traits, then the 
universe will quickly become populated with numerous versions of 
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that system. 
In short, an infinite universe, in which everything that can 
possibly occur does occur, will certainly evolve over time to 
contain discrete systems that recognize and respond to external 
threats, and that pass those strategies on to new generations of 
themselves. And for that reason, the universe we share is populated 
by what we call “living organisms.” 
One could argue, however, that conscious awareness is not 
actually necessary to the success of such a system. So long as a 
discrete system can recognize threats and select an appropriate 
response, it need not be consciously aware of those threats; a 
mechanistic awareness, like that of a self-driving automobile, 
would certainly suffice. Indeed, we have all experienced having a 
reflexive response to a sudden movement or noise, and that 
reflexive response seems to precede conscious cognition of the 
threat. 
It may be true, therefore, that a mechanistic awareness of 
external threats would suffice to increase a system’s likelihood of 
survival, in which case the consciousness of the system would not 
seem to play a significant role in the tendency of such a system to 
evolve over time. But there is also no reason to exclude conscious 
deliberation from the methods by which a discrete system’s 
defensive mechanisms and self-optimizing strategies are directed, 
and that is particularly true if the system’s defensive response 
involves some computational evaluation of multiple alternatives. In 
such a case, conscious deliberation might supplement mechanistic 
awareness as part of an overall strategy of self-preservation. 
I concede, for example, that a very basic form of animal life—
say, a sea sponge (phylum porifera)—could function completely 
mechanistically. If, however, a discrete system is to have a detailed 
and nuanced perception of the external world, it needs to have a 
very supple internal component that can accurately reflect and 
represent the external changes that are occurring in its 
environment. And because one internal component might be best 
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suited to reflecting and representing one aspect of the external 
world (light frequencies, for example), while another might be best 
suited to reflecting and representing another aspect (sound 
frequencies, or smells, or textures, for example), a discrete system 
that has a very detailed and nuanced perception of its environment 
would need to have many very supple internal components, each 
specially suited to its task, and it would also need to have a means 
of communicating and compiling the information from these 
diverse components to construct a single integrated representation 
of the world. And it would need to be able to include in that 
integrated representation predictive calculations about different 
courses the world might take under different circumstances, 
measuring each of those predictions against a record of past 
experiences and thus selecting self-optimizing behaviors. And the 
component within the system that performed the information-
compiling function—a low-frequency brainwave, perhaps—would, 
like all things, be conscious of itself by being itself, and thus it 
would be conscious of the deliberations of the system. 
In summary, if a discrete system is to have a very 
sophisticated mechanistic awareness of the surrounding world, 
then it will also have a conscious awareness of that world, and 
because its sophisticated configuration will enable it to activate 
self-optimizing behaviors, it will outlast other systems. One could 
say, then, that an individual soul does not make such a system a 
better survivor, but an individual soul is an evolutionary byproduct 
of traits that do make the system a better survivor. Put colloquially, 
an individual soul comes for free with the deal. Thus, discrete 
systems—organisms, that is—guided by individual souls are very 
likely to evolve in an infinite universe in which everything that can 
possibly occur does occur. 
But we have to be clear; the individual soul that characterizes 
complex systems is just an illusion of subject-object consciousness 
superimposed on the fact of universal consciousness-of-self. Even 
a mechanical machine is conscious in some sense, although the 
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consciousness-of-self of its parts is not integrated in a way that can 
give rise to an individual soul. One could say that the rudimentary 
consciousness-of-self that is the underlying being of all things is no 
more like human consciousness than a subatomic particle is like a 
human brain. It is a consciousness that has no relative “I,” no 
conceptual categories, no discursive thoughts, and no constructed 
narrative about a person living in a world. 
The implication of this discussion is, of course, that 
functionalism turns out to be a viable theory of consciousness. In 
other words, the internal structures that are necessary to perfectly 
mimic the behavior of a higher-order animal will, as a byproduct, 
give rise to an individual soul. I would add that functionalism, 
materialism, idealism, and parallelism are all, in their own ways, 
valid models for explaining consciousness. The reason so many 
philosophers disagree about their “-isms” is that they have not 
transcended the subject-object divide. They are knowing only the 
“outside” of things, relying on a mediated and inaccurate means of 
gathering information, and they are imagining that they are 
knowing the true form of things, as they are in themselves. 
Moreover, the more one comprehends things as they are in 
themselves, rather than as they appear to be to the human senses, 
the more one conforms one’s mind to the universal mind. Put in 
theistic terms, God knows all things perfectly—but not by seeing 
them, not by hearing them, not by tasting them, not by smelling 
them, not by touching them. Rather, by being them. 
2. Mind Meld 
Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we 
generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other 
is himself there before us “in person.” On the other hand, 
this being there in person does not keep us from admitting 
forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other Ego 
himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances 
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themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own 
essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it 
were, if what belongs to the other’s own essence were 
directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my 
own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself 
would be the same. (Cartesian Meditations, § 50.) 
—Edmund Husserl (1859–1938 C.E.) 
At this point, we are confronted with a troublesome question. 
It is well and good to say that all things are conscious of 
themselves by being themselves, but what in this context 
constitutes a “thing”? What defines the boundaries of a self-
conscious unit? We can consider the problem both from a macro 
and a micro perspective. 
From the macro perspective, how can we speak of distinct 
“parts” of the material universe? Is not every so-called “part” 
subject to the same laws of physics that govern the whole and, 
therefore, fully determined, in both form and action, by everything 
that surrounds it? In other words, no part is causally distinct, and 
therefore the universe is a single interdependent unity that is not 
divisible into parts, except perhaps by convention of speech. And if 
the universe is, in truth, a single interdependent unity, how does its 
universal consciousness-of-self become segmentized into the 
consciousness of, for example, a human brain or a spider’s brain? 
Conversely, considering the problem from the micro 
perspective, how does the consciousness-of-self of, say, a 
subatomic particle—its consciousness, that is, of its own 
definitional characteristics—merge with the consciousness-of-self 
of similar subatomic particles to become the consciousness-of-self 
of an atom, a molecule, a neural cell, or a brain? In short, we have 
not really answered the mystery of human consciousness until we 
have determined what sort of things can share a single mind. 
Edmund Husserl, among others, pointed out that a defining 
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characteristic of any distinct mind is the inaccessibility of other 
minds, and conversely, the accessibility of another’s mind makes 
that other mind, by definition, an extension of one’s own mind. 
(Cartesian Meditations, § 50.)  So, if the consciousness-of-self of 106
a single subatomic particle constitutes the “mind” of that particle, 
how do the minds of two such particles overcome their mutual 
inaccessibility, merging to form a common mind? And if clusters 
of subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, and neural cells can all 
somehow share a single merged mind, does it have to stop there? 
Could a group of people share a single mind as does the homo 
gestalt in Theodore Sturgeon’s More Than Human? 
It may be that the minds of two or more people can in fact 
merge given the right circumstances. The two hemispheres of the 
human brain are in many ways redundant, meaning that if one 
hemisphere of the brain does not properly develop, a person can 
still function, to some extent, using only the other brain 
hemisphere. In a sense, then, most of us have two conscious brains, 
not one, and yet we experience both these conscious brains as a 
single mind.  And if a person can merge the minds of his or her 107
two distinct brain hemispheres, then presumably two people can 
merge the minds of their two distinct brains. 
Likewise, consider the way the brain combines the fields of 
vision of the two eyes. The brain receives two relatively “flat” 
images through each of the two eyes, but the mind knows only a 
single, three-dimensional image. Thus, the mind combines the two 
received images, ignores redundant information, and suppresses 
the indexicality that distinguishes the images from one another. In 
like manner, it would seem that the minds of two people could 
merge, transcending their indexicality and becoming a single mind 
 A similar idea is expressed in Spinoza’s Ethics. See Ethics, IIA4, 106
IIA5, and IIP13, Dem.
 See Nagel, “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,” pp. 107
405–409.
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with a more universal perspective. 
But what would it take for such a “mind meld” to occur? 
Presumably, it would take conditions similar to those that apply to 
the two hemispheres of a single brain. The two people would need 
to be bound closely together, sharing similar sensory inputs, and 
they would need to be in close communication with each other. 
Finally, they would need to share a functional and causal unity 
such that there was some systemwide advantage to having a single 
shared mind. Under those conditions, their sense of being two 
minds might recede, and it might be replaced by a single merged 
mind.  108
3. The Human Mind 
Like everything metaphysical the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of 
language. (Zettel, No. 55.) 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951 C.E.) 
Some philosophers have wondered whether consciousness is 
possible without language. Without language, an individual soul’s 
perception of the external world is no more than a stream of 
incomprehensible data. But when a soul begins to categorize the 
incoming data by type and pattern, it is forming a protolanguage, 
and it can thus begin to interpret the world it is perceiving. An 
animal may not attach a particular phoneme chain to the 
 It might be that we frequently, if only momentarily, experience such 108
psychic links with collaborators on a common project. One thinks, for 
example, of a small music ensemble playing a complex piece that 
requires one-pointed concentration. Cf. Della Rocca, Spinoza, pp. 115–
117, esp. p. 117 [defining consciousness in terms of causal independence 
(which might include the causal independence of a group of co-
collaborators].
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experience of water, but it recognizes water, because it is capable 
of categorizing the data that underlie its perceptions. It is able, in 
other words, to compare the received data against a catalog of 
stored archetypes, and by finding a match, it can recognize a thing 
such as water. Thus, without language there is no meaningful 
perception. 
It might be debated to what extent animals are born with this 
catalog of stored archetypes—this protolanguage—and to what 
extent they build it from experience. They are probably born with a 
large part of it, for even a newborn calf knows to suckle the teat of 
its mother, and many animals begin the process of navigating the 
world they inhabit within minutes or hours of birth.  And because 109
animals—including human ones—interpret the world by matching 
the data of perception against a catalog of archetypes, their 
knowing of the world is, in actuality, a knowing of their own 
conceptions, not a direct knowing of the world. 
But even if both animals and people are born with a catalog of 
stored archetypes, they also augment that catalog over time, based 
on their experiences, and some animals assign unique vocalizations 
or bodily movements to the most important archetypes, allowing 
them to communicate ideas. As a child masters language, an ever 
increasing vocabulary of phoneme chains is stored in its memory, 
and these phoneme chains are then retrieved, arranged, and 
combined according to rules of grammar. As a result, human 
beings are able to describe past events, predict future benefits or 
dangers, and plan optimal responses, but most important, human 
beings are able to present to themselves, in the privacy of their 
own propositional thoughts, a narrative about the external world 
they are encountering. 
Thus, the advanced linguistic capacity of human beings 
inalterably changes human perception. For a person, perception is 
not just a matter of recognizing water in a forest stream; a person is 
 Cf. Ethics, II40, Schol. 2; id., IIP49, Schol.109
115
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
also able to formulate complex propositional thoughts about all the 
things that water implies. Most animals wander through the world 
recognizing categories such as food, shelter, and danger, and 
responding with appropriate patterned responses, but they do not 
construct an accompanying narrative about these experiences. 
Human perception, however, includes a narrative about a person 
living in a world, and that narrative changes what it means to be 
conscious. 
We use language not just to communicate with one another but 
also to communicate with ourselves, and thus we generate a world 
of the imagination that rivals the world of sensory perception. 
Then, every experience must be integrated into a story we are 
authoring about who we are, and if a particular experience doesn’t 
fit the story, we tweak the story, or we experience a psychological 
crisis. If we are injured, we do not merely feel pain, as an animal 
does. We also include that pain in a narrative about a person who 
suffers pain. The pain exists for some time, and then it ends, but 
the story about an unfortunate person who had pain, and who will 
have pain, remains. And because of that story, our pain becomes 
unbearable. Thus, language turns out to be a very dangerous thing. 
The propositions that arise in our minds tend to be recycled from 
the propositions we have read and heard. They are not always 
valid, and they often cause suffering. Therefore, no matter how 
clever they might seem, they must be evaluated with caution. 
But propositional thought is not the only thing that colors 
human perception. Emotion does so, too. A beautiful flower is not 
just a blend of shining color; there is also a unique feeling that 
accompanies a person’s perception of it, a feeling that is different 
for each person. Philosophers sometimes use the plural term 
“qualia” to describe aspects of perception that are personal to the 
perceiver. They talk about “what it’s like” for Mary to see a 
particular flower, distinguishing “what it’s like” for Mary to see the 
flower from “what it’s like” for John to see the same flower. 
But this emotional aspect of human perception is easily 
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understood by a nondualist. We have learned that all objective 
perception is actually consciousness-of-self. The external world is 
reflected and represented in one’s own self, like a distant city 
reflected in a mirror, and one’s consciousness-of-self thus gives 
rise to a knowing of the world. But what happens if the internal 
representations of the world do not become completely 
transparent? What happens if one sees just a little bit of the mirror 
surface in addition to seeing the distant city? What happens if 
consciousness of physiological changes in one’s body leaks 
through into one’s perception of some external object or event, 
blending with that perception? The answer is that one experiences 
that blending as an emotional coloration of the external 
perception.  110
Thus, the human experience of seeing a beautiful flower is a 
combination of the perceived details of the flower (light 
frequencies, shape, texture, aroma, etc.), the narrative about 
flowers that runs in one’s propositional thought stream (youth, 
fertility, life force, romance), and the perception one has of one’s 
own physiology as it is affected both by the flower and by the 
narrative (endorphin release, heart rate, breathing pattern). And 
therefore Mary’s seeing of a flower can never be the same as 
John’s seeing of it, because Mary and John might be gazing at the 
same flower illuminated by the same setting sun, but the content of 
Mary’s consciousness is only her own self, and the content of 
John’s consciousness is only his own self. In other words, each is 
gazing at the flower but through a different mirror. 
4. Mary Is Seeing Red 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, 
forced to investigate the world from a black and white 
room via a black and white television monitor. She 
 See Della Rocca, Spinoza, pp. 113–114.110
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specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, 
let us suppose, all the physical information there is to 
obtain about what goes on when we see ripe 
tomatoes . . . . [¶] What will happen when Mary is 
released from her black and white room . . . ? Will she 
learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will 
learn something about the world and our visual 
experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her 
previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the 
physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, 
and Physicalism is false. (“Epiphenomenal Qualia,” p. 
130.) 
—Frank Jackson (born 1943 C.E.) 
Frank Jackson proposed the thought experiment of Mary and 
her black-and-white room—quoted above—as a way of proving 
that consciousness is something that exists independent of all the 
physical facts governing conscious experience. Consider the 
moment that Mary steps out of her black-and-white room and first 
sees a ripe red tomato hanging on a vine in the afternoon sunlight. 
On the one hand, we have all the physical facts related to the 
sunlight, the tomato’s surface, the reflected light, Mary’s eye, her 
neural system and brain, her brain’s electrical activity, etc. On the 
other hand, we have Mary’s subjective experience of seeing a red 
tomato for the first time—consciousness, that is, with “red tomato” 
as its content. Thus, consciousness seems to be an additional fact, 
distinct from all the physical facts. Put another way, we can 
imagine the existence of all the physical facts (the sunlight, the 
tomato, the reflected light, the eye, the brain, the electrical activity, 
etc.) without consciousness being part of the show. The physical 
facts do not seem to demand consciousness, which seems therefore 
to be something additional. 
But the difference between the physical facts related to Mary 
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seeing a red tomato and Mary’s actual consciousness of a red 
tomato is not that the latter is an additional fact distinct from all the 
physical facts; rather, the difference lies in two distinct ways that 
one can be aware of something—one inferential, mediated by the 
senses, and distorted; the other direct, unmediated, and perfect. 
In the case of inferential awareness of a thing, one gathers data 
about it from the impressions it makes on one’s sense organs and 
then constructs a narrative about it based on a catalog of stored 
archetypes. Everything then appears to be matter, not 
consciousness, and Mary’s seeing of a tomato involves sunlight, 
the tomato’s surface, reflected light, the eye, the neural system, the 
brain, the brain’s electrical activity, etc. By contrast, direct and 
unmediated awareness of a thing as it is in itself is simply a matter 
of being that thing. Everything then appears to be consciousness, 
not matter, and Mary’s seeing of a tomato is the condition of being 
Mary’s brain when it is reflecting and representing a red tomato in 
the form of neural spiking frequencies. 
Thus, Mary’s consciousness is not an additional fact, distinct 
from all the physical facts involved in the act of seeing a red 
tomato; rather, her consciousness is the experience of being one of 
those physical facts. Mary observes the electrical activity in her 
brain directly (from the “inside”) instead of inferentially (from the 
“outside”), and when observed directly, not inferentially, it turns 
out to be consciousness. And no two observers can see the same 
tomato in the same way, because each is conscious only of his or 
her own self, not of the tomato. Only the tomato is truly conscious 
of the tomato, and only a bat knows what it is like to be a bat. We 
are all seeing the world by gazing into differently shaped mirrors, 
and then we are arguing about what the world looks like. 
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5. The House of Mirrors 
We live in a house of mirrors and think we are looking out 
the windows. 
—Friedrich Salomon Perls (1893–1970 C.E.) 
Consciousness-of-self (which is unmediated and perfect) 
becomes subject-object consciousness (which is mediated and 
distorted) by a process of seeing past one’s own self to gather 
information about the world that one’s own self is reflecting and 
representing. And this phenomenon does not describe only higher-
order animals. All things are affected by, and thus internally reflect 
to some extent, the things that surround them, and therefore the 
world can be characterized as a vast house of mirrors, although 
most of those mirrors are relatively poor reflectors. 
It follows that the more perfectly one replicates the external 
world in one’s own being, the more perfectly one comprehends the 
true nature of the world. And conversely, the more one investigates 
and accurately understands the true nature of the external world, 
the more perfectly one replicates it within. Thus, one becomes the 
universe by investigating it and knowing it ever more perfectly. 
And perhaps becoming a thing by knowing it ever more perfectly 
is a suitable definition of love. The human soul can, therefore, be 
characterized as a mirror in a house of mirrors, and love cleans the 
glass. 
Thoughtful people sometimes ask themselves, Why am I me? 
Why was I born as this person and not that person? Why do I 
happen to be the consciousness of this particular body and not that 
of a beggar on the street or a billionaire or a bird? Such thoughts 
fail to recognize that consciousness is one. In our discussion of 
Vedānta, we mentioned the simile of sunlight streaming through a 
window lattice, each ray of light, pouring through its own aperture, 
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appearing to be distinct from the others. Likewise, the sense we 
have of being a particular individual in a particular place is just a 
trick of the mind or, to put it a different way, a trick of the brain. 
Consciousness is one, but it simultaneously shines within a 
diversity of structures, giving rise to a sense of individuality that is 
merely an illusion. When gazing at the reflection of the sun in a 
series of water-filled pots on a ledge, the sun appears to be many, 
and when looking at all the conscious beings in the world, each 
pursuing its own purposes, consciousness appears to be many, but 
there is only one sun, and there is only one consciousness. That is 
the teaching of Vedānta. 
Therefore, we are individuals only insofar as we are empirical 
beings, perceiving the world through the mediation of our senses 
rather than resting in the universal nondual consciousness that we 
are. Only as empirical beings are we souls inhabiting a vast 
external universe. As empirical beings, our knowledge of the 
universe is based on its reflection and representation within our 
own selves, and therefore it is indexical. Like the image of the 
world that is reflected in the mirrored surface of a ball ornament, 
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And like a collection of such ornaments, each of us reflects the 
others reflecting the others, and so on. But even then, we all share 
one consciousness, and we are all iterations of the same indivisible 
universe. 
Suppose one were to make a map of the world that was so 
accurate and perfect that it included (on a smaller scale) every 
detail of the world, and therefore it included even the map itself, 
and even the map-within-the-map was so accurate and perfect that 
it, too, included every detail of the world, and so on. And because 
the world is dynamic and changing, one’s map, too, would need to 
be dynamic and changing. Needless to say, one would face 
insurmountable practical difficulties pursuing such a map project, 
but assume, for purposes of a thought experiment, that the project 
is doable and that one has done it. In that case, the map one has 
made would be the world; it would be one scale of reference in a 
world that was a perfect fractal, and in a perfect fractal, no scale of 
reference is distinguishable from any other. 
Now, add that this map of the world is conscious of itself. In 
that case, the map, by reason of its consciousness-of-self, would 
know the world perfectly, and it would experience its identity with 
all that is. That is so, because a perfect map is not a mere 
representation of reality; it is indistinguishable from reality. But 
while this perfect map was under construction, before it became 
perfect in each of its details, it would be a representation, not a 
replica, of the world, and therefore, in its consciousness-of-self, it 
would not experience an identity with all that is, but rather a sense 
of separation. 
This idea is wonderfully illustrated by the paintings of René 
Magritte. Perhaps The Human Condition (1933) best captures the 
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point.  Magritte described the painting in this way: “In front of a 111
window seen from inside a room, I placed a painting representing 
exactly that portion of the landscape covered by the painting. Thus, 
the tree in the picture hid the tree behind it, outside the room. For 
the spectator, [the tree] was both inside the room within the 
painting and outside in the real landscape. This is how we see the 
world. We see it [as if] outside ourselves, and at the same time we 
only have a representation of it in ourselves.”  Later, discussing 112
his art in a letter to a friend, Magritte noted the impossibility of 
human beings seeing anything other than imperfect representations 
of reality. “How can anyone enjoy interpreting symbols? They are 
‘substitutes’ that are only useful to a mind that is incapable of 
knowing the things themselves. A devotee of interpretation cannot 
see a bird; he only sees it as a symbol.”  113
In other words—and here we return to our thought experiment 
involving a map—while the map is still under construction, it is 
only a representation of reality, and therefore its consciousness-of-
self is a mere interpretation of reality—a symbol. Suppose, in 
particular, that this half-constructed map was made with 
diminishing detail in proportion to distance from a particular point 
of reference. Then, the map’s consciousness-of-self would take the 
form of a perceiver located at that point, interposing a subject-
object divide between itself and the surrounding world. 
And it is useful at this point to stop discussing maps and to 
 Other Magritte paintings that are relevant in this context include: The 111
Treachery of Images (1929), The Fair Captive (1931), The Human 
Condition (1935), The Key to the Fields (1936), The Domain of Arnheim 
(1942), The Call of the Peaks (1942), The Fair Captive (1947), 
Euclidean Walks (1955), and Evening Falls (1964). 
 Magritte, La Ligne de Vie II, quoted in Torczyner, Magritte: Ideas and 112
Images, p. 156.
 Letter from René Magritte to Achille Chavée, Sept. 30, 1960, quoted 113
in Torczyner, Magritte: Ideas and Images, p. 70.
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discuss living organisms instead. Each such organism knows the 
world by reflecting it, and thus each is, in its own being, an 
imperfect map of the world, distorting the world relative to 
particular location in space and time. We see, then, that each of us, 
by becoming a more perfect map, becomes the world, and as others 
do the same, we close the gap that separates us from one another. It 
is the indexicality that we impose on the world that makes us feel 
that we are separate individuals. Each of us is a map of the same 
universe, but for each of us there is a different “You are here” 
arrow at the center of the map. We need to remove that “You are 
here” arrow. 
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Part Five: Consciousness Explained? 
It is only when Citi, the ultimate consciousness-power, 
comes into play that the universe comes forth into being, 
and continues as existent, and when it withdraws its 
movement, the universe also disappears from view. . . . 
The other things [said to be the foundation of 
existence] . . . , since they are (supposed to be) different 
from the light of consciousness can never be a cause of 
anything, for not being able to appear owing to their 
supposed difference from consciousness-power, they are 
(as good as) nonexistent. (Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to 
sūtra 1.) 
—Kṣemarāja (10th–11th century C.E.) 
We are aware of an external world. Why do we call it 
“external”? We do so because it is something we know by 
inference from the effects it has on our own self. Our knowledge of 
it is mediated by the sense organs and therefore imperfect. And 
since we know it only by inference, according to a narrative we 
have constructed from distorted and grossly insufficient data, we 
understand relatively little about it. But if instead of inferring the 
objects in the external world, we could know them in a manner that 
was direct and unmediated, what would be their true form? 
Well, we know the true form of one of the things in the 
external world. We know the true form of a human brain (or 
perhaps a part of one). We know it by being it, and therefore—at 
least as to it—our knowing is direct and unmediated. And we also 
know the form a human brain appears to have when it is viewed 
from the “outside”—that is, when it is known only inferentially, 
the way a physiologist knows it. It follows, then, that the true form 
of any external thing (a tree, a rock, a mountain, etc.) is as different 
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from its inferred form as the experience of being a human brain is 
different from the material form a brain appears to have when it is 
perceived empirically. And it also follows that the true form of any 
external thing is consciousness, just as the true form of a living 
brain—its form when known directly—is consciousness. 
Many philosophers and scientists—unable to free themselves 
from Cartesian dualism (or its twin, the subject-object divide)—
take the physical universe as a given, and they consider 
consciousness to be something extra, something that, in theory at 
least, could disappear from the physical universe, and the universe 
could continue without it.  For them, the physical universe does 114
not depend on consciousness; rather, consciousness depends on the 
physical universe. These philosophers and scientists happily accept 
the existence of matter, space, and time, and based on an ontology 
of the physical, they imagine such silly things as universes known 
by no one and nothing. They even imagine “zombies”—by which 
they mean bodies that are constructed and function exactly like 
living human bodies but that have no consciousness. These 
philosophers and scientists do not wonder about the existence of 
the physical universe, but they wonder why, for certain complex 
organic structures, there is something it is like, subjectively, to be 
that thing. They wonder, in other words, how it could be that some 
physical things are conscious. 
But existence is just as much of a philosophical puzzle as 
consciousness. Where, or in what, is this vast expanse of space-
time located? What is its ontological foundation and source? And 
how did it come to contain all these galaxies and blackholes, 
fermions and bosons, and all the rest? And most important, if it all 
could still exist independent of consciousness, then what possibly 
could be its significance? These questions are all answered when 
the problem of existence finds its solution in consciousness. 
Consciousness exists—nothing else exists. It has no location, 
 See, e.g., Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 75–76.114
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size, or duration. It didn’t come into existence, nor can it cease to 
exist, for space, time, and change are only ideas that arise within 
consciousness. Consciousness is, and therefore it can’t not be. It 
has no support nor source. It is not a conglomerate, not an 
amalgam, not divisible into parts. Nothing is separate from it nor 
outside it. It is without limitation, dependent on nothing, free. It is 
alone. It is its own purpose, which is only to delight in itself. It is 
anything one might call God and anything one might call non-God. 
It is closer to each of us than anything we could seek, closer even 
than our own name and form. It is the soul of the soul, the self of 
the self, the I of the I. 
The whole physical universe, then, is happening in 
consciousness, and it only appears to be a material thing, extended 
in space and time, because we perceive it inferentially (from the 
“outside”) instead of experiencing it directly (from the “inside”). 
Undoubtedly, each of us can affirm, paraphrasing Descartes’s 
famous formula, I am conscious; therefore, I am. But it is the 
assertion of this book that the converse, too, is true: I am; 
therefore, I am conscious. To be is to be conscious, and it is 
nothing more. 
The materialist examines the physical universe and finds 
unconscious matter, but what is the materialist actually conscious 
of when perceiving all that unconscious matter? Only his or her 
own self, which is shimmering with consciousness. Where, then, is 
all the unconscious matter? It is nothing but an inference drawn 
from data received through sense organs. Certainly, the materialist 
would agree that his or her own brain is constructed of the same 
subatomic particles as the rest of the universe. So, if the materialist 
experiences the true unmediated form of his or her own brain as 
consciousness, then surely the same must hold true for everything 
else in the universe—or at least the materialist should have some 
philosophical basis for drawing a distinction. It makes the most 
sense, then, in light of the subjective experience we all have of 
being conscious, to assume that consciousness is the ground of 
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being and that nondual consciousness-of-self is the true form of all 
things. They only appear to be material when we know them 
sensorially, by their reflections within ourselves. 
Many people assert that consciousness exists only a little bit 
here and there, a special feature of complex organic structures. If a 
great cataclysm destroyed all those organisms, then, it is 
sometimes asserted, the universe—full of swirling galaxies, stars, 
and planets—would continue as before, but known by no one and 
nothing. On Earth, the sun would rise in the east and set in the 
west, vegetation would sprout during the warm seasons, rivers 
would flow, wind would blow, rainstorms would drench the soil, 
but all without anyone or anything conscious of it. But the notion 
of an unknown and unknowable universe is doubtful, if not 
preposterous. If there could be one such known-by-nothing 
universe, then why not a million billion? What is the point of 
imagining such universes, and what would be the point of their 
existence? 
Consciousness is the purpose of existence. The universe exists 
only to be known. And consciousness also marks the horizon of 
existence. The absence of consciousness implies nonexistence. 
And by “nonexistence” is not meant nothingness, for nothingness 
implies space and time. Rather, the absence of consciousness is 
simply impossible, because consciousness and being are the same 
thing. 
But here we are not intending to validate a primitive form of 
panpsychism whereby rocks and mountains, statues and stupas, all 
have human minds. When we say that consciousness and being are 
the same thing, the term “consciousness” refers only to each 
thing’s consciousness-of-self. The problem some philosophers 
have when considering panpsychism is that it is very difficult for 
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them to imagine a rock  or a frying pan  having thoughts. In 115 116
other words, philosophers reject panpsychism because they make 
the assumption that a human mind, or something close to it, is what 
it means to be a conscious thing. But if we drop that assumption 
and instead merely consider the possibility that consciousness-of-
self is the underlying stuff of existence, then we have solved the 
“hard problem” of consciousness: Consciousness is, and nothing 
else is; it is without size or duration; and its purpose is only to 
revel in its consciousness of itself. 
 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 297–299.115
 Della Rocca, Spinoza, pp. 108–118.116
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Part Six: Freedom in a Deterministic Universe 
1. Fables and Fantasies 
But if you believe that God speaks more clearly and 
effectively through sacred Scripture than through the light 
of the natural intellect, which he has also granted us, and 
which, with his divine wisdom, he continually preserves, 
strong and uncorrupted, then you have powerful reasons 
for bending your intellect to the opinions you attribute to 
sacred Scripture. (Letter 21.) 
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
As philosophies go, determinism doesn’t win many popularity 
contests. No one wants to be controlled. It cuts us at the core, for if 
we are controlled, then we have no agency, and if we have no 
agency, then we do not really exist, at least not in the individual 
sense that we find meaningful. And if we have no agency even as 
to our own thoughts, then we have no agency at all. Determinism 
implies ego death, and the ego doesn’t want to die. If one examines 
the question closely, one realizes that it is one’s ego that most 
resists determinism. 
But as Spinoza pointed out, “[i]t is no obstacle to the truth of a 
thing that it is not accepted by many.”  We don’t decide 117
philosophical questions by majority vote. Rather, it is we who need 
to realign our conception of self to make the truth less unappealing. 
The famous 20th century nondualist Nisargadatta Maharaj (1897–
1981 C.E.) taught that enlightenment is as simple as “That art thou” 
(Tat twam asi); the difficult part is believing it. Significantly, many 
people who reject determinism, insisting vehemently that they 
have the freedom to choose, are quite comfortable with the idea of 
 Short Treatise II, xxvi, 10.117
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divine foreknowledge. They are quite comfortable, that is, with the 
idea that God’s knows in advance what they will choose. 
The laws of physics imply a fully deterministic universe that 
denies the possibility of personal agency, and both Vedānta and 
Kashmiri Shaivism embrace that principle, albeit with some 
nuance. Spinoza, however, is particularly explicit and 
unambiguous on the point. He asserts, for example: “In nature 
there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined 
from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an 
effect in a certain way.” (Ethics, IP29.) And, he adds: “Things 
could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other 
order than they have been produced.” (Ethics, IP33.) But Spinoza
—for whom thought and matter are the same thing—goes even 
farther. He argues that determinism applies even to the psychic 
flow of thoughts and desires: “In the mind there is no absolute, or 
free, will, but the mind is determined [(i.e., caused)] to will this or 
that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this again 
by another, and so to infinity.” (Id., IIP48. Accord, id., IP32, with 
Dem. and Cor. 2.) 
Few people are ready to accept Spinoza’s comprehensive 
determinism, a determinism that makes one’s thoughts as rule-
bound and inevitable as E = mc2. For most people, personal agency 
defines the very thing they imagine themselves to be, and therefore 
Spinoza might as well be asking them to die. Prominent teachers of 
moral philosophy often urge their followers to relinquish the ego-
sense, and many people readily accept the validity of that advice, 
but few consider what relinquishing the ego-sense really implies. It 
implies the absence of personal agency and, hence, the elimination 
of the self. Few people are willing to take moral philosophy that 
far. So, unless Spinoza can replace the self he takes away with one 
more magnificent, most people will continue to prefer the lie of 
personal agency over the truth of determinism. And why is 
personal agency the “lie” and determinism the “truth”? Because 
the laws of physics govern the human brain just as surely as they 
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do the planets. 
The sense we have of personal agency is directly related to the 
Cartesian paradigm of a soul that pilots a body. But if we consider 
that the universe is a single interdependent unity that operates 
according to fixed laws and that cannot be divided into isolated 
parts, then our resistance to determinism will slowly dissolve in 
favor of a much nobler conception of what we are and what it 
means to be free. In short, the small self that we imagine ourselves 
to be does not actually exist, and therefore the question of its 
freedom is simply irrelevant. Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950 C.E.), 
the sage who attracted many people to nondual philosophy, taught 
that one should “enquire for whom is this destiny and [thus to] 
discover that only the ego is bound by destiny . . . and that the ego 
is non-existent.”  118
There is no point in arguing about whether the wings on a pig 
are covered with pig hair or feathers, because pigs don’t have 
wings. Similarly, there is no point in arguing about whether the 
individual soul of a person is free or bound, because people don’t 
have individual souls. And as for one’s true self—universal 
nondual consciousness—it is supremely free and independent, 
much more free then any individual soul could ever be. But to 
arrive at that new construction of self, the illusory ego-self must 
die, and the ego-self doesn’t want to die, so people resist 
determinism, and they cling to fables and fantasies that reinforce 
their false (Cartesian) construction of who they are. And some of 
those fables and fantasies are the daily fare of religion. 
Spinoza was not opposed to religion or to the religious life—
quite the contrary.  He appreciated the ability of prophets, acting 119
by way of the imaginative faculty of the mind, to inspire and 
 Mudaliar, Day by Day with Bhagavan, p. 266.118
 In his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza distinguished between 119
philosophy and religion, arguing that each had its appropriate role and 
that they were mutually compatible.
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motivate people toward lives of piety and moral rectitude. The 
rituals, ceremonies, holidays, iconography, cosmogony, moral 
precepts, and lore of religion all add a special richness to life, and 
these metaphorical teaching tools educate in a way that dry 
philosophical prose cannot. Like a poem, a song, or a painting, the 
images of religion reach deep into the hidden parts of the mind and 
communicate at an archetypal level. There validity for Spinoza was 
not their philosophical truth; rather, it was there emotive power. 
Spinoza recognized that, for most people, religion fills a 
psycho-spiritual gap left open by determinism. In a world that 
functions solely in accordance with deterministic physical laws, 
how can we say that actions have moral qualities? Of course, every 
act has its consequences. But in a fully deterministic world, what 
basis is there for imagining any moral consequences of an act? 
Most people intuitively recoil from the nihilism that determinism 
seems to imply, and for them, faith in a moralistic God provides a 
much-needed bulwark against the rising tide of nihilism in modern 
culture. Indeed, it was with a desire to validate moral behavior that 
Spinoza wrote his masterpiece, the Ethics. 
In many cases, people are only able to love God because they 
imagine God to have anthropomorphic qualities like kindness, 
compassion, self-sacrifice, providence, justice, and even righteous 
anger. More important, it is those qualities in God that cause 
people to cultivate similar qualities in themselves. Neither 
Spinoza’s “infinite intellect” nor Vedānta’s Brahman—impersonal 
as they are—is likely to evoke tears of heartfelt devotion or to 
inspire a selfish man to repent. Religion offers us a God that has an 
inner psychological life very much like an idealized version of our 
own, a loving and just God that we can emulate, a personal God 
that philosopher-saints like Buddha, Śaṅkara, or Spinoza dare not 
take away. 
All that is true, and yet it is also true that religion meets us 
where we are, and it speaks to the doubts and fears we feel in that 
place. And, as noted, most people imagine themselves to be an 
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individual soul piloting a body, and they don’t want to wake up 
from that dream. And for one who is dreaming that dream, nothing 
reinforces the dream more powerfully than the belief that one can 
exercised one’s freedom to choose, and nothing disturbs the dream 
more powerfully than the body’s obvious mortality. Thus, our 
greatest fears are the loss of agency and the inevitability of death. 
The first implies that we do not really exist as individuals, and the 
second implies that our existence is fleeting, relatively 
meaningless, and will end too-often in pain. 
It is no accident, then, that the two main topics of religion are 
moral choice and the immortality of the soul. Religion consists of 
stories, stories that people like to tell, and people like to tell stories 
about heroes who, exercising their freedom of choice, navigated 
extremely difficult moral dilemmas. They like to tell stories about 
the adventures of the individual soul before bodily birth and after 
bodily death. And they even like to tell a few stories that might 
guide a person, by increments, toward a different, truer sense of 
self. 
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2. You Cannot Find the Chooser 
If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way 
around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it 
would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its 
way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution 
taken once and for all. . . . [¶] . . . If one thinks out to the 
very last consequence what one exactly knows and 
understands, there will be hardly any human being who 
will be impervious to this view, provided his self-love 
does not ruffle up against it. Man defends himself from 
being regarded as an impotent object in the course of the 
Universe. But should the lawfulness of events, such as 
unveils itself more or less clearly in inorganic nature, 
cease to function in front of the activities in our brain? 
(“About Free Will”) 
—Albert Einstein (1879–1955 C.E.) 
When confronted by Spinoza’s deterministic view of the 
universe, one might immediately object, as did the mathematician 
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708 C.E.), that one has 
the daily experience of making choices—exercising one’s free will, 
that is—and that this direct experience disproves determinism. 
“For who would deny,” Tschirnhaus asked, “except by 
contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think, in my 
thoughts, that [now] I will to write, and that [now] I do not will to 
write[?]” But Spinoza responded that this feeling of freely 
exercising one’s will is a mere illusion.  Surely, when one is 120
 The question and Spinoza’s response actually appear in a letter 120
Spinoza wrote to a Leiden medical student named Georg 
Hermann Schuller (1651–1679 C.E.), but in that letter, Spinoza answers 
questions posed by Tschirnhaus. (Letter 58.)
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making a choice, there exists some physical brain-event 
corresponding to the thought one is having, and if so, then a very 
expert neuroscientist could, at least in theory, trace the physical 
causes of that brain-event, and those physical causes would be 
wholly sufficient to explain why the event occurred and, therefore, 
why the corresponding thought occurred. There is, then, no need 
for an individual soul that exercises freedom of choice. The 
physical brain, operating according to immutable laws of physics, 
is perfectly capable of doing all the choosing by itself. Moreover, 
in a physical system that is causally complete and closed, each 
thing occurring of necessity from all the things that preceded it, 
there is no wiggle room that would allow for the exercise of free 
choice. 
And quantum randomness offers no solution to the puzzle, 
because quantum randomness is fully constrained by fixed 
probabilities. Therefore, it, too, leaves no room for the exercise of 
true freedom. Thus, according to Spinoza, Tschirnhaus’s 
experience of exercising free will—now choosing to write, now 
choosing not to write—proves nothing more than that “that the 
mind is not always equally capable of thinking of the same object.” 
(Letter 58.) 
What if Spinoza is correct? What if the laws of physics really 
are making all the choices one imagines oneself to be making? 
What if all the deliberations that go into the decisionmaking 
process have a physical substratum and are physically determined? 
What if one is merely the knower of the decisionmaking process, 
not its decider? It certainly feels as if one is choosing, but the 
decision is an inevitable consequence of all that precedes it, or, at 
least, a fixed probability based on all that precedes it. Yes, one is 
the decider, but only in a purely mechanistic sense, for the outcome 
is governed by immutable laws. 
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A story about Albert Einstein illustrates the point.  Einstein 121
was once seen on Nassau Street in Princeton, looking pensive as he 
waited for the walk signal. A student asked, “Professor Einstein, 
what are you thinking?” The student supposed that the famous 
scientist was struggling with some difficult question of theoretical 
physics, but Einstein gestured across the street to the popular 
Baltimore Dairy Lunch and said, “Whether to have chocolate or 
vanilla.” 
So, let’s imagine, as a thought experiment, that you, the 
reader, are contemplating a binary decision—perhaps, whether to 
have chocolate or vanilla ice cream at “The Balt” in Princeton, 
New Jersey. Imagine further that both options are equally desirable 
in your estimation, and therefore the choice between the two is not 
an obvious one. You contemplate the chocolate; then you 
contemplate the vanilla. Perhaps you even imagine the experience 
of each based on memories of past visits to The Balt. And then a 
thought appears in your mind: Chocolate. You step forward to the 
counter and say, “Can I have a scoop of the chocolate, please?” 
And you think to yourself, “I chose the chocolate.” 
But you didn’t choose anything, for with what meta-mind did 
you choose which thought would enter your mind as you chose 
which ice cream to order? And if there is such a meta-mind, with 
what meta-meta-mind did you choose its thoughts? And the 
question can be asked ad infinitum. What actually happened when 
you chose the chocolate is that you were conscious of two options, 
and then you were conscious of a selection that took the form of a 
strong thought in favor of one of the two options, and then you 
asserted ownership of that selection, declaring mentally that you 
had chosen the chocolate, after which you were conscious of, and 
reveled in, a sense of personal agency. But if the vanilla-thought 
had come instead of the chocolate-thought, then vanilla would 
 This story was related to the present author by his father, who was a 121
student at Princeton in the mid 1950s. It was told on campus at that time.
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have been your choice, and then you would have said about that 
choice that you had chosen the vanilla, and again you would have 
reveled in a sense of personal agency. 
And that is the point made by Spinoza in his response to 
Tschirnhaus. The passage has already been quoted above, but here 
is a fuller version: 
[L]et us conceive something very simple—say, a stone 
which receives a certain quantity of motion from an 
external cause which sets it in motion. Afterward the 
stone will necessarily continue to move . . . , because it 
has this quantity of motion. Therefore, this permanence of 
the stone in motion is compelled, . . . because it must be 
defined by the thrust of the external cause. What is to be 
understood here concerning the stone should be 
understood concerning any singular thing whatever . . . : 
that each thing is necessarily determined by some external 
cause to exist and produce effects in a certain and 
determinate way. Next, conceive now, if you will, that 
while the stone continues to move, it thinks, and knows 
that . . . it strives to continue to move. Of course since the 
stone is conscious only of its striving . . . , it will believe 
itself to be free, and to persevere in motion for no other 
cause than because it wills to. And this is that famous 
human freedom that everyone brags of having, and which 
consists only in this: that men are conscious of their 
appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are 
determined. So the infant believes that he freely wants the 
milk; the angry boy that he wants vengeance; and the 
timid, flight. . . . For though experience teaches 
abundantly that there is nothing less in man’s power than 
to restrain his appetites, and that often, when men are torn 
by contrary affects, they see the better and follow the 
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worse, they still believe themselves to be free . . . .  122
What Spinoza is saying in this letter is that the laws of physics 
are the actual causes of all our choices, but our ignorance of the 
precise cause-and-effect sequence that underlies the choice leads 
us to believe that we are making “free” choices. And Spinoza 
makes the same point more formally in the Ethics. He writes: 
“[M]en are deceived in that they think themselves free . . . . This, 
then, is their idea of freedom—that they do not know any cause of 
their actions.” (Ethics, IIP35, Schol.; see id., IP33, Schol. 1.) And, 
as noted, the same idea appears also in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. In his 
commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā, Śaṅkara says: “It is, indeed, 
the ignorant who identify themselves with the cause and the effect, 
with the not-Self. But not the wise; for, these latter do not identify 
themselves with the cause and the effect since they know that the 
Self is distinct from the cause and the effect.”  And in Crest-123
Jewel of Discrimination, Śaṅkara says: “The body moves hither 
and thither, impelled by the vital force. [¶] A log of wood is carried 
by the river to lower or to higher ground. [Likewise, the] body, 
carried by the river of time, enjoys or suffers the effects of past 
actions.”  124
Similarly, the nondual texts of Kashmiri Shaivism describe 
choice as a mechanistic process that we then falsely interpret to be 
an exercise of agency. A passage from Kṣemarāja’s Spanda-
 Letter 58.122
 Bhagavadgītābhāṣya XIII, 2, translated in Mahādeva Śāstri, The 123
Bhagavad-Gītā, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, 
p. 280.
 Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 549–550, translated in Prabhavananda and 124
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, pp. 123–124. 
Similar ideas appear in the Ashṭāvakra Gītā, which may have been 
authored by one of Śaṅkara’s students. See Ashṭāvakra Gītā XI, 2–4; 
XVIII, 25.
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Nirṇaya speaks of the “senses,” a technical term that does not refer 
merely to the five senses of perception (the tanmātras) and their 
corresponding sense organs (the jñānendriyas), but also to the 
organs of action by which we engage the world through the senses 
(the karmendriyas). Kṣemarāja says: 
[T]hat Spanda principle [(i.e., the dynamic aspect of 
universal consciousness)] not only moves the senses but 
rather by infusing consciousness into the supposed 
experien[cer] makes him [(or her)] capable of effecting 
the movement, etc. of the senses by virtue of which he is 
full of the erroneous conception, “I am directing the 
senses.” He himself is nothing without the infusion of the 
Spanda principle into him. . . . [¶] If it is maintained that 
one directs the senses by an internal sense which uses a 
goad called desire, then that sense called desire, being 
itself of the nature of the directed, would require another 
sense for setting it in motion, and that in its turn would 
require another, and so on. Thus there would be a 
regressus ad infinitum.  125
In this passage, Kṣemarāja is making the point that we do not 
actually choose our desires or our actions; rather, we are caused to 
desire and to act, and then, after witnessing the desire and the 
action, we imagine that we have made a choice so to desire and so 
to act. And that, of course, is exactly what Spinoza says in his letter 
answering Tschirnhaus’s doubt. A similar idea appears in the Yoga 
Vāsiṣṭha: 
[T]here is no causal connection between the mind and the 
senses, but there is the coincidence of the thought and of 
the manifestation of the sense organs—just like a crow 
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 8.125
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sits on a palm tree and accidentally [(i.e., by random 
coincidence)] the fruit drops from it, and it appears that 
the crow dislodged it! (III, 67.)  126
All these passages deny the reality of the individual soul’s 
subjective sense of agency. But the quotation from Kṣemarāja’s 
Spanda-Nirṇaya also points out the impossibility of searching 
within oneself and finding the chooser. As Kṣemarāja explains, if 
one maintains that there is a special meta-mind in which one forms 
the desire that goads one’s senses of perception and action, then in 
what meta-mind does one form the desire that goads that desire? 
One has merely shifted the problem, not answered it. And if one 
cannot find the chooser, then one cannot find an individual soul 
that has agency, and if one cannot find an individual soul that has 
agency, then one cannot find a self, at least not a self that 
resembles the soul of Cartesian dualism. 
The Buddhists call that experience “emptiness” (Sanskrit: 
śunyata), and whether one is a physicist or a Buddhist (or both), 
emptiness can be a scary realization, for if “non-self” (Sanskrit: 
anātman) is true, then all that remains of a person is 
epiphenomenal consciousness. You don’t get to write the script; 
you don’t even get to pick the show; but you get a front row seat in 
the theater, and the story is guaranteed to be a doozy. But—spoiler 
alert—the lead character (you) dies at the end. 
3. What Does It Mean To Be Free? 
I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what 
I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I 
do not want, . . . then it is no longer I that do it, but sin 
which dwells within me. . . . I can will what is right, but I 
 The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha also denies human agency. See, e.g., Yoga Vāsiṣṭha 126
IV, 38; VI, 1:53.
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cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I 
do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, 
[then, once again,] it is no longer I that do it, but sin 
which dwells within me. . . . For I delight in the law of 
God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another 
law at war with the law of my mind and making me 
captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members. 
Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this 
body of death? 
—New Testament, Rom 7:15–24 (RSV) 
Poor Paul. He has split himself in two by deciding he likes 
some of the things in God’s show but not others. And because it is 
all God’s show and because Paul likes only part of the show, Paul 
must be worshiping a made-up god of his imagination, not the God 
that actually is. And it is no answer to blame the devil, for either 
the devil is a second god in competition with God, in which case 
God is not truly God, or the devil is only doing what God wants, in 
which case it is all God’s show, and Paul is hating God’s show, 
calling it evil and wretched. Poor Paul.  127
Paul’s familiar dilemma raises the question, What does it mean 
to be free? There is, of course, the freedom to gratify one’s 
passions, but if we think that free choice means a sort of libertarian 
(libertine?) freedom to indulge, we are in grave error. The freedom 
 This book is not intended to be an explication of the book of Romans, 127
which is one of the greatest texts of the ancient world and, in my view, 
the most theologically interesting of all the Christian scriptures. By way 
of his faith theology, Paul may have arrived at an understanding not 
completely unlike that proposed in this book. See, e.g., Rom 3:20, 8:1. 
On Paul having split himself in two, see Sigmund Freud, “Instincts and 
Their Vicissitudes,” p. 136 [“In so far as the objects which are presented 
to [the ego] are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself . . . ; and, on 
the other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of 
unpleasure . . . .”].
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to indulge implies only the absence of artificial constraints such as 
those imposed by parents, community, or government; it doesn’t 
imply true freedom. On the contrary, one who indulges passions 
lives under the sovereignty of those passions. Far from being free, 
such a person is tossed this way and that by external influences, 
rarely expressing his or her own essential nature. The person has 
only substituted one form of external control for another. And the 
freedom from one’s passions also does not imply free choice, 
although it certainly offers a measure of personal autonomy. 
Suppose a perfectly free being freely chooses good. Is that 
freedom? One would think so. But if this free being freely chose 
good, then it must be good by nature, because, being free, its 
choice of good could not have been compelled by anything outside 
itself. And if this free being is good by nature, then it has always 
done good, it is now doing good, and it will always do good. In 
other words, this being is bound fast—by reason of its inner 
essential nature, which is good—to doing good. In what sense is 
that freedom? How, after all, can we speak of an actual capacity to 
do evil if, due to an immutable predisposition, evil can never be 
done? 
Must, then, a free being that is good by nature choose to do 
something outside its nature—choose to do evil—to prove its 
freedom (that proof being a greater good that outweighs the evil)? 
That hardly seems right, for if this free being chooses to do evil 
because of the greater good of proving its freedom, then it would 
still be doing good, and it would not have proved anything. And if 
this free being chooses to do evil for the sake of evil, then this 
being would be evil by nature, not good by nature. And either way, 
its actions would still be determined by its inner essential nature. 
Perhaps, therefore, we need to redefine freedom not as the 
freedom to exercise a particular choice but as the freedom to 
express one’s inner essential nature unimpeded by external forces. 
Freedom, in other words, is the freedom to be the sole cause of an 
action rather than a concurrent cause; it is the freedom to have 
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one’s action arise from who or what one is, not from some external 
compulsion. Philosophers call that freedom “soft determinism.” It 
is “determinism” because everything that one does is governed by 
immutable laws of physics, and one does it by absolute necessity, 
compelled by one’s inner essential nature. It is “soft” because it 
involves a certain sort of free will. One’s “will” (i.e., one’s inner 
essential nature) is “free” (i.e., not overcome by external 
compulsion). One is not a puppet hanging from the strings of 
external circumstances, forced to dance to their tune. One is rule-
bound and controlled, but one is controlled from within, not from 
without. 
Take, for example, the situation of a person who overeats 
sweets despite a strong desire to lose weight. Human beings have 
evolved to desire foods that promote health, because that desire 
makes them better survivors. Therefore, if one is presented with a 
food choice (say, fresh fruit or moldy fruit), and if one desires and 
chooses the food that promotes health (say, the fresh fruit), one 
cannot be said to have exercised one’s free choice. Rather, one has 
merely acting in accordance with one’s innate bodily 
programming, a programming that evolved to promote one’s 
survival. 
But in the wild, which is where human beings did most of 
their evolving, sweet foods promote health, because they are 
relatively rare and they supply a great deal of energy. But in 
today’s industrialized world, sweet foods do not always promote 
health, because we have access to them in quantities that far 
exceed their useful value. Because the evolution of our bodily 
predisposition for sweet foods has not caught up with our 
technological ability to provide ourselves with massive quantities 
of such foods, we tend to overeat sweets. We do not do so, 
however, if we use our reasoning powers—which is also a part of 
the body, and which is also a product of evolution—to overpower 
our bodily predisposition for sweet foods. 
The point is, however, that whatever one does (whether one 
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overeats sweets or not), one does not do it as an exercise of free 
choice; one does it because some decisionmaking algorithm has 
dominated the situation—either the logic of one’s reasoning 
powers or the impulse of one’s bodily predisposition for sweet 
foods. And this same point can be made about every choice. As 
regards every choice, there will be some internal programming that 
determines the option one selects. Thus, our ability to use our 
reasoning powers to “choose” against overeating from a box of 
sweets does not prove human freedom any more than a chess-
playing computer proves computer freedom. But what it does 
prove is the ability of our essential nature rather than the proximity 
of the box of sweets to determine our actions, because our 
reasoning powers are the means by which we ensure that we are 
controlled from within, not from without. Moreover, those same 
reasoning powers enable us to understand the world around us as it 
is, not as it appears to be, and in that way, Spinoza explains, they 
make our thoughts more like God’s thoughts. 
In summary, the freedom we desire is not really freedom at all; 
the freedom we desire is that our actions should flow from who or 
what we are in our essential nature, not from some external 
compulsion. And because we desire that freedom, we desire that 
our reasoning powers should prevail over the impulses of our 
bodily predisposition. Hence, Paul’s indictment of his own bodily 
predisposition: “I see in my members another law at war with the 
law of my mind . . . . Who will deliver me from this body of 
death?” (Rom 7:23–24.) 
Paul, who very much wanted to do good, complains that he 
finds himself instead doing the “sin” that he “hates.” But because 
Paul cannot control his bodily impulses, he concludes that it is not 
he who does the sin, but the sin that dwells in him. Paul understood 
that his reasoning powers were proof of his connection to the mind 
of God and also to immortality, and by contrast, he saw his natural 
bodily predisposition as a sort of imprisonment, explicitly 
associating “sin” with the bodily mortality. 
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But if Paul was incapable of resisting the impulse to do the 
thing he had reasoned not to do, then, as he says, it was not he that 
did it (in the sense of a person or soul with agency). Rather, it was 
his bodily predisposition that did it. And the converse, too, is true. 
If Paul could sometimes resist the thing he had reasoned not to do, 
then, again, it was not he that did it (again, in the sense of a person 
or soul with agency). Rather, it was his essential nature that did it. 
And with that insight, one begins to wake up and see that there is 
no doership and that there never was any doership. It only seemed 
otherwise because one was dreaming that one was an individual 
soul piloting a body. Paul—who frequently relied on Hebrew 
scripture to support his ideas—needed to reread the Adam and Eve 
story from the book of Genesis and to consider more carefully 
what it teaches about free choice. (See Appendix Two, page ___.) 
Here, then, we can return to the question we asked at the 
outset of this chapter. Suppose a perfectly free being freely chooses 
good. This free being—which is good by nature—has always done 
good, is now doing good, and will always do good. This being is 
bound fast—by reason of its good nature—to doing good. Is that 
freedom? Yes, that is freedom. It is not the freedom to will or do 
something that is contrary to what one is. Rather, it is the freedom 
to express one’s essential nature unimpeded, and that is the only 
freedom anyone should desire. 
4. Effortless Effort 
As for what [your friend] has maintained next—that if we 
are compelled by external causes, no one could acquire a 
habit of virtue—I do not know who has told him that it 
cannot happen from a fatal necessity, but only from a free 
decision of the mind, that we should have a strong and 
constant disposition. (Letter 58.) 
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
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“But wait a minute!” you might object. “If choice is a mere 
illusion, then why should I struggle to fulfill my duties and my 
moral obligations? If everything is determined by the laws of 
physics and if what I do right now cannot change the future even a 
bit, then I will spend the day sleeping and the night carousing.” 
The mistake in that sort of fatalistic thinking is the line “what I do 
right now cannot change the future even a bit.” Go ahead and sleep 
all day and carouse all night if your essential nature is so weak, but 
you are mistaken if you think that such behavior is justified by soft 
determinism. Only a fool’s version of determinism imagines, 
fatalistically, that good will come without effort or that hardship 
will come despite it. If good is “fated,” then why not effort, too? 
Put another way, it is very often the case that, in the fullness of 
time, the people who have pleasant things happen to them are not 
the same people who “spend the day sleeping and the night 
carousing.” Everything is fixed by the laws of cause and effect, but 
what you do right now is an integral part of that cause-and-effect 
system, and therefore what you do right now is the measure of both 
your essential nature and what will happen to you at a future time. 
People tend to confuse determinism with fatalism, and they 
tend to think that freedom of choice is necessary to make us 
hardworking, self-restrained, and morally upright. And you will 
look long and hard to find a moral theologian who preaches to a 
general audience that there is no freedom of choice. Rather, they 
will all assert that one has such freedom and that one must exercise 
one’s freedom by choosing what is noble and rejecting what is 
harmful. And these moral theologians might also point out that 
doing good is often unpleasant and undesirable, and that people are 
naturally inclined against it, whereas doing evil is often attractive 
and profitable, and that people are naturally inclined in favor of it. 
Therefore, they will conclude, only the carrot and the stick can 
cause weak-minded people to do what is beneficial and to avoid 
evil. 
147
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
It doesn’t seem to occur to these moral theologians that if 
people are naturally inclined to act in a particular way, it cannot be 
called “evil” anymore than it is evil for animals to follow their 
natural instincts. Rather, it is merely an expression of the way in 
which God (or, if you prefer, natural circumstance) has created 
human beings. At worst, then, the so-called “evil” that a person is 
naturally inclined to do is an act that violates the social contract, 
not one that violates some moral code of natural origin. And 
likewise, the good that the moral theologian seeks to enforce by 
preaching freedom of choice is a socially constructed good, not a 
natural good. 
This point is not intended to suggest that the socially 
constructed good is invalid or that it can be lightly cast aside. For 
purposes of regulating human behavior, we can tentatively define 
“good” as that which offers the greatest possible benefit for the 
most possible people, or, more precisely, that which enables the 
most possible people to express outwardly their inner essential 
nature. That definition is, of course, just a starting place, and it 
would need to be refined to account for the protection of natural 
resources, plant and animal life, and the personal interests of the 
weaker members of society. The point is, however, that when good 
is defined in such terms, the socially constructed good very often 
(not always) satisfies the definition. It is to our mutual advantage 
to live in a healthy society, and a healthy society must enforce the 
precepts that foster that mutual benefit. In many cases, therefore, 
an intelligent person will naturally choose the socially constructed 
good, just as animals that live in social groups do. But the same 
cannot be said for less thoughtful members of society, and here the 
arguments of the moral theologian are quite valid. 
A weak-minded man who has raped, or even murdered, in 
pursuit of some myopic conception of personal advantage has not 
done a natural evil; rather, he has done the sort of thing that 
predatory animals often do, effectively reducing himself to their 
level. It may be that he has never lived in a healthy society or that 
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he otherwise lacks the ability to recognize the mutual advantage of 
conforming his conduct to a socially constructed norm. But, by 
committing rape or murder, this weak-minded man has seriously 
undermined the mutual benefit that is the purpose of the social 
contract, and the most effective way of regulating this man’s 
behavior might be through a system of reward and punishment that 
is direct and unambiguous, and by telling the man that he has the 
freedom to choose his actions and that he should choose those that 
lead to reward and avoid punishment. 
And as the moral theologian also knows, such methods will 
motivate ordinary people, too, increasing their industriousness and 
moral rectitude. But that is so only for people who are immersed in 
Cartesian dualism, imagining themselves to be souls piloting 
bodies. Such people tend to believe that effort is linked to (and 
dependent on) freedom of choice. But the truth is that there is no 
shortage of effort even in a fully deterministic world, especially if 
we focus our attention on those people who achieve great things. A 
wise philosopher embraces effort but renounces personal 
ownership of that effort, thus converting it into joy. A fool, by 
contrast, renounces the effort itself—and then bemoans the 
difficulties that follow. 
But what does it mean to renounce personal ownership of 
one’s effort? Ramana Maharshi (1879–1950 C.E.) was once asked, 
“Are only important events in a man’s life, such as his main 
occupation or profession, predetermined, or are trifling acts in his 
life, such as taking a cup of water or moving from one place in the 
room to another, also predetermined?” 
“Yes, everything is predetermined,” responded the sage. 
“Then . . . what free will has man?” queried the incredulous 
seeker. 
“What for . . . does the body come into existence?” Ramana 
asked. “It is designed for doing the various things marked out for 
execution in this life. The whole programme is chalked out. . . . As 
for freedom for man, he is always free not to identify himself with 
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the body and not to be affected by the pleasures or pains 
consequent on the body’s activities.”  128
In other words, nothing can constrain a person who is ripe for 
awakening from realizing that his or her true identity is not the 
body but the universal consciousness in which effort is effortless. A 
passage from Kṣemarāja’s Spanda-Nirṇaya expresses a similar 
principle, using the name Śaṃkara to refer to the universal 
consciousness: 
Śaṃkara is one who does śam.  By śam is meant the grace 
which consists in enabling the aspirant to recognize the 
vast expanse of His (Śiva’s) [universal] Consciousness, 
which is non-dualistic and is the Highest Bliss . . . . 
Such Śaṃkara, who is our own essential nature, do we 
laud. Here, the sense of [the term] “lauding” is that, by 
considering Him as excelling the entire cosmos, we enter 
into His being by obliterating the state of assumed 
agency.  129
Kṣemarāja is saying here that by renouncing one’s false sense of 
agency, one realizes one’s identity with something much greater: 
the universal consciousness. But by describing the universal 
consciousness as “Highest Bliss,” Kṣemarāja is also implying that 
the sense of effort only exists if one imagines one has agency. 
That, then, is what it means to renounce personal ownership of 
effort. One renounces the idea of being a person who makes the 
effort. Consider the example of an athlete who, after intently 
pursuing victory on the playing field, notices an abrasion on the leg 
but is unable to recall when or how it occurred. The injury caused 
 Mudaliar, Day by Day with Bhagavan, pp. 91–92, italics added.128
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 1, italics 129
added.
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pain, no doubt, but the athlete did not accept ownership of the pain; 
instead, the athlete’s mind was directed elsewhere, and the pain 
was never recorded into memory; it was forgotten as soon as it was 
felt. In like manner, a wise philosopher renounces ownership of 
effort, doing so by refusing to record the effort into a remembered 
narrative about a person who gains this or suffers that. 
Everything that occurs in this world is governed by the laws of 
physics, but when the laws of physics brought you, the reader, into 
the world, did those laws create a weak-minded fool who would 
cease all effort upon learning that freedom of choice is a mere 
illusion? Of course not! Therefore, if you feel some internal 
resistance to effort, ask yourself who is resisting. You will find that 
it is your false self that is resisting, the self that thinks it has 
freedom of choice, the self that keeps a careful tally of merits and 
injustices, the self that clings to the notion of a person who should 
not have to do this or who should receive that. Why pay that false 
self any mind now that you know it to be unreal? Why give it 
power over you? There is no resistance to the effort required to 
indulge a pleasure. Therefore, one’s resistance to effort is merely a 
matter of having rejected some part of God’s wonderful show. That 
resistance is mere static that can (and should) be tuned out in favor 
of expressing one’s essential nature in every moment. 
Consciousness revels in toil and in rest, knowing each to be, like 
shadow and light, the forms of its own play. 
It must be noted, however, that the feeling of choice (i.e., the 
feeling of personal agency) remains even for one who is awake to 
nondual truth. It may be that all the deliberations that go into a 
decisionmaking process have a physical substratum and are 
physically determined, but if one is going to function effectively, 
allowing self-optimal decisions to unfold, one must certainly 
cultivate the feeling that one is exercising one’s power of choice. In 
other words, even after recognizing that freedom of choice is a 
mere illusion, one needs to play along as if it were real, for we 
evolved as creatures that imagined themselves to have such 
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freedom, and we are hardwired to operate most effectively based 
on that self-conception. The only practical difference, then, 
between one who is awakened to nondual truth and one who is not 
is that the awakened person makes choices as if choices were 
possible, whereas others make choices believing choices to be 
possible. But that difference is not insignificant; it implies peace of 
mind for the awakened person and psychic turmoil for everyone 
else. 
So, let the moral theologians preach about freedom of choice, 
and let them beseech their listeners to exercise that freedom in 
favor of industriousness and moral rectitude. Such teachings are 
suitable for the general congregation. But for you, the thoughtful 
philosopher, the realization that choice is an illusion does not cause 
you to cease your effort to promote good in every moment. Rather, 
it spurs you to greater effort, while renouncing the thought of being 
a person who makes an effort. For you, effort is effortless, and 
moral good is the gentle path. So, keep this great mystery close to 
the heart and, as an effortless expression of your essential nature, 
be calm and carry on. 
5. Punishment 
And as for what [your friend] adds finally—that if 
[determinism] is assumed, all wicked conduct would be 
[morally] excusable—what of it? For evil men are no less 
to be feared, nor are they any less destructive, when they 
are necessarily evil. (Letter 58.) 
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
As noted, the primary reason for the dogma that we have 
freedom of choice is to justify reward or punishment for those who 
comply with or violate society’s precepts. Is it fair, after all, for 
society to impose punishment on a violent felon if the felon had no 
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control over the course of events that resulted in the crime? We 
have all experienced moments when, in the throes of hot passion or 
the flights of misguided deliberation, we do something we later 
wish we had not done. If, however, we go over the event in our 
mind, we see that in the moment that we acted, we were absolutely 
convinced that the action was correct, and we could not, therefore, 
have acted in any other way. And if that is true for us, who are very 
thoughtful and law abiding by nature, is it not equally true for the 
rapist and the murderer? Wasn’t he, too, acting under the influence 
of an irresistible impulse or under a wrong-headed conviction? We 
all know he was, for why else would he have so acted? But how 
then can we justify his imprisonment or execution? We do so, very 
often, by invoking the dogma that he had freedom of choice, and 
therefore he can be held morally responsible for his actions. 
In considering the problem of punishment in a deterministic 
universe, our earlier discussion of Paul’s Letter to the Romans is 
particularly relevant, because there we saw that to be “free” means 
to have one’s actions determined by one’s essential nature. 
Consider the statement, “John is good.” The speaker probably does 
not mean that John’s actions are all randomly generated and that, 
by rare chance, they all happen to be good. If that were the 
intention underlying the statement, then John’s very next action 
would be no more likely to be good than a rolled pair of dice is 
likely to come up cat’s eyes. What the speaker is saying, therefore, 
is that John’s essential nature—the inner something that governs 
his actions when he is acting autonomously—is good. And if that is 
so, then the speaker must admit that it is not John’s freedom of 
choice that empowers John to be good; rather, it is the way John is 
constructed at the core of his being that does so. In brief, our 
ability to assess a person’s moral character implies that there is 
something essential in a person that determines behavior when 
external compulsions are absent, which, in turn, implies soft 
determinism, not freedom of choice. 
And, of course, the word “good” in the statement “John is 
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good” is not significant to the foregoing analysis; the adjective 
could just as well be “reliable,” “steadfast,” “kind,” “moral,” 
“lazy,” “selfish,” etc. Whatever the adjective used, the speaker is 
saying that John’s essential nature matches that description and 
governs his actions when he acts autonomously. Therefore, one 
who relies on freedom of choice as a justification for punishment is 
faced with an intractable dilemma: Either (1) human beings have 
no essential nature that governs their behavior, in which case a 
person’s past actions tell us nothing about his or her future 
conduct, and punishment serves no purpose; or (2) human beings 
have an essential nature, in which case we can legitimately judge a 
person’s future conduct from his or her past actions, but the person, 
then, has no true freedom of choice, and therefore relying on 
freedom of choice as a justification for punishment is fallacious. 
Indeed, true freedom would imply the absence of any 
governing principle directing a person’s behavior, in which case 
the person’s choices can only be random and, hence, blameless. It 
seems, then, that determinism, not freedom of choice, is what 
actually justifies punishment. We can justly punish a person 
because we accept that the person’s actions are governed by his or 
her essential nature, not by mere lottery. We do not account right or 
wrong to a pair of dice unless the dice have a predisposition to roll 
in a particular way, and likewise we cannot account right or wrong 
to a person unless the person has a predisposition to act in a 
particular way. 
And it is no answer to say that a person’s predisposition is not 
a fixed thing, that it is instead something that the person forms and 
reforms over time, and that a person can make free choices about 
how that ongoing formation of self proceeds. That answer merely 
shifts the analysis: Either (1) the person forms his or her 
predisposition by random decision, in which case moral 
assessment of the person is impossible; or (2) the person forms his 
or her predisposition based on an underlying essential nature, in 
which case that essential nature is ultimately what is determining 
154
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
the person’s actions, and the person has no freedom of choice. 
What we really mean, then, when we justify punishment by 
reference to freedom of choice is not that the wrongdoer’s actions 
were truly free. What we really mean, rather, is that the 
wrongdoer’s actions were not the result of some external influence 
(psychological or physical), and therefore those actions accurately 
tell us something about the person’s inner essential nature. As we 
concluded in our discussion of Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 
“freedom” could be thought of as the name we give to determinism 
when actions are determined by an actor’s own essential nature, 
not by external influences. But Spinoza used a different label. For 
him, the phrase “power of acting” referred to the measure of a 
thing’s ability to be the sole cause of an event rather than a 
concurrent cause—its ability, that is, to act rather than to react. 
Moreover, Spinoza argued that an increase in a person’s “power of 
action”—what we might call a person’s “self-actualization”—is the 
key to true happiness. (Ethics, IIID2; id., IIIP11, Schol.) 
Spinoza drew no distinction between human behavior and the 
flow of forces that deterministically govern the rest of the natural 
world. He wrote: “I do not think it right to laugh at nature, and far 
less to grieve over it, reflecting that men, like all else, are only a 
part of nature.” (Letter 30.) Fire does not need to justify its 
tendency to burn, and a lion does not need to justify its tendency to 
kill. Nature has produced a world of incomparable beauty, and its 
punishments require no further justification. And if human society 
is organized to produce the greatest possible benefit for most 
possible people, while also protecting the natural world and the 
interests of the weak, then it does not need the dogma of free 
choice to justify its punishments. 
That said, society only has an interest in controlling antisocial 
behavior at its source. It may be that most wrongdoers act 
primarily under the influence of external forces. Some wrongdoers 
might be weak-minded, easily swayed by bad company or the pull 
of destructive habits. Other wrongdoers might be misinformed, and 
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that misinformation might have hardened into a false conviction or 
a deep-seated distrust, distorting the person’s judgment and 
influencing his or her behavior. In such cases, it might be that a 
punitive approach does not best serve society’s valid interest in 
preserving the peace. 
6. Theodicy 
[T]hey seem to conceive man in Nature as a dominion 
within a dominion. For they believe that man . . . has 
absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined 
only by himself. And they attribute the cause of human 
impotence and inconstancy, not to the common power of 
Nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, 
which they therefore bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or (as 
usually happens) curse. . . . But . . . nothing happens in 
Nature that can be attributed to any defect in it, for 
Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of 
acting are everywhere one and the same, that is, the laws 
and rules of Nature, according to which all things happen, 
and change from one form to another, are always and 
everywhere the same. (Ethics, III, Preface, italics added.) 
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
In Spinoza’s assessment, God didn’t create a universe that has 
any evil in it at all, neither natural evil, nor human evil. But people 
nevertheless imagine evil, projecting their flawed and artificial 
conception of what ought to be upon the events they witness, and 
then—like modern-day versions of the prophet Job—they puzzle 
about evil, and they doubt God’s sovereignty. Why, they ask, is 
there evil if God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good? Why 
are there holocausts? Why earthquakes? Why epidemic diseases? 
Why wars? 
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It does not seem to occur to these modern-day Jobs that their 
god is as much an invention of their imagination as the so-called 
good and evil they assign to the events they are witnessing. They 
fashion an idol that shares their fabricated conception of good, and 
then, because many things fall short of that conception, they begin 
to doubt the idol they have fashioned. And, finally, they invent a 
second idol, at war with their beloved first idol, and they blame the 
second idol for everything they dislike, reassuring themselves that, 
in the end, the first idol will prevail over the second idol. (See 
Appendix Two, page ___.) But Spinoza saw the matter differently. 
He argued that, however we might define good for purposes of 
regulating human society, the only valid measure of good for 
purposes of judging God’s creation is what actually is. 
A person who declares anything in the universe to be evil—
whether that thing is a natural event or a product of the human will
—is an idolator, worshiping an invented god. But a person who 
rejects nothing, celebrates all that is, and recognizes that the human 
will is itself only a part of nature, that person has found God. In 
short, the universe is perfect, for if it is not perfect, then God is not 
perfect. Spinoza said it this way: 
[T]hings have been produced by God with the highest 
perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a 
given most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God of 
any imperfection, for his perfection compels us to affirm 
this. Indeed, from the opposite, it would clearly follow . . . 
that God is not supremely perfect; because if things had 
been produced by God in another way, we would have to 
attribute to God another nature, different from that which 
we have been compelled to attribute to him from the 
consideration of the most perfect being. (Ethics, IP33, 
Schol. 2.) 
Thus, according to Spinoza’s view, if one is confronted by 
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something one imagines to be evil, one’s only option is to 
reimagine it—or to reimagine God, which amounts to the same 
thing. 
Not surprisingly, the Upanishads, too, deny the existence of 
evil, whether natural evil or human evil. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad, for example, we read about a person (man or woman) 
who knows Brahman: 
Him these two do not overcome—neither the thought 
“Hence I did wrong,” nor the thought “Hence I did right.” 
Verily, he overcomes them both. What he has done and 
what he has not done do not affect him. [¶] This very 
[doctrine] has been declared in the verse: This eternal 
greatness of a Brahmin [(i.e., a knower of Brahman)]/ Is 
not increased by deeds (karma), nor diminished./ One 
should be familiar with it. By knowing it,/ One is not 
stained by evil action. [¶] Therefore, having this 
knowledge, having become calm, subdued, quiet, 
patiently enduring, and collected, one sees the Soul just in 
the soul. One sees everything as the Soul. Evil does not 
overcome him; he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn 
him; he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from impurity, 
free from doubt, he becomes a Brahmin [(i.e., a knower of 
Brahman)].  130
And in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, we read: 
Now, the Soul (Ātman) is the bridge [or, dam], the 
separation for keeping these worlds apart. Over that 
bridge [or, dam] there cross neither day, nor night, nor old 
age, nor death, nor sorrow, nor well-doing, nor evil-
doing. [¶] All evils turn back therefrom, for that Brahman-
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.22–23.130
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world is freed from evil. Therefore, verily, upon crossing 
that bridge, if one is blind, he becomes no longer blind; if 
he is sick, he becomes no longer sick. Therefore, verily, 
upon crossing that bridge, the night appears even as the 
day, for that Brahman-world is ever illumined.  131
Likewise, in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, we read: 
Such a one [who knows Brahman], verily, the thought 
does not torment: “Why have I not done the good 
(sadhu)? Why have I done the evil (pāpa)?” He who 
knows this, saves (spṛṇute) himself (ātmānam) from these 
[thoughts]. For truly, from both of these [thoughts] he 
saves himself—he who knows this! [¶] Such is the mystic 
doctrine (upaniṣad)!  132
Finally, in the Kaushītaki Upaniṣad, we read: 
There he shakes off his good deeds and his evil deeds. His 
dear relatives succeed to the good deeds; those not dear, 
to the evil deeds. Then, just as one driving a chariot looks 
down upon the two chariot-wheels, thus he looks down 
upon day and night, thus upon good deeds and evil deeds, 
and upon all the pairs of opposites. This one, devoid of 
good deeds, devoid of evil deeds, a knower of Brahman, 
unto very Brahman goes on.  133
So he who understands [Brahman]—by no deed 
whatsoever of his is his world injured, not by stealing, not 
 Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.4.1–2.131
 Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.9.132
 Kaushītaki Upaniṣad 1.4.133
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by killing an embryo, not by the murder of his mother, not 
by the murder of his father; if he has done any evil 
(pāpa), the dark color departs not from his face.  134
He does not become greater (bhūyas) with good action, 
nor indeed lesser (kanīyas) with bad action. [¶] This one 
[(i.e., Brahman)], truly, indeed, causes him whom he 
wishes to lead up from these worlds, to perform good 
action. This one, also, indeed, causes him whom he 
wishes to lead downward, to perform bad action.  135
Consistent with these upanishadic texts, Śaṅkara, too, 
describes an ultimate state in which moral distinctions are 
transcended.  But nondual Kashmiri Shaivism goes even further, 136
using moral transcendence to justify backroom ritualized violations 
of religious and social norms.  Here, Kashmiri Shaivism becomes 137
the subject of legitimate criticism. 
The point being made by scriptural passages that validate 
moral transcendence is not that a person can or should act as a self-
 Kaushītaki Upaniṣad 3.1.134
 Kaushītaki Upaniṣad 3.8. See also Maitri Upaniṣad 6.18 [“Then, 135
being a knower, shaking off good and evil,/ He reduces everything to 
unity in the supreme Imperishable.” and “So, with the Brahman-knowers, 
faults/ Do never any shelter find.”].
 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 1, 22, II, 3, 48, translated in Thibaut, The 136
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, 
pp. 240, 248; Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 433, 503, 545, translated in 
Prabhavananda and Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of 
Discrimination, pp. 105, 117, 123. Similar ideas also appear throughout 
the Yoga Vāsiṣṭha.
 See, e.g., Sanderson, “Meaning in Tantric Ritual”; Sanderson, “Purity 137
and Power among the Brahmans of Kashmir”; Sanderson, “Śaivism and 
the Tantric Traditions.”
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indulgent libertine or that moral ideals are simply meaningless. On 
the contrary, actions have consequences, transgressive actions 
usually have very unpleasant consequences (both for the actor and 
for the target of the action), and an intelligent person will pursue 
the general good. Moral ideals evolved and continue to exist 
because they foster one’s personal self-actualization and because 
they goad one toward a more perfect (less indexical) understanding 
of the world. Thus, the point being made by these scriptural 
passages that validate moral transcendence is not that moral ideals 
are meaningless but that one is never alienated from God on 
account of the things one may have done. 
But can the world really be perfect and devoid of evil if it has 
holocausts and earthquakes, epidemic diseases and wars? A wise 
philosopher will certainly try to prevent and guard against such 
calamities, but a wise philosopher sees no natural evil in suffering 
and death. Our sense organs allow us to perceive only a minute 
fraction of the universe, and we perceive it by way of a distorted 
and inadequate reflection, resulting in a flawed narrative about a 
soul that inhabits and pilots a body. But that’s not what we really 
are. The fact is that bodies die—if not after 20 years, then after 90 
or more. Consciousness, however, is eternal (i.e., outside time), 
and when eternity is the scale of reference, calculating the 
difference between 20 and 90 years is like measuring the waist on 
a mosquito. 
7. The Perfect Freedom of God 
I say that a thing is free if it exists and acts from the 
necessity of its own nature alone, and [that it is] 
compelled if it is determined by something else to exist 
and produce effects in a certain and determinate way. For 
example, even though God exists necessarily, still he 
exists freely, because he exists from the necessity of his 
own nature alone. . . . You see then that I place freedom 
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not in a free decree, but in free necessity. . . . I should like 
your friend, who raises these objections to me, to tell me 
how he conceives [1] the human virtue which arises from 
the free decree of the mind [(i.e., freedom of choice)] to 
coexist with [2] God’s preordination. If he confesses . . . 
that he does not know how to reconcile these things, then 
he is trying to hurl at me the spear by which he himself is 
already pierced through. (Letter 58.) 
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
God created a magnificent universe that is constructed in 
every detail according to elegant physical laws, and this universe 
plays itself out across time, each new configuration determined by 
the configuration that preceded it. Some people are troubled by 
that model of reality. They want time to be mutable from moment 
to moment. They don’t like imagining time to be a fixed landscape, 
analogous to the spatial dimensions. For them, determinism seems 
to reduce the infinite possibilities associated with freedom to the 
single possibility associated with the laws of physics. Thus, 
determinism seems to them to limit the scope of God’s creative 
freedom. What they fail to recognize is that an infinite thing 
doesn’t need to renounce determinism to prove its freedom, for 
infinity is the very definition of freedom. 
Indeed, the so-called “freedom” the permits a choice from 
moment to moment is actually a constraint, not a freedom, for if a 
choice must be made, then only one of an infinitude of possibilities 
can become actual, while the others must remain only imaginary. 
God, therefore, is much more free if every possibility can be 
actualized. Infinity, not choice, is the measure of God’s freedom. 
Spinoza describes God’s perfect infinite freedom this way: 
. . . [S]ince the divine nature has absolutely infinite 
attributes, each of which also expresses an essence 
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infinite in its own kind, from its necessity there must 
follow infinitely many things in infinite modes (i.e., 
everything which can fall under an infinite intellect) . . . . 
(Ethics, IP16, Dem.) 
. . . [N]othing can be or be conceived without God, 
but . . . all things are in God. So there can be nothing 
outside him by which he is determined or compelled to 
act. . . . (Ethics, IP17, Dem.) 
God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists only from 
the necessity of his nature, and acts from the necessity of 
his nature. (Ethics, IP17, Cor. 2.) 
In these passages, Spinoza is defining God’s freedom in terms of 
God’s infinitude and thus the absence of any external constraints. 
In Kashmiri Shaivism, the Sanskrit words svatantra and 
svātantrya are used to express this same freedom. The point 
expressed by these Sanskrit terms is that God, or universal 
consciousness, is dependent on nothing outside itself, which means 
that there is nothing that can act as a limiting factor with respect to 
God’s creativity.  In other words, the freedom of God is not the 138
petty freedom of choosing one possibility over another; rather, the 
freedom of God is the freedom to manifest all the possibilities. In 
the Spanda-Nirṇaya, Kṣemarāja explains this absolute freedom, 
referring to God by the name Śaṃkara: 
Of that—i.e., of Śaṃkara—who is a compact mass of 
Light and Bliss and who is everyone’s own being, there is 
nowhere—i.e., in no space, time, or form—any 
obstruction—i.e., any impediment—in His free advance, 
 Singh, Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, p. 122, n. 14.138
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because nothing can veil His nature.  139
It is valuable to consider in this context the “many worlds” 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. This controversial scientific 
theory proposes that, when a quantum-level measuring event 
occurs, every place where, according to mathematical probability, 
a subatomic particle might be, it actually is, in some world. 
Moreover, because in our world the measuring event locates the 
particle in only one of those possible locations, it follows that in 
other worlds (i.e., in parallel versions of the universe), similar 
measuring events are locating the particle in the other locations 
where the particle might be. The universe thus splits into multiple 
versions of itself whenever a measuring event takes place.  140
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 2. See also 139
Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 1 [“The 
glorious great Lord by His power of absolute Freedom assuming the 
subjective roles of Śiva, Mantramaheśvara, Mantreśvara, Mantra, 
Vijñānākala, Pralayākala, and Sakala and the role of [the] sphere of 
objects appropriate for each subject, in the process of gradual descent, 
displays [all things on all levels of manifestation] . . . .”], com. to 
Spandakārikā, section 3, verse 13 [“The Power of Absolute Freedom of 
the Lord” produces all things out of letters.]; Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. 
to sūtra 20 [“And the Highest Lord is full of the flow of bliss, because of 
His being free from all desire, because of His being fully perfect, because 
of His being the essence of absolute freedom . . . .”]; Yogarāja’s com. to 
Paramārthasāra, verse 1 [“Notwithstanding his self-manifestation as all, 
his nature is that of supreme consciousness characterized by his own 
absolute undivided freedom shining as the highest non-dual 
illumination.”].
 The “many worlds” interpretation summarized in the main text was 140
proposed by Bryce Seligman Dewitt and R. Neill Graham based on Hugh 
Everett’s 1956 doctoral thesis. See Dewitt and Graham (editors), The 
Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. For a critical 
discussion of the “many worlds” interpretation, see Barrett, “Everett’s 
Relative-State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics”; Barrett, The 
Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds.
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According to this theory, it is only the indexicality that we 
impose on the universe—our point of view relative to the whole—
that causes us to measure the subatomic particle in a particular 
location. Everything that can possibly occur in the universe does 
occur, somewhere, at some time, in some version of the universe, 
but because of the limitations imposed by our sense organs, we 
experience the unfolding of only one of those possibilities. But 
notice the wording used above: “Everything that can possibly 
occur in the universe does occur . . . .” The universe, in its perfect 
freedom, actualizes every possibility, not every strange phantasm 
of the human imagination, and we know from long experience that, 
in the fullness of time, all the possibilities of the universe tilt 
toward beauty. 
Thus, the wealth of possibilities that people associate with 
freedom of choice is not reduced, by determinism, to just a single 
possibility. Rather, in God’s infinite universe, all possibilities are 
actualities, and it is only the limits of human perception that 
prevent a person from experiencing more than one of those 
actualities. Freedom of choice, by contrast, only seems to offer a 
wealth of possibilities. It fails to deliver on its promise, because in 
a universe governed by choice rather than infinitude, only one of 
the wealth of possibilities becomes actual. Spinoza makes this 
point very persuasively: 
Others think that God is a free cause because he can (so 
they think) bring it about that the things which we have 
said follow from his nature (i.e., which are in his power) 
do not happen or are not produced by him. . . . [¶] . . . 
[¶] . . . [T]hey prefer to maintain that God is . . . not 
creating anything except what he has decreed to create by 
some absolute will. [¶] But I think I have shown clearly 
enough that from God’s supreme power, or infinite nature, 
infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, that is, 
all things, have necessarily flowed . . . . And in this way, 
165
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
at least in my opinion, God’s omnipotence is maintained 
far more perfectly. [¶] Indeed—to speak openly—my 
opponents seem to deny God’s omnipotence. For they are 
forced to confess that God understands infinitely many 
creatable things, which nevertheless he will never be able 
to create. . . . Therefore, to maintain that God is perfect, 
they are driven to maintain at the same time that he 
cannot bring about everything to which his power 
extends. I do not see what could be feigned which would 
be more absurd than this or more contrary to God’s 
omnipotence. (Ethics, IP17, Schol., italics added. See also 
id., IP32, Cor. 2.) 
In other words, freedom, for Spinoza, is the ability to choose all 
the possibilities, not just one. Professor Einstein can have the 
chocolate and the vanilla. 
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Part Seven: Time and Eternity 
1. The Circularity of Time 
I ask you, my friend, to consider that men are not created, 
but only generated, and that their bodies already existed 
before, though formed differently. (Letter 4.) 
—Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677 C.E.) 
In light of what we have learned up to this point, what can we 
say about death? First, the notion of an immortal individual soul 
that floats away from the dying body and journeys to a new 
beatified body in heaven or to a new human body on earth is a 
simplistic fantasy that must be set aside. There is no bubble-like 
soul that exists independent of matter, steers the ship of the body, 
and emerges, specter-like, when the body dies. Consciousness and 
matter are one; the human soul is the human brain, or some 
component of it. The human brain, or some component of it, is 
conscious of itself by being itself, and it infers an external world 
from modifications it observes within its own self. Therefore, 
although consciousness is both universal and eternal, the unique 
characteristics of a specific human mind depend on the complex 
configuration of a specific human body. The destruction of that 
body results in a dispersal of the system that gave rise to that mind, 
and what remains is the consciousness-of-self of the dispersed 
parts. 
Nonetheless, the universal consciousness is what one always 
was. And because that consciousness is the ground of being, 
nothing can ever extinguish it. It cannot be extinguished as a 
whole, and it cannot be extinguished in its parts, for that would 
imply the theoretical possibility of extinguishing it as a whole. 
Therefore, the death of a person does not affect even a bit the 
universal consciousness that shined in and through that person. The 
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universe was sparkling with consciousness before the person died, 
and it continues to do so no less brightly after the person dies. 
Nothing changes other than the images that appear and disappear 
in consciousness. 
Immortality, according to this way of thought, is a matter of 
merging one’s identity with an immortal thing. Hive insects 
sacrifice themselves for the sake of the continuing vitality of the 
hive, and people sometimes identify so strongly with children, 
family, or clan that they value the continuing vitality of those 
social groups over their own individual existence. Moreover, in all 
the effects that one’s self-expressive actions have had on the flow 
of events in the universe, there is a sort of memory—a “soul print,” 
one might say—of one’s individual soul. Kṣemarāja says, for 
example: “It is never witnessed that [(i.e., it never occurs that)] the 
produced product, such as the jar, can conceal the nature of the 
agent, such as the potter, etc.”  Rather, the jar is the soul print of 141
the potter, and all one’s soul prints are part of an eternal chain of 
cause and effect, giving rise to a kind of immortality. To limit 
oneself to a particular thing in that chain—a human body having a 
particular form at a particular time—is somewhat arbitrary. 
Consider, too, that all things in the universe unfold in cycles, 
human history being no exception. If so, the impressions one has 
made in the ripples of time may disperse for a while, but their 
effects will not. It follows, therefore, that the complex forces that 
once converged to bring a particular human body into existence 
will do so again, in a very similar form, and when that occurs, the 
new body will give rise to an individual soul very much like one’s 
own. And thus, one will be reborn, even though one’s individual 
soul had no uninterrupted existence. 
The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad expresses this idea 
metaphorically, making reference to the roots of a tree: 
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 2.141
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As a tree of the forest, 
Just so, surely, is man. 
His hairs are leaves, 
His skin the outer bark. 
. . . 
A tree, when it is felled, grows up 
From the root, more new again; 
A mortal, when cut down by death— 
From what root does he grow up? 
. . . 
If with its roots they should pull up 
The tree, it would not come into being again. 
A mortal, when cut down by death— 
From what root does he grow up?  142
What this poetic passage tells us by way of metaphor is that, after 
being “cut down by death,” a person will arise again, like a new 
tree growing up from the roots of a felled tree. But this return of 
the body can only take place if the person has left “roots” in the 
ground, meaning that it can only take place if the person has acted 
with gainful intent. 
Many people, however, are uncomfortable with the idea that at 
the moment of death, they will disperse into relative oblivion and 
then form again at some future time, but with no specific 
recollection of their former existence. They do not want the “weak 
immortality” of a future iteration of themselves; rather, they want 
the “strong immortality” of an individual soul that survives the 
body’s death and proceeds to a new existence. In short, they want 
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.9.28.142
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continuity of self from one body to the next, just as they have 
continuity of self from one day to the next.  143
The truth is, however, that if we are talking about the 
individual soul, we don’t even have continuity of self from 
moment to moment. A thought experiment will help illustrate the 
point. Suppose a powerful god has the ability to create human 
beings from raw organic material. Further suppose that this god 
decides, prior to creating Peter and Paul, every personality trait that 
Peter and Paul will have. Then, this god creates Peter. After some 
time, this god says to Peter, “I will kill you and create Paul in your 
place.” Peter immediately objects. Despite the promise regarding 
the creation of Paul, Peter rightly feels that he is going to die. 
But suppose, instead, that this powerful god takes the list of, 
say, ten-thousand Petrine traits and the corresponding list of ten-
thousand Pauline traits, and after creating Peter, this god slowly, 
one trait per day, changes Peter’s traits into Paul’s traits. Yesterday, 
Peter liked train travel; today, he finds the he prefers driving a car. 
In this manner, Peter is incrementally transformed, trait by trait, 
over the course of some twenty-seven years into Paul, and finally, 
one fine morning during the middle of the twenty-eighth year, 
Peter says, “I think I’ll call myself Paul from now on; I like that 
name.” Peter no longer feels he has been killed and that Paul has 
been created in his place, and the reason Peter does not object is 
that the change from Peter to Paul happened slowly, and Peter was 
given a chance to identify with each new Pauline trait as it arose. 
The point here is not to deny that one has some sort of 
continuing existence; rather, the point is to show that the 
continuum of one’s existence might well be quantized, like frames 
in a movie, rather than a true continuum, and ten-thousand small 
 Of course, there is consciousness even in dreamless sleep, for one 143
knows one was asleep. What characterizes dreamless sleep is that, 
despite one’s consciousness, sensory perceptions are neither interpreted 
nor recorded into memory, and the imagination is inactive.
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deaths just don’t feel as bad as one big death. 
In fact, even matter itself is not continuous as it glides through 
space. Rather, it consists of wave functions expressing probable 
locations, and its movement through space is quantized. So, what 
then can we say about an individual soul, the existence of which is 
derivative of a complex configuration of matter? The continuity of 
one’s individual self that one seeks after the body’s death does not 
exist before the body’s death. So, if one is not scared to be alive, 
then why be scared to die? 
Consider another thought experiment, and here we will draw 
once again from ideas presented in the Star Trek television series. 
Imagine the existence of a teleportation device like the Star Trek 
“transporter.” This device can scan one’s body in an instant and 
determine the precise characteristics of every molecule (type, 
location, charge, momentum, etc.), converting one’s material 
existence into data. The scanning process destroys one’s body, but 
because one’s exact molecule-for-molecule form is recorded as 
data, the device can transfer the data to a distant location, and there 
it can somehow construct one’s perfect replica out of the dust of 
that distant location (or perhaps out of matter derived from the 
transporter’s own energy beam). Moreover, because this 
reconstructed body is a perfect molecule-for-molecule replica of 
the original scanned body, even reproducing the exact kinetic 
energy and electrical charge of each molecule, the new body is 
alive and conscious with the same memories and thoughts as the 
original, and it has all the same abilities as the original. Needless to 
say, building this device would be no mean feat, but let us assume 
such a device exists. 
If one were to submit to being teleported in this way, one’s 
regenerated self in the distant location would seem to be 
continuous with one’s former self, but there would be no actual 
continuity. In other words, the version of oneself that appeared in 
the distant location would be completely distinct from one’s former 
self, but one would subjectively feel that one was the same person. 
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And if that is so, then perhaps the continuity of an individual 
self—the “strong immortality”—that most people desire is actually 
not as important as having the feeling of such continuity. After a 
few trips in the transporter, noncontinuous existence no longer 
seems so bad. We are no longer afraid to have our body destroyed, 
reduced to mere data, and then reconstructed in a distant place, and 
we no longer worry that the reconstructed body, which has no 
physical continuity with the body we had before, constitutes a 
different person. In other words, after a few trips in the transporter, 
we no longer cling to the idea of an individual soul that must 
journey from one body to the next. Intermittent existence, it turns 
out, is not so bad after all; it just takes some getting used to. And, 
of course, the cycles of time that characterize the universe can be 
thought of as a giant transporter device that converts a person into 
information and then reconstructs the person, albeit with only a 
nonspecific recollection of his or her past. What more can we 
want? 
Many people find comfort in the models of immortality taught 
by the religions of the world. Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, and 
Christian scriptures suggest, for example, that the consciousness of 
a person reincarnates in a new mortal body in this world.  And 144
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptures add that the soul can 
acquire an immortal body.  But these scriptural discussions of the 145
afterlife are often vague about the newly embodied soul’s 
recollection of the past. In the case of reincarnation, for example, it 
is generally understood that the soul retains the wisdom it has 
 See, e.g., Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5:3–10; Bhagavad Gītā 2:11–53, 4:5; 144
Majjhima Nikaya 136; Isa 26:19; Ezek 37; Job 19:25–26, 33:22–30; 
Eccles 1:9–10; 1 Clem 24–26.
 See, e.g., Pss 23:6, 49:15–16, 73:23–28; Dan 12:1–3; 1 Cor 15:35-58; 145
2 Cor 5; Qur’an 2:82, 4:122, 41:8, 64:9, 98:7–8.
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gained from past experiences, but no specific memories.  And if 146
that model of immortality is comforting for those who are religion-
minded, then the memory of every detail of one’s past life is not 
essential to immortality. Indeed, even during the life of one’s 
present body, memories are constantly in flux. At best, memory is a 
relatively low resolution sketch of what one has actually 
experienced, and over the long term, what one primarily carries 
into the future is a narrative and a set of values. 
In summary, the cycles of time (saṃsāra) offer us a perfectly 
acceptable form of immortality. The complex forces that once 
converged to bring a particular human body into existence will do 
so again, and when that occurs, it will be one’s reborn self. And 
that future body need not be precisely like one’s present body to be 
a valid future self, for even in the course of a single lifetime, the 
body is constantly changing, and there is no particular reason to 
prefer genetic stasis over incremental genetic improvement. 
All beings, therefore, are immortal, and the desire we have for 
the continuity of an individual self merely reflects the fear of death 
that evolution has hardwired into us. That continuity does not exist 
during the lifetime of one’s present body, and it need not exist after 
one’s present body dies. A new tree grows up from the roots of a 
felled tree—that is the immortality we get, and it is enough. We 
need not insist on the “strong immortality” of a soul that travels 
from body to body, when the “weak immortality” of periodic 
bodily return will do the job just fine. 
Beings arise and subside in consciousness. Each has its natural 
arc of life, and its death is its perfection. Perpetuating that which 
has reached its natural end serves no purpose. The underlying 
consciousness is eternal. The only thing that dies is the narrative 
one is authoring about a person who lived at a particular time and 
place. But not to worry. There will be other narratives—unless, that 
is, one has gone outside time. 
 See Bhagavad Gītā 4:5.146
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2. Eternity 
There are, assuredly, two forms of Brahman: Time 
and the Timeless. That which is prior to the sun is the 
Timeless (a-kāla), without parts (a-kala). But that which 
begins with the sun is Time, which has parts[, for the sun 
metes out time]. Verily, the form of that which has parts 
[(i.e., time)] is the year [(i.e., the solar cycle)]. From the 
year, in truth, are these creatures [(i.e., physical 
organisms)] produced. Through the year, verily, after 
having been produced, do they grow. In the year they 
disappear. Therefore, the year, verily, is Prajāpati, is Time, 
is food, is the Brahman-abode, and is Ātman [(“Soul”)]. 
For thus has it been said:— 
’Tis Time that cooks created things, 
All things, indeed, in the Great Soul. 
In what, however, Time is cooked— 
Who knows that, he the Veda knows! 
—Maitri Upaniṣad 6.14–15 
In the previous section, we talked about the cycles of time. 
According to Vedānta, time exists only in relation to the periodic 
change of some observed object. In theory, the periodic change of 
any observed object could serve to calibrate time, but the sun, 
because of its unmistakable prominence, is symbolic of all the 
others. In Vedic thought, moreover, time is circular, unfolding in 
planetary cycles that constantly realign in ever-new ways. And 
Vedānta further teaches that all physical organisms are governed by 
time. Put another way, physical organisms are subject to decay and 
death. In the Upanishads, the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth is 
called saṃsāra (from the Sanskrit root saṃsṛ, meaning “to 
revolve,” “to cycle”), and Vedānta philosophy offers us the key by 
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which we can escape that temporal cycle. 
For most of us, a lifetime of 90 years seems far too short, but 
to an elderly person with a tired body, a lifetime that goes on 
forever might seem almost wearisome. In our quest for 
immortality, forever is not really what we seek; really what we 
seek is to transcend time. It is time that we need to overcome, not 
death. We need a new perspective that allows us to feel that time 
does not contain us—rather, that we contain time. Then, there is no 
“90 years,” and there is no “forever.” Then, there is only existence, 
consciousness, and bliss. But how do we “transcend time”? 
Some religious-minded people imagine that God created the 
universe at a particular point in linear time—say, 5,780 years ago
—and that it has existed ever since, revolving and spinning its way 
to what we find before us today. But if we think about it more 
deeply, we realize that the notion of Creation occurring at a 
particular point in linear time is a very silly one. It implies that 
there was an empty expanse of space and time, and God suddenly 
decided to create a universe to fill space and evolve through time. 
But if space and time preceded the creation of the universe, how 
were they measured? How, in other words, can there be space and 
time without some change in the relative position of two things? 
Therefore, God must have created space and time when God 
created the universe. But if that is so, then we have no basis for 
saying that Creation occurred at a particular point in linear time, 
because time itself is one of the created things. Creation, therefore, 
must occur outside time, in which case it occurs continuously, 
yesterday, today, and tomorrow. 
We read in the book of Psalms: “This is the day that YHVH 
made; let us be glad and rejoice in it.” (Ps 118:24.) According to 
this psalm, God (YHVH) did not just create a universe way back in 
the hoary past and leave it to unfold. Rather, God created this day, 
even this moment, whatever it might contain. Spinoza makes the 
same point. He asserts: “God is not only the cause of things’ 
beginning to exist, but also [the cause] of their persevering in 
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existing, or (to use a Scholastic term) God is the cause of the being 
of things.” (Ethics, IP24, Cor.) In other words, things have no 
being, no persevering in existence, without the universal 
consciousness as their support in every moment. Creation, 
therefore, is an eternal event (i.e., outside time), and as Spinoza 
explained, “in eternity, there is neither when, nor before, nor 
after” (Ethics, IP33, Schol. 2), because “eternity can neither be 
defined by time nor have any relation to time” (id., VP23, Schol.). 
In eternity, there is no arising and subsiding; there is only God’s 
thought and all that it implies, indestructible, untouched by time. 
Spinoza explains: 
We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar 
as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time 
and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained 
in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine 
nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as 
true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and 
their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. 
(Ethics, VP29, Schol.) 
What Spinoza is saying in this passage is that there is an 
essence in each thing that exists as an eternal idea in God’s mind, 
and everything that a thing will ever be in the dimensions of space 
and time is implied by that essence. Thus, from the point of view 
of God, all the events that will ever transpire in the unfolding of 
time exist in an eternal now. Just as the fixed landscape appears to 
a dizzy person to be moving, so that eternal now appears to a 
person immersed in the dimension of time to be time-flow. But the 
spreading out of space and time is a mere appearance, merely a 
way of organizing the data. 
In the Spanda-Nirṇaya, Kṣemarāja’s uses the term spanda to 
explain the principle that all of time exists in an eternal now that 
never changes and that can never cease to be. The Sanskrit word 
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spanda means a “slight movement,” but in the context of the 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, it means an “oscillation,” a “vibration,” or a 
“pulse,” and the Spanda-Nirṇaya explains that this “pulse,” despite 
appearing to be a succession of different aspects (i.e., phase 
progression), is actually unchanging and eternal. Kṣemarāja says: 
In reality, . . . nothing arises and nothing subsides. . . . [I]t 
is only the divine spandaśakti (the divine creative 
pulsation) which, though free of succession, appears in 
different aspects as if flashing in view and as if 
subsiding.  147
If one considers the question carefully, one realizes that 
periodicity is merely a way of describing what a circle looks like in 
the dimension of time, and outside time, that same periodicity, that 
same circle, is an eternal idea that is not subject to any change at 
all. And because God has the eternal idea of an infinitude of such 
circles, each slightly different in size, there is no phase 
synchronicity among the countless periodic things that populate the 
universe. And from that absence of phase synchronicity, there 
arises the illusion of linear history. 
There is, therefore, no point in speaking of a particular 
moment in linear history when God created the universe. Instead, 
we would do better to refer to essence and its actualization in 
space-time. Essence is nothing other than the eternal ideas from 
which everything in the universe is logically derivable. And the 
actualization of essence is the unfolding in dimensions of space 
and time of all that is implied by those eternal ideas. 
Essence never came into existence, and it cannot cease to 
exist. Only its actualizations in space-time can come into existence 
and cease to exist. In the dimensions of space and time, new 
iterations of one’s body can appear and disappear, but none of 
 Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 1.147
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those bodies could ever appear or disappear in the dimensions of 
space and time if they did not exist as an eternal essence outside 
space and time, unaffected by the changes space and time imply. 
Spinoza explains the point this way: 
[I]n God there is necessarily an idea that expresses the 
essence of this or that human body, under a species of 
eternity. (Ethics, VP22.) 
Therefore, though we do not recollect that we existed 
before the body, we nevertheless feel that our mind, 
insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a 
species of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence it has 
cannot be defined by time or explained through duration. 
(Ethics, VP23, Schol.) 
And there is no greater satisfaction than the experience of 
one’s own existence as an eternal idea in the mind of God, and that 
occurs every time one leaves a “soul print” on the flow of time. 
Insofar as one’s actions come from within, emerging as an 
expression of one’s essential nature rather than being caused by 
external circumstances, one feels one’s existence as a thought that 
God cannot un-think. 
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Conclusion 
There is no mind-body problem. Rather, the only thing we can 
ever be conscious of is our own self. What we call “matter” is 
merely the relatively dull and often lifeless way things appear to be 
when our knowledge of them is mediated through the senses and 
inferred from their effects. What we call “consciousness” is the 
true form of things, experienced directly, as they are in themselves. 
And that consciousness is indivisible, because it is antecedent to 
anything that could divide it; it is indestructible, because it is 
antecedent even to time. 
I, the writer of this book, and you, its reader, are one. The only 
thing that separates us is the indexicality we impose on the 
universe because of the imperfections in our sensorial perception 
of it. Our true form, which we can experience when we withdraw 
from the senses, is the entire universe without the “You are here” 
arrow at its center. 
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Appendix One: Some Citations to South Asian 
Sources 
1. Material World Is Merely Name and Form 
The Upanishads assert that everything in the material world is 
Brahman and that any apparent differentiation is merely name and 
form. Here is a sampling of texts: 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7 [“Verily, at that time the world 
was undifferentiated. It became differentiated just by name and 
form, as the saying is: ‘He has such a name, such a form.’ ”]; 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.6.3 [“Name and form are the real. 
By them this Life is veiled.”]; 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.1.2 [“Verily, by speech . . . a 
friend is recognized. By speech alone . . . the Rig-Veda, the Yajur-
Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the [Hymns] of the Atharvans and 
Aṅgirases, Legends (itihāsa), Ancient Lore (purāṇa), Sciences 
(vidyā), Mystic Doctrines (upaniṣad), Verses (śloka), Aphorisms 
(sūtra), Explanations (anuvyākhyāna), Commentaries (vyākhyāna), 
what is offered in sacrifice and as oblation, food and drink, this 
world and the other, and all beings are known. The highest 
Brahman . . . is in truth speech.”]; 
Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.1.4 [“Just as, my dear, by one piece of 
clay everything made of clay may be known—the modification is 
merely a verbal distinction, a name; the reality is just ‘clay’ —”]; 
Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.3.2–3 [“That divinity [i.e., Being] 
bethought itself: ‘Come! Let me enter these three divinities [i.e., 
heat, water, and food] with this living Soul (ātman), and separate 
out name and form.”]; 
Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.2.1–2 [“Speech (vāc), assuredly, is 
more than Name. Speech, verily, makes known the Rig-Veda, the 
Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the Atharva-Veda as the fourth, 
Legend and Ancient Lore as the fifth, the Veda of the Vedas [i.e., 
Grammar], Rites for the Manes, Mathematics, Augury, 
Chronology, Logic, Polity, the Science of the Gods, the Science of 
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Sacred Knowledge, Demonology, Military Science, Astrology, the 
Science of Snake-charming, and the Fine Arts, as well as heaven 
and earth, wind and space, water and heat, gods and men, beasts 
and birds, grass and trees, animals together with worms, flies, and 
ants, right and wrong, true and false, good and bad, pleasant and 
unpleasant. Verily, if there were no speech, neither right nor wrong 
would be known, neither true nor false, neither good nor bad, 
neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Speech, indeed, makes all this 
known. Reverence Speech. [¶] He who reverences Speech as 
Brahman—as far as Speech goes, so far he has unlimited freedom, 
he who reverences Speech as Brahman.”]; 
Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.14.1 [“Verily, what is called space 
(ākāśa) is the accomplisher of name and form. That within which 
they are, is Brahman. That is the immortal. That is the Self (Ātman, 
Soul).”]; 
Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.2.8 [“As the flowing rivers in the ocean/ 
Disappear, quitting name and form,/ So the knower, being liberated 
from name and form,/ Goes unto the heavenly Person, higher than 
the high.”]; 
Praśna Upaniṣad 6.5 [“As these flowing rivers that tend 
toward the ocean, on reaching the ocean, disappear, their name and 
form (nāma-rūpa) are destroyed, and it is called simply ‘the 
ocean’—even so, of this spectator, these sixteen parts [constituting 
the human person] that tend toward the [Cosmic] Person, on 
reaching the [Cosmic] Person, disappear, their name and form are 
destroyed, and it is called simply ‘the Person.’ That one continues 
without parts, immortal!”]. 
Śaṅkara, who adheres closely to the Upanishads, makes the 
same assertion in his own writings: 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 1, 14, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, p. 228 [“[I]f there is known a lump of clay which really 
and truly is nothing but clay, there are known thereby likewise all 
things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of 
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which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these 
modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate 
from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a 
modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects 
distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far as they are clay 
they are true. —This [analogy, taken from the Chāndogya 
Upaniṣad 6.1.4,] is given with reference to Brahman; applying the 
phrase ‘having its origin in speech’ to the case illustrated . . . we 
understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart 
from Brahman.”]; 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 1, 22, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, p. 240 [“For that this entire apparent world, in which 
good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to 
the non-discrimination of (the Self’s) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, 
and so on, which spring from name and form, the presentations of 
Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained 
more than once.”]; 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 1, 27, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, pp. 241–242 [“By that element of plurality which is the 
fiction of Nescience, which is characterized by name and form, . . . 
Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world . . . .”]; 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 1, 33, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, p. 243 [“And, finally, we must remember that the 
scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; 
it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterized by name 
and form, the figments of Nescience . . . .”]; 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II, 3, 46, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, p. 247 [“The pain of the individual soul also is not real, 
but imaginary only, caused by the error consisting in the non-
discrimination of (the Self from) the body, senses, and other 
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limiting adjuncts which are due to name and form, the effects of 
Nescience.”]; 
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya IV, 3, 7, translated in 
Mādhavānanda, The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, reprinted in 
Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, pp. 261–262 [“It is for 
this reason that the whole world, to its utter delusion, superimposes 
all activities peculiar to name and form on the self, and all 
attributes of this self-effulgent light [(i.e., the self)] on name and 
form, and also superimposes name and form on the light of the 
self, and thinks, ‘This is the self, or is not the self; it has such and 
such attributes, or has not such and such attributes; it is the agent, 
or is not the agent; it is pure, or impure; it is bound, or free; it is 
fixed, or gone, or come; it exists, or does not exist,’ and so on.”]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 228, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 70 [“A jar 
made of clay is not other than clay. It is clay essentially. The form 
of the jar has no independent existence. What, then, is the jar? 
Merely an invented name!”]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 251–254, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, pp. 74–75 
[same, again using clay analogy]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 386, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 97 [“All 
things—from Brahma the creator down to a single blade of grass— 
are the apparently diverse names and forms of the one Ātman. 
They are simply appearances, and not real. Therefore meditate 
upon the Ātman as one and infinite.”]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 391, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 98 
[same]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 398–407, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, pp. 99–101 
[same]. 
A similar idea—that the world is created out of letters (the 
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building blocks of words)—is developed in the texts of nondual 
Kashmiri Shaivism: 
Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 4 [“Of this threefold 
limited knowledge, that which makes oneself consider himself as 
incomplete and imperfect is the anava mala; that which brings a 
sense of difference in every thing is mayiya mala; that which 
makes one perform good or bad deeds is karma mala. Of this 
threefold limited knowledge, matrka, or alphabet from a to ksa, the 
mother of the entire universe, is the presiding deity.”]; 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, coms. to Spandakārikā, section 3, verses 13, 
14, and 15 [same]. 
2. Consciousness-Matter Dualism 
Despite his great renown as a nondualist, Śaṅkara often 
emphasizes a stark consciousness-matter dualism. Here is a 
sampling of texts: 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Intro., translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, at p. 196 [“It is a matter not requiring any proof that the 
object and the subject . . . which are opposed to each other as much 
as darkness and light are, cannot be identified.”]; 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II, 3, 48, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, at p. 248 [“[F]undamentally all [behavioral] obligation is 
an erroneous imagination existing in the case of him only who 
does not see that his Self is no more connected with a body than 
the ether is with jars and the like.”]; 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya III, 3, 54, translated in Thibaut, The 
Vedānta-Sūtras, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, p. 255 [“[I]n the same way as we admit the existence of 
that perceptive consciousness which has the material elements and 
their products for its objects, we also must admit the separateness 
of that consciousness from the [material] elements. And as 
consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the Self must 
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be distinct from the body.”]; 
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya IV, 3, 7, translated in 
Mādhavānanda, The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, reprinted in 
Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential Vedānta, p. 263 [“All these 
assumptions [of Buddhism] are contradictory to this Vedic path of 
wellbeing that we are discussing, since they deny the light of the 
self as distinct from the body and illumining the consciousness of 
the intellect.”]; 
Bhagavadgītābhāṣya XIII, 2, translated in Mahādeva Śāstri, 
The Bhagavad-Gītā, reprinted in Deutsch and Dalvi, The Essential 
Vedānta, p. 278 [“It is a well-ascertained truth that that notion of 
identity of the individual Self with the not-Self,—with the physical 
body and the like—which is common to all mortal creatures is 
caused by avidyā [(‘ignorance’)] . . . . Similarly consciousness 
never actually pertains to the body; neither can it be that any 
attributes of the body—such as pleasure, pain and dullness—
actually pertain to Consciousness, to the Self; for, like decay and 
death, such attributes are ascribed to the Self through avidyā.”]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 154–164, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, pp. 57–59 
[denying any connection between Ātman (consciousness) and the 
body]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 194–226, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, pp. 65–69 
[same]; 
Vivekacūḍāmaṇi 384, translated in Prabhavananda and 
Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination, p. 97 
[same].  148
 The same consciousness-matter dualism appears in Śaṅkara’s sub-148
commentary to Vyāsa’s commentary to the Yoga Sūtras, although it is 
disputed whether Śaṅkara is the actual author of the sub-commentary. 
See Yogasūtrabhāsyavivaraṇa IV.14–23.
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3. The Material World is Consciousness 
A central principle of nondual Kashmiri Shaivism is that all 
things are forms of consciousness. Here is a sampling of texts: 
Kṣemarāja’s intro. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1 [“consciousness of 
Śiva alone is . . . the self of the entire manifestation”]; 
Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1 [“In this world, 
nothing exists which is outside the range of consciousness 
(acetitasya). . . . [¶] . . . [B]eing deprived of the light of 
consciousness, they cannot appear at all and thus are unreal; if they 
appear, then they are consciousness itself (for it is only 
consciousness that can appear).”]; 
Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 15 [“every observable phenomenon and 
even the void appear as a form of consciousness”]; 
Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 16 [“the entire universe 
[is] the nature of consciousness” (quoting Vijñānabhairava Tantra 
63)]; 
Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 22 [“This experience 
[of the universe] gleams forth as a form of one’s own Self.”]; 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 1 
[“Even while she displays external perception . . . or internal 
perception . . . , she suppresses the (real) nature of her identity with 
the perceiver . . . .”]; 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 2 
[“In this world, whatever—e.g., prāṇa (life-force), puryaṣṭaka (the 
subtle body), pleasure, the blue color, etc.—that may possibly be 
conceived to have the capacity of veiling the Light of 
Consciousness is nothing if it does not come into light (na 
prakāśate), and if it does come into light (prakāśamānaṃ tu), then 
it is only the nature of Śaṃkara whose very form is Light (of 
Consciousness). . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . How can there be an obstruction 
of His by [anything in the] world? Because by His obstruction that 
which is considered the obstructor itself can by no means 
appear.”]; 
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Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 5 [“It 
can be said that here whatever inner object there is (like pain, 
pleasure, etc.) or whatever external object there is (like blue or 
yellow [(i.e., sensory perceptions)]) [or] whatever subject there is 
(like the [subtle body], body, and senses) [all these] have evidently 
no existence . . . as long as they are not experienced. When they 
are experienced, then being experienced, they are of the nature of 
consciousness. They are simply consciousness, this is what it 
comes to.”]; 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā section 1, verses 14–
16 [“All that which He [(i.e. the universal consciousness)] 
manifests is perishable as regards its external form. Its 
perishableness is, however, nothing else than its submergence of 
[objective existence] and abiding as the I. Therefore, it is only the 
objective aspect of the subject, such as the body, etc., which is 
manifested and withdrawn by the Lord, not the subjective aspect, 
which is identical with the light of the Supreme “I” . . . .”]; 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 1 [“It is only when chiti, 
the ultimate consciousness-power, comes into play that the 
universe comes forth into being . . . .”]; 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 15 [“one . . . makes the 
universe appear as identical with one’s Self”]; 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 16 [“the entire universe 
is experienced as identical with the Self”]; 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 17 [“The exalted Saṃvit 
(universal consciousness) itself . . . is present as the innermost 
(reality) of all”]; 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 20 [“So that then 
whatever appears—for example, the body [(i.e., organs of 
perception)], pleasure [(i.e., internal states)], blue [(i.e., external 
perceptions of color, size, form, tone, taste, odor)], etc.—or 
whatever is known for certain [using innate intelligence], or 
remembered, or thought out, in all these cases it is the play of chiti-
śakti [(‘consciousness-power’)] which flashes forth as the 
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background (of all experience).”]; 
Mahārtha Mañjari, quoted in Singh, Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, p. 
33 [“[It] is Śiva Himself, of unimpeded Will and pellucid 
consciousness, who is ever sparkling in my heart. . . . The entire 
wor ld g leams as the wondrous de l igh t o f pure I -
consciousness.” (quoting Abhinavagupta)]; 
Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 5 [“Any object 
different from him [(i.e., Śiva, or the universal nondual 
consciousness)], even if the existence of such an object might be 
hypothesized, would not be perceivable or knowable because it 
would not be manifest [to consciousness]. Again, whatever is 
manifest appears because of its identity with his illumination 
nature.”]; 
Yogarāja’s com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 10–11 [“[A]n 
object that is differentiated from illumination and therefore not-
manifest [to consciousness] cannot be known as different from 
illumination, since it is both unmanifest and unknowable. 
Therefore, it must be admitted that such an object is non-existent 
(avastu).”]; 
Paramārthasāra, verse 44 [“[A]nything untouched by 
illumination . . . is like a flower-in-the-sky; it does not exist.”]. 
4. Consciousness Is One and Undivided 
Nondual Kashmiri Shaivism further concludes that space and 
time cannot divide consciousness or differentiate souls from one 
another, because space and time are subordinate to consciousness. 
Here is a sampling of texts: 
Kṣemarāja’s com. to Śiva Sūtras, sūtra 1 [“Difference in the 
case of cit or consciousness cannot be established either by means 
of space or time or form, for if these . . . are different from cit or 
consciousness, then being deprived of the light of consciousness, 
they cannot appear at all and thus are unreal; if they appear, then 
they are consciousness itself (for it is only consciousness that can 
appear). Thus it is not possible to attribute difference to 
188
The Nondual Mind 
_______ 
consciousness (i.e., Self) on the basis of difference in space, time, 
and form.”]; 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verse 2 
[“Therefore, nothing whether space, time, or form can be said with 
propriety to obstruct Him whose work is this whole world, by 
whose Light [(i.e., consciousness)] it is manifested . . . .”]; 
Spanda-Nirṇaya, com. to Spandakārikā, section 1, verses 12–
13 and 14–16 [same]; 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 1 [“[N]ot being able to 
appear owing to their supposed difference from consciousness-
power, they are (as good as) non-existent. . . . Therefore, space, 
time, and form which have been brought into being and are 
vitalized by it [(consciousness)] are not capable of [disturbing] its 
real nature . . . .”]; 
Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, com. to sūtra 7 [“[T]he light (of 
consciousness) cannot be divided by space and time, and the 
merely inert can not be a subject.”]; 
Yogarāja com. to Paramārthasāra, verse 6 [“[T]here is no 
time or space different from him [(i.e., universal consciousness)], 
that could destroy or affect his unity . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If space 
and time existed apart and independent of him [(i.e., universal 
consciousness)], then there would be a possibility of the 
superimposition of the opposite quality of multiplicity. But since 
their very existence depends on pure consciousness revealing 
them, it must be admitted that the supreme Lord is one, the 
embodiment of pure consciousness, despite his manifesting as 
many [out of his own free will].”; underlined textual additions by 
the present author]; 
Yogarāja com. to Paramārthasāra, verses 10–11 [“Time in the 
form of the past, the present, and the future does not affect it. This 
is because time is admitted to be manifested within it, while it 
itself is beyond birth and death.”]. 
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Appendix Two: Freedom of Choice in Hebrew 
Scripture 
And YHVH–God planted a garden in Eden, from the East, 
and he placed there the Adam that he [had] formed. And 
YHVH–God sprouted out from the soil every tree nice for 
appearance and good for eating, and the Tree of Life in 
the midst of the garden, and the Tree of Knowledge of 
Good and Evil. . . . And YHVH–God commanded 
concerning the Adam, saying: “From every tree of the 
garden you will surely eat, but from the Tree of 
Knowledge of Good and Evil you will not eat from it, for 
in the day you eat from it, you will surely be mortal.” . . . 
And YHVH–God built the rib that he took out of the Adam 
into a woman and brought her to the Adam. . . . And the 
two of them were naked—the Adam and his woman—and 
they were not ashamed. And the Serpent was more naked 
than all the living beings of the field that YHVH–God had 
made. And he said to the woman: “Hmm? For God said, 
‘You will not eat from every tree of the garden.’ ” And the 
woman said to the Serpent, “From the tree-fruit of the 
garden we will eat, but from the fruit of the tree that is in 
the midst of the garden, God said ‘You will not eat from 
it, and you will not touch it, lest you be mortal.’ ” And the 
Serpent said to the woman, “You will surely not be 
mortal! For God knows that in the day you eat from it, . . . 
your eyes will open, and you will be like gods, knowers 
of good and evil.” And the woman saw that the tree was 
good to eat, and it was beneficial for the eyes, and the tree 
was desirable for the intellect, and she took from its fruit, 
and she ate, and she gave also to her man with her, and he 
also ate, and the eyes of the two of them were opened, and 
they knew that they were naked, and they stitched leaves 
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of fig, and they fashioned for them[selves] wraps. And 
they heard the sound of YHVH–God walking in the garden, 
for the spirit of the day, and the Adam and his woman hid 
from the face of YHVH–God in the midst of the tree[s] of 
the garden. And YHVH–God summoned the Adam, and he 
said to him, “Where are you?” And he said, “Your sound I 
heard in the garden, and I feared, for I am naked, and I 
hid.” And he said, “Who told to you that you were naked? 
You ate from the tree that you were commanded ‘Do not 
eat from it.’ ” . . . And YHVH–God said, “Behold, the 
Adam [is] like one from us, to know good and evil. And 
now, lest he send forth his hand and take also from the 
Tree of Life and eat and live forever.” And YHVH–God 
sent him from the garden of Eden. 
—Gen 2:8-3:23 
The story of Adam and Eve’s rebellion against the 
commandment of “YHVH–God” is usually understood as scriptural 
proof that humans have freedom of choice. It is pointed out that 
God (YHVH) could have created Adam and Eve as programmed 
automatons, incapable of disobeying God’s instructions. But, 
instead, God created human beings with freedom, and the proof is 
that Adam and Eve used their freedom to disobey God’s 
commandment. A comparison is then sometimes drawn to the 
healthy psychological development of a youth to adulthood: To 
establish an individual identity, the youth must disobey his or her 
parents, after which a reconciliation is hopefully made, and the 
child, now an adult, engages his or her parents as a peer, although 
with due respect. The moral, therefore, of the Adam and Eve story 
is that human freedom is a good that outweighs the evil of Adam 
and Eve’s rebellion. 
But is that really the moral? I don’t think so, for where did the 
story say that, although God was the creator of all things, Adam 
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and Eve were the creators of their own thoughts? And where did 
the story say that God’s creation was not governed by deterministic 
laws? And where did the story say that God was not the ultimate 
source of Adam and Eve’s disobedience? Where, in short, did the 
story say that Adam and Eve had agency? 
The first thing to notice about the story of Adam and Eve in 
the Garden is that as soon as Adam and Eve disobey God’s 
commandment, thus exercising what seems to be freedom of 
choice, they develop knowledge of “good and evil.” Thus, freedom 
of choice and moral dualism are presented as two sides of the same 
coin. 
But if Adam and Even were able to rebel against God, they 
could do so only because God, who created them, gave them that 
disposition. Their agency, therefore, was only an illusion. Hence, 
what the story really teaches us is that our false sense of agency 
goes hand in hand with our habit of faultfinding about the world 
around us. By rebelling against God, Adam and Eve began to 
imagine that they had agency, that they were the masters of their 
own destiny, and as soon as they imagined themselves to be 
independent in that way, free to make their own way in the world, 
they began dividing up God’s creation into “good” and “evil.” 
By this reckoning, faultfinding can be seen as the underlying 
sin that Adam and Eve committed. Adam and Even partook from 
the “tree”—the mental habit—of knowing good and evil, and that 
mental habit made them feel alienated from God. In short, the 
illusion of agency is inextricably linked, in the Bible’s account, 
with the illusion of evil. In truth, there is no freedom of choice, and 
there is no evil, but as soon as we imagine that we have agency, we 
also imagine evil. And the converse, too, is true. As soon as we 
imagine evil, we also imagine we have the freedom to choose good 
over evil, and then—like Paul in his letter to the Romans—we 
cannot understand why it is that we sometimes fail to resist those 
things that we have labeled as evil. 
But if the foregoing explication of Adam and Eve’s story is 
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correct, and if the error of dualism is their only sin, then why does 
God (YHVH) say in response to Adam and Eve’s eating from the 
Tree of Knowledge: “Behold, the Adam [is] like one from us, to 
know good and evil”? Doesn’t that statement imply that all the 
members of the entire divine council, including even YHVH, are 
knowers of good and evil (i.e., dualists), just like Adam and Eve? 
The confusion arises because we tend to impose the idiom of the 
English language onto the Hebrew text. When the Hebrew text 
tells us that Adam, by knowing evil, has become “like one from 
us,” it quite literally means that there is one member of the divine 
council that is a knower of good and evil (i.e., a dualist). And 
which one is it? Presumably, the Serpent, because he is the one 
who claims that knowing good and evil will make Adam and Eve 
“like gods.” (Gen 3:5.) In short, Adam and Eve ate from the tree of 
dualistic thinking, and they became dualists, like the Serpent, who 
is Satan, God’s alter-ego according to dualistic theology. 
Thus, a close reading of Hebrew scripture suggests that Adam 
and Eve never really had freedom of choice. They only imagined 
they had it, and then they imagined that they had used their 
freedom to rebel against God’s command, and having so imagined, 
they began to justify themselves by faultfinding, by persuading 
themselves, in other words, that God gets it wrong sometimes. 
They then took upon themselves the task of choosing between 
things they deemed to be good in God’s perfect creation and things 
they deemed to be evil. 
And if person proudly claims to have freedom of choice, then 
acts of great self-control are the proof of that claim, and irresistible 
bodily urges are feared and hated, because they undermine one’s 
imagined sense of agency. Therefore, when Adam and Eve took 
upon themselves the task of choosing things they deemed to be 
evil, the first thing they chose was the natural bodily urges that 
God had given them. And since nakedness reveals a person’s 
natural bodily urges for all the world to see, Adam and Eve made 
wraps and covered themselves. 
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Then, from that small start, Adam and Eve imagined many 
other things to be evil, and whenever they found themselves unable 
to resist such things, they justified their actions with contrived 
excuses, or they covered their actions with the “fig leaves” of 
locked doors and deleted computer files, or they bemoaned their 
sinfulness, as Paul did in his letter to the Romans. And although 
Adam and Eve could not—even after the most careful examination
—pinpoint when or how they chose to have the thoughts that led to 
their rebellion against God, they never doubted their freedom to 
choose, for doing so would have stripped them of the false sense of 
agency they had gained when they first bought into the lie of 
Cartesian dualism. God therefore asked Adam, “Where are you?” 
God knew that Adam, by imagining he had agency, had become 
indexical. He had become a map with a “You are here” arrow at its 
center. He had developed a false sense of location within the 
Garden. 
For Adam and Eve, it was their arrogation of agency that 
constituted their true rebellion. And it was that same arrogation of 
agency that caused them to superimpose an invented good-evil 
dualism upon the perfect world that God had made. Among all the 
days of creation, the only day that God does not call “good” is the 
second day, the day when God created a “divider” (Hebrew: 
mavdil), for dualism is the great lie. Adam and Eve claimed to have 
freedom of choice, and then they elevated the relative good of 
dualism over the absolute good of loving all that is, and so it 
was . . . 
. . . until they awoke from that dualist dream and realized that 
they had never rebelled against God even for a moment. In fact, 
they had no power to do so, and the personal agency that they 
imagined themselves to have was only a proud lie that had 
separated them from God. 
It was God who created the thought that led Adam and Eve to 
follow the Serpent’s advice. It was God who created that thought 
just as surely as God breathed the “breath of life” into Adam’s 
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brow (Gen 2:7) and just as surely as God created pharaoh’s 
thoughts when pharaoh decided to harass the Israelites (Exod 7:3, 
9:12, 10:1, 10:20, 10:27, 11:9-10). The only “sin” was Adam and 
Eve’s belief that they had the freedom to sin. And when they 
relinquished that belief and accepted that everything is God’s 
show, they stopped their constant faultfinding—they stopped being 
knowers of good and evil. 
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